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Preface
This dissertation focuses on the concept of trust. It comprises ﬁve chapters: Chapter 1
(introduction) deﬁnes the concept of trust, gives a historical overview of trust measure-
ment and outlines the debates that triggered the research in Chapter 2, 3 and 4. Chapter
1 partially reproduces a longer study that underwent peer-review for the working paper
series of the IPSA Committee on Concepts and Methods (see Bauer 2014a).
Chapter 2, 3 and 4 have been published in the Public Opinion Quarterly, the Swiss Po-
litical Science Review and the European Sociological Review. Altogether, I have to thank
13 anonymous reviewers for their feedback. The three studies are independent as they
each focus on a diﬀerent research question and a diﬀerent debate within trust research.
At the same time, they are all concerned with the concept of trust and in Chapter 1 I
outline in how far the respective debates overlap. Chapter 5 represents the conclusion
that sums up the insights of this dissertation and makes propositions as to the future of
trust research.
The present dissertation does not comprise all of the projects on which I worked during
the last years. Together with Simon Munzert I published the study Political Depolar-
ization in German Public Opinion, 1980-2010  which won the 2014 prize of the German
General Survey. Together with Markus Freitag I co-authored the book chapter ``Was
uns zusammenhält : Zwischenmenschliches Vertrauen als soziales Kapital der Schweiz 
in 2014. Moreover, three studies on which I worked, which are not part of this disser-
tation, are currently under review: The book chapter Political Trust in Switzerland:
Again a special case?  co-authored with Markus Freitag and Pascal Sciarini, the article
Personality and the Foundations of Social Trust co-authored with Markus Freitag and
the article Vague Concepts in Survey Questions: A General Problem Illustrated with
the Left-Right Scale co-authored together with Kathrin Ackermann, Pablo Barberá and
Aaron Venetz. On diﬀerent occasions I refer to these works throughout this dissertation.
This document has been typeset using LATEX. The statistical analyses were conducted
using R, STATA and MPLUS. Do-ﬁles and data are available for replication.
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1 Introduction
Conﬁdence, evidently, is one of the most important synthetic forces
within society (Simmel 1908, 346)
Without the general trust that people have in each other,
society itself would disintegrate (Simmel 1900, 149)
1.1 Trust, a relevant but challenging concept
Already in the beginning of the 20th century, the sociologist Georg Simmel (1908, 1900)1
observed that trust is a fundamental ingredient of social relationships. In everyday con-
versations we use the concept to discuss whether other persons can be relied on to behave
in ways we expect them to. For instance, we could ask ourselves if a mechanic can be
trusted to repair our car, we might discuss whether a certain friend can be trusted to
keep a secret to himself or whether a certain teacher can be trusted to prepare us well
for an exam. Trust is linked to behavior and has an impact on various decisions we take
throughout our lives. Only if we possess a certain level of trust, will we lend our car
to our neighbor, share secrets with friends or invest our money in certain stocks. For a
social scientist it is rewarding to work on a concept that almost everyone can relate to.
Non-scientists normally show a particular interest in this ﬁeld. In discussions everyone
will come up with a personal experience that is related to trust, which conﬁrms that the
idea of trust accompanies individuals throughout their lives.
It is trust as a fundamental prerequisite for cooperation that is most interesting from a
societal point of view. Groups of individuals  and essentially a society is a group of
individuals  can economize vast resources if its members cooperate and exchange goods.
For instance, two neighbors may save costs when they decide to share a set of tools.2
1 Above quotes were taken from translations of Simmel's work (cf. Simmel 2004, 177f, Simmel
1950, 318). In the English translations the German word Vertrauen is sometimes translated with
conﬁdence and sometimes with trust depending on the context (Simmel 1950, 345).
2 Essentially, this is the idea of sharing economy and the idea behind initiatives such as Pumpipumpe
that aims at facilitating exchange between neighbors (Hofer 2014).
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Scaling this idea up to the societal level, one can argue that a society beneﬁts because
cooperation frees time and resources that can be used elsewhere. However, only when I
trust my neighbor to handle our set of tools with care, will I agree to the sharing agree-
ment and, therefore, cooperate with him. In some situations we trust others because we
assume that they have internalized certain norms that make them trustworthy. Following
Hardin (2002, 29) such reasons might be called a trustee's internal motivations.
However, in nowadays societies we have designed all sorts of institutions to incentivize
people to behave trustworthily (e.g. Freitag and Traunmüller 2009; Herreros 2004).
These institutions allow us to trust others even if we do not believe in a person's in-
ner motivation, namely because these institutions serve as an external motivation to
behave trustworthily (e.g. Hardin 2002, 40). Buyer-seller relationships represent an clas-
sic example. In many cases trustworthiness in these relationships  and our trust as a
consequence  will be assured through a functioning, eﬃcient and eﬀective law enforce-
ment system. In other words, we will have a certain level of trust that is necessary to
buy a product because we assume that the vendor is aware of possible sanctions if he
acts untrustworthily.3
However, we have to be careful in portraying trust as normatively desirable. It is not
desirable that individuals naively trust their peers and get repeatedly cheated by them as
a consequence. It is also not desirable that citizens naively trust their political leaders,
while these enrich themselves personally rather than working in the public's interest.
Hence, from a normative point of view, it is not trust but rather trustworthiness which is
the desirable attribute of individuals living in a society.4 In other words, it is good for a
society if its members intend to honor their commitments and avoid harming others  to
cite a popular deﬁnition of trust that implicitly also deﬁnes trustworthiness/trustworthy
behavior (Glanville and Paxton 2007, 231, Barber 1983, Yamagishi and Yamagishi 1994).
High levels of trust will only generate desirable outcomes in societies in which levels of
trustworthiness are also high. In societies in which members commonly cheat others and
take advantage of them, low trust seems desirable in that it might lead to attempts to
exclude the untrustworthy and to install and maintain institutions that ensure higher
3 In Section 1.2.1 I comment on the important insight that sanctions and contractual law DO NOT
function as a replacement of trust (see e.g. Seligman 1997 for this position). In my view we should
not confound trust as, e.g. the expectation that a vendor sells me a functioning product, with trust
as the expectation that a seller sells me a functioning product out of personal goodwill. In other
words, lines of thought on which my trust judgment may be founded do not belong to the concept
itself. I might trust another person to behave in a certain way for various reasons that might include
both the trustee's internal and external motivations to use Hardin's (2002) terms.
4 Hardin (2002, chap. 2) illustrates that many trust arguments concern trustworthiness rather than
trust.
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levels of trustworthiness in the long run.5
In many contexts individuals entertain trusting relationships, i.e. they trust and behave
trustworthily within subgroups such as their family, their ethnic community or their so-
cial class. Here, trustworthiness and trust are limited to a certain circle of people. For
instance, familism, i.e. trusting and identifying yourself only with your family is seen
as one of the cultural obstacles to development.6 In such societies [w]hat is outside the
family is at best inconsequential, at worst an enemy (Harrison 2000, xxvii). Members
of a society that is characterized by strong familism will take advantage of others, i.e.
act untrustworthily towards third persons in order to help their family members if nec-
essary. As a consequence, cooperation and exchange will principally occur within family
networks that is subgroups of society.
Ideally, a modern society is not divided into subgroups. In the ideal society individuals
would act trustworthily towards others regardless of group aﬃliations. As a consequence,
individuals would be able to trust others independently from their background and bar-
riers preventing cooperation would be low, not only within subgroups as is typically the
case, but also among strangers.
Empirical data suggest that the Scandinavian countries come closest to this ideal (e.g.
Delhey and Newton 2005). These countries are ranked at the top when relying on self-
report measures of trust but also when it comes to potential indicators of trustworthiness
such as crime or corruption statistics. It is here that trusting seems to be a good strategy
because high trust levels and resulting trusting behavior is answered by cooperation at
least most of the time.
Given above elaborations it is not surprising that trust is a popular concept in the social
sciences. Many inﬂuential and widely cited books in the social sciences focus on the
concept itself (e.g. Barber 1983; Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984; Gambetta 1988; Hardin
2002; Luhmann 1979; Misztal 1996; Nooteboom 2002; Rawls 1971; Seligman 1997; Sz-
tompka 1999; Uslaner 2002). Similarly, studies that focus on other concepts such as
administrations, civil society, social capital or justice repeatedly mention the concept of
trust because it is such an essential ingredient to social science arguments (see e.g. Blau
1964; De Tocqueville 2002; Giddens 1991; Putnam 1993; Schelling 1980; Weber 2005, just
to name a few selected titles). Nowadays, the ﬁeld of trust research is vast and spans
5 Building institutions that incentivize others to behave trustworthily requires cooperation. In some
groups trust might be too low to initiate such a process. A minimum level of trust is necessary to
start a cooperative relationship in the ﬁrst place. Trust, in turn, is strongly contingent on trust-
worthiness. As a consequence groups (e.g. societies) characterized by low trust and trustworthiness
are sitting in a trap that is hard to escape (Rothstein 2005).
6 See Ermisch and Gambetta (2010) for a related study.
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various disciplines. Yet despite the knowledge that has been generated in this ﬁeld and
the brilliance of various theoretical accounts, research on this concept also suﬀers from
certain shortcomings and resulting negative eﬀects.
First, there is a vast number of deﬁnitions of trust and many of them are elusive and
ambiguous, a situation many scholars lament (e.g. Bigley and Pearce 1998; Hardin 2006;
Hoﬀman 2002; Hosmer 1995; Lewicki and Bunker 1995; Luhmann 1988; McKnight and
Chervany 1996; Nannestad 2008; Shapiro 1987). Table A1 gives an overview of some of
the more inﬂuential deﬁnitions.7 This condition makes it very diﬃcult to structure and
compare existing research.8 As a result of conceptual vagueness, theories connecting trust
to other phenomena are often vague and blurred. Various scholars have coined diﬀerent
trust subconcepts such as particularized trust, which further adds to the confusion.
As a consequence debates that evolve around trust are often at cross-purposes as two
recent examples show. The ﬁrst debate concerns the forms of political trust. This debate
hinges on a conceptual misunderstanding since Fisher, van Heerde and Tucker (2010,
2011) diﬀerentiate forms of trust according to the considerations on which political trust
 understood as expectation  may be based. For instance, people might have a certain
level of trust because they believe that they are protected through institutions of law
enforcement. Hooghe (2011), in contrast, diﬀerentiates forms of political trust according
to the trustee at whom the expectation is directed, such as a parliament or a government.
He ﬁnds that respondents do not distinguish between diﬀerent institutions. Hence, it is
not surprising that the respective authors disagree on whether one can diﬀerentiate be-
tween forms of political trust or not. The second debate concerns the term trust radius.
The authors in this debate conceive trust in the same way, namely as an expectation.
However, Delhey, Newton and Welzel (2014, 2011) use the term radius to describe that
respondents might have a diﬀerent radius of people in their mind while answering trust
questions. van Hoorn (2014), in contrast, follows the classical meaning as suggested by
Fukuyama (2001). Here, the trust radius encompasses diﬀerent trustees in which the
truster has speciﬁc but varying levels of trust.
Second, deﬁnitions of trust that we ﬁnd in empirical research are often followed by com-
pletely detached measurement, hence, there is a lack of concept-measurement consistency
(Goertz 2006, 95). As a consequence, empirical tests of theories that relate trust to other
concepts are often debatable, since they do not really test those theories but rather
empirical relationships between measures of something else.
7 Inﬂuential here simply understood as widely cited.
8 See Bromiley and Cummings (1995); Hosmer (1995); Lewicki and Bunker (1995); McKnight and
Chervany (1996); Mishra (1996); Sitkin and Roth (1993) for noteworthy attempts to typologize
research on trust.
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1.2 Deriving a conception: What is trust?
Given the above described problems this dissertation is bound to start with the question:
What is trust? I proceed by identifying notions that reappear across the most inﬂuential
deﬁnitions that were coined by diﬀerent authors. Departing from these notions I derive
a deﬁnition of trust.
First, several notable scholars agree on the fact that trust plays a role in situations that
can be described referring to three elements (Baier 1986, Hardin 2002, Hardin 1992, 154,
Luhmann 1979, 27, Sztompka 1999, 55): For instance, Baier (1986) points to the im-
portance of diﬀerentiating between diﬀerent trustees and the expected behavior in this
relation, thus, taking trust to be a three-place predicate (A trusts B with valued thing
C) (Baier 1986, 236). Slightly reformulated, when speaking about trust we essentially
speak about a truster A that trusts, i.e. judges the trustworthiness of a trustee B with
regard to some behavior X.9 Turning this statement around we may speak of a trustee
B who is trustworthy with regard to some behavior X and a truster A. These three pa-
rameters ABX suﬃce to deﬁne the concept of trust and may be replaced with diﬀerent
real-life trustees and behaviors. Moreover, this formulation illustrates that a diﬀerentia-
tion between trust and trustworthiness is of fundamental importance. Even when there
is no call for trust, a person or institution can possess the attributes of trustworthiness
(Levi and Stoker 2000, 476), i.e. a trustee can be trustworthy independent of the level
of trust the truster has in him.10
Second, trust can be conceived of as a probability. The idea of trust as a subjective proba-
bility  as a degree of belief  seems fairly clear (cf. Hoﬀman 2002, 379). Several authors
directly refer to probability in their deﬁnitions. For instance, Gambetta (1988, 217)
asserts that trust is a particular level of the subjective probability with which an agent
assesses [...] another agent. Similarly, Oﬀe (1999, 47) writes that trust is a belief that
refers to probabilities that [...] others will do certain things or refrain from doing certain
things. Dasgupta (1988, 62, 65-66) uses the example of a customer who is unsure whether
a salesman is trustworthy or untrustworthy and imputes a (subjective) probability p to
9 The term behavior also encompasses passive behavior or non-behavior such as refraining from
robbing someone or stealing a bike (e.g. Oﬀe 1999, 47). Instead of simply using the term behavior,
Sztompka (1999, 55) uses the term content, but X has also been called the domain by Levi and
Stoker (2000, 476). Below, the synonymous expressions behave trustworthily and be trustworthy
are used interchangeably. The same is true for expectation and judgment.
10 Certainly, one could add further parameters such as context S  e.g. a certain neighborhood 
however, that would unnecessarily increase the complexity of an otherwise parsimonious statement.
Additional parameters should rather be seen as causal factors that explain trust and, thus, do not
belong to the concept itself. In this regard, abstraction and simpliﬁcation from complex reality is a
necessity in deriving a useful conception.
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the salesman being honest. Coleman (1990, 99) does not explicitly deﬁne trust as a
subjective probability, however, he develops a formal model for the placement of trust
in which the mentioned subjective probability appears as an expectation. The above
deﬁnitions are widely cited by other scholars in the ﬁeld who seem to have embraced the
idea of trust as a probability, a probability that quantiﬁes the subjective belief that a
trustee will behave trustworthily. The idea of trust as a subjective probability has also
been criticized (e.g. Nooteboom 2002, 39-41). First, if the subjective probability is 1, no
risk is left which seems to be an essential characteristic of the concept of trust. However,
even when a person reports that he/she trusts someone 100%, this person still reports
an expectation regarding a future event. Hence, even if this person is certain (= 100%)
there is always the objective risk that his/her expectation is wrong. Second, the idea of
subjective probability might seem too rational and calculative to describe expectations
by humans (Nooteboom 2002, 41, 42). Importantly, by deﬁning and measuring trust
as subjective probability we do not make any assertions regarding rationality. On the
contrary: Individuals' judgments may be wrong and also systematically biased. Besides,
if we assume that a scale from 0 to 100 is too ﬁne-grained we can always use a scale with
fewer scale points. Essentially, respondents do not seem to have problems in expressing
simple expectations in probabilistic terms (Clinton and Manski 2002).
Third, there is a temporal dimension to the concept. A general characteristic of the
concept of trust is that it refers to expectations about future behavior. Many authors
have deﬁned trust in this way, even if their deﬁnitions diﬀer in many other respects (see,
e.g. Bacharach and Gambetta 2001, 150, Baier 1986, 235, Barber 1983, 8-9, Dasgupta
1988, Gambetta 1988, 217, Hoﬀman 2002, 378, Luhmann 1988, 97, Mayer, Davis and
Schoorman 1995, 712, Oﬀe 1999, 47, Sztompka 1999, 25). Hence, normally trust describes
(potentially wrong) expectations about a trustee's future behavior. In our theories we
have to be very explicit and clear regarding the temporal dimension. We have to specify
whether we theorize about a truster's expectations that concern the future or about the
expectations a truster might have had in the past. Our future expectations, i.e. trust
judgments, are often related to past expectations that are revised after collecting relevant
experiences.
Fourth, trust is generally linked to behavior that has a positive value for the truster (e.g.
neighbor returning borrowed money; friend keeping a secret; car not breaking down). In
other words, trust rests on the premise that A has a preference with regard to behavior
X. A prefers that B displays trustworthy behavior XT rather than untrustworthy behav-
ior X
 T . By adding this assumption trust is set apart from simple expectations. This
idea is reﬂected in many accounts of trust. Mostly, because authors refer to the fact
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that trust is related to the interest of the truster (e.g. Hardin 2002; Levi and Stoker
2000; McKnight and Chervany 1996). Other authors do so more implicitly in that they
restrict the behavior of the respective relationships to behavior that should normally be
against the interest of the truster. For instance, Rotter and Stein (1971) refer to lying
or deceiving others. Eventually, I would suggest to avoid the term interest since it is the
subjective nature of preferences that matters in trust situations. A trustee could act in
a friend's objective interest (lie to him for his own good) but the friend would still feel
betrayed if the trustee acts against his subjective preference. Finally, it can be assumed
that preferences are often similar across As, i.e. most people have the same expectation
of a trustee in similar situations. For instance, everyone prefers a friend to keep a secret
if asked to do so.11
Fifth, trust is at stake in all sorts of cases and scholars of various disciplines diﬀer in
their focus with regard to the trusters (As), trustees (Bs) and behaviors (Xs). Most
commonly social scientists investigate trust judgments by individuals (= trusters) gen-
erally, but they also focus on more speciﬁc groups of trusters such as patients (Mechanic
and Schlesinger 1996), criminals (Gambetta 2006) and taxi drivers (Gambetta and Hamill
2005). Similarly, trustees in empirical research encompass the police or courts (Tyler and
Huo 2002), political parties and partisans (Carlin 2014; Carlin and Love 2013), sellers
(Doney and Cannon 1997), science and technology (Roberts et al. 2013) and investments
(Bottazzi, Da Rin and Hellmann 2011) just to name a few. Finally, researchers inves-
tigate trust judgments that concern a wide variety of (un)trustworthy behaviors (Xs)
regarding which trustees are assessed. An applicable and general conception has to be
ﬂexible enough to encompass diverse behaviors as well as non-human trustees. This can
be achieved by keeping the abstract placeholders ABX in our conception and replacing
them with speciﬁc content depending on our research question. As social scientists we
can probably agree that A should encompass single individuals or groups of individuals.
B, in turn, should be a placeholder that can be ﬁlled with diﬀerent content, certainly
single individuals and groups of individuals (e.g. a government), but also with physical
objects (e.g. a dice, a car, a plane) or institutions (e.g. a certain law, democracy as
a set of institutions, the legal system).12 X, in turn, may refer to behavior of diﬀerent
sort, such as does not steal my bike, protects the human rights and will not crash.
11 Is it important that the trustee is aware of the truster's preference? (cf. Hardin 2002) In my view
it is not important. It would force us to refrain from using the concepts when discussing trust in
and trustworthiness of objects such as a car.
12 In contrast to Hardin (2002) who clearly excludes abstract trustees such as governments in his
encapsulated interest view of trust, I suggest trust and trustworthiness should be conceptualized
without this restriction.
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This ﬂexibility is useful as long as researchers clearly state the substance of the elements
ABX, that is the cases they investigate.
To sum up, cases of trust can be described by three elements (A = truster; B = trustee; X
= behavior) and concern behavior to which a preference by the truster A is attached. The
concept designates a probability, namely the truster's subjective estimation of the prob-
ability that the trustee will display trustworthy behavior. Besides, a useful conception
should be ﬂexible enough as to encompass all sorts of cases, i.e. have a broad extension.
These characteristics may be used to derive a uniﬁed deﬁnition:
Trust PA is A's subjective estimation of the probability PB that B displays
behavior XT preferred by A rather than X T .
Both PA (= trust) and PB (= trustworthiness) potentially depend on all three elements
of the relation (ABX) and, as probabilities, PA and PB may take on values from 0 to 1.
Moreover, PA is not necessarily related to PB since A may over- or underestimate B's
trustworthiness. Besides, trust is an attribute of truster A whereas trustworthiness is an
attribute of trustee B.
The term subjective emphasizes that A's trust judgment may be wrong and deviate from
some objective probability. We can measure trust by directly asking someone whether
he thinks that a trustee will be trustworthy in the future or what his past expectations
were in this regard. We can measure trustworthiness as past behavior (by observing a
trustee's behavior or by querying him/her about it) or as future behavior (only by query-
ing him/her about it). However, various scholars have criticized self-report measurement
of trustworthiness pointing to the issue of social desirability (e.g. Ermisch and Gambetta
2011, 3).
1.2.1 Resulting conceptual clariﬁcations
The above described conception clariﬁes several important conceptual issues that need to
be reemphasized at this stage: First, the above understanding establishes that trust is an
expectation and not a decision or a behavior.13 Hardin (2002, 58-60) regards this position
as trivially evident, however, researchers often mix expectations and ensuing decisions
or behaviors in their theories and deﬁnitions. Since trust is an expectation about future
behavior, it is not necessary that some exchange or action took place. Trusting behav-
ior (Barr 2003), e.g. A lending 20 euros to B, may be the consequence of a certain level
13 Interestingly, measuring trust as an expectation requires subjects to choose, i.e. to decide about
points on a trust scale.
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of trust, i.e. the subjective probability the truster estimates (e.g. PA A 0.7). Sometimes,
however, alleged trusting behavior is not due to a high level of trust but rather due to
coercion, indiﬀerence or simply the absence of other behavioral options. This conceptual
clariﬁcation also highlights that theories about trust are not decision theories such as the
expected utility theory or the prospect theory that take into account various other
aspects such as the costs of diﬀerent choices. It also highlights that trust does not equal
cooperation and should probably not be measured as such (cf. Cook and Cooper 2003).
Second, we may treat trust and conﬁdence as synonyms. However, there is some dis-
agreement regarding conﬁdence in the literature. Following Luhmann (1988, 97) and
Deutsch (1960, 124) one can sensibly argue that the term conﬁdence represents a nar-
rower understanding of trust, namely the case in which the trust judgment exceeds a
certain threshold (e.g. PA C 0.8). Conﬁdent individuals are individuals with a high level
of trust. Luhmann (1988, 97) writes: If you do not consider alternatives [...], you are in
a situation of conﬁdence. Deutsch (1960, 124) describes conﬁdence as the individual's
assumption that the event he desires rather than the event he fears will occur. Thus,
an individual with low conﬁdence would still be located somewhere in the upper range
of the trust scale (e.g. conﬁdence could range from 0.5 to 1 on the trust scale). To avoid
these conceptual pitfalls we should stick to the term trust.14
Third, in contrast to Cook, Hardin and Levi (2005, 33f), Hardin (2002, 89f) and Lewicki
and Brinsﬁeld (2012) I argue that it does not make sense to treat trust and mistrust/distrust
as two distinctive concepts.15 Similarly to Gambetta (1988), Luhmann (1980) and Car-
lin (2014) I suggest to treat mistrust/distrust as antonym for trust, only that the scale
is reversed. For instance, if we ask How high is the probability that the government
will successfully deal with the economic crisis?, then the lower an individual's estimated
probability (e.g. PA   0.3), the higher is his level of mistrust and the lower his level of
trust.16 If the probability is low we would expect individuals to behave in ways that
suspicious, distrustful individuals do. For instance, A will not lend B any money if he
assumes that B is unlikely to return the money. Thus, it seems to make sense to measure
trust and distrust/mistrust on one single (probability) scale.
Fourth, risk and uncertainty can be deﬁned in relation to trust and trustworthiness. First,
corresponding to the two concepts there are two types of risk that are simply the com-
14 Interestingly, Simmel's use of the German word Vertrauen is translated with both the English
words conﬁdence and trust (see Footnote 1). Hence, in German this distinction is less relevant.
15 See also Lagace and Gassenheimer (1989), Omodei and McLennan (2000) and Wrightsman and
Wuescher (1974)
16 We could also reformulate this question so that it is a low subjective probability PA that refers to
behavior preferred by A. Then, the higher a truster's probability estimate, the higher his level of
mistrust/distrust.
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plementary probabilities of PA and PB respectively. RA   1  PA is the subjective risk
of the truster A. When Peter has a high level of trust in someone to, e.g. return a purse
that he lost, he estimates the risk that the trustee will not bring back the purse as very
low, e.g. RA   1  PA   0.1 (see Figure 1.1). The same is true for trustworthiness:
RB   1  PB is the objective risk complementary to the probability that someone will
behave trustworthily. Second, individuals may be uncertain about their judgment of a
trustee B which can be expressed by an uncertainty interval around the trust point esti-
mate as depicted in Figure 1.1. In situations in which we do not have any information
about a trustee B or in which we do not have any preconceptions about factors that
should inﬂuence B's trustworthiness with regard to X, we may ﬁnd ourselves unable to
give any precise estimate. At its extreme this can be expressed by a large uncertainty
interval that covers the whole trust scale going from 0 to 100 % (or 0 to 1).
Figure 1.1: Trust, risk and uncertainty
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Fifth, trust as an expectation is based on lines of thought and emotions (CA) that in-
ﬂuence A's estimate. These factors CA do not belong to the concept of trust itself, but
should rather be seen as causal elements that explain variance in expectations, i.e. prob-
abilities estimated by diﬀerent trusters. CA is related to ABX in that diﬀerent trusters
A potentially rely on diﬀerent CAs that also vary as a function of B and X. For instance,
when boarding a plane we might trust the pilots because we assume that it is in their
self-interest not to cause a plane crash. When judging the trustworthiness of a family
member or a close friend emotions may bias our otherwise more critical judgment (cf.
Hoﬀman 2002; Michel 2013). Depending on their personal attributes some trusters may
focus on the moral values that they think B possesses, whereas other trusters may con-
sider the potential sanctions that B might be subject to. Likewise, some As may rely on
more complex trains of thought, while others might rely on simplistic heuristics (individ-
uals with long hair can not be trusted). But we may also ﬁnd that most trusters rely on
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similar CAs. In the end all individuals come up with an expectation, i.e. a certain level
of trust even if the process to arrive at this judgment is a diﬀerent one. Confounding
trusting expectations with the lines of thought and emotions on which these expectations
are based is a relatively common problem in the trust literature. Moreover, scholars often
invent new trust subconcepts to refer to trust judgments that are based on diﬀerent Cs.
See for instance Fisher, van Heerde and Tucker (2011, 2010) as cited in Section 1.1 or
Uslaner's 2002 deﬁnition of moralistic and strategic trust in Section 1.2.2.
1.2.2 Subconcepts of the overall trust concept
The general concept of trust has seen several conceptual oﬀsprings. Figure 1.2 traces
the popularity of diﬀerent trust subconcepts based on a simple word search across recent
Jstor (Burns et al. 2009) and Google Books (Michel et al. 2011)17 publication data. The
graphs illustrate that the number of publications has increased massively since the 1990s
and that there was a surge of research on political trust in the 70s. We can also see that
trust research was conducted simultaneously under diﬀerent labels, i.e. on diﬀerent trust
subconcepts. Table A1 in the appendix contains deﬁnitions for these subconcepts. In
this section, I outline how the diﬀerent subconcepts can be subsumed under the general
conception of trust presented in Section 1.2.
In essence, most of the trust subconcepts that were coined during the last decades rep-
resent special cases that fall under the formalized conception outlined in Section 1.2.
Mostly, they simply specify A, B or X in a particular way. Sometimes they refer to
speciﬁc Cs.
As can be seen from Figure 1.2, the most frequently used concepts are social trust and
interpersonal trust that are synonymous. In both cases the trusters as well as the trustees
comprise individuals or groups, so A & B = humans. In most applications of these con-
cepts, X is not clearly speciﬁed. In more speciﬁc deﬁnitions such as by Rotter (1967)
(interpersonal trust), trustworthy behavior is more clearly deﬁned. Another widely used
concept is political trust designating cases in which the trustee belongs to the political
sphere. Hence, B can be any political actor such as a parliament, a government or a
party.18 More speciﬁc deﬁnitions of political trust such as the one formulated by Hether-
ington and Husser (2012, 313) restrict the trustee B to governments and the expected
17 The search was conducted using the package ngramr within the English Corpus of Google Books
(eng_2012).
18 In the strict sense political trust is also a form of social trust in that institutions are made up of
persons.
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behavior X to performing well.19
Particularized trust which is often regarded as the opposite of generalized trust (see
discussion in the next paragraph), is deﬁned as [p]lacing faith only in our own kind
(Uslaner 2002, 28). Hence, B encompasses people of your own kind, however, it is
not really clear who falls into this category. Sometimes particularized trust is equated
with knowledge-based trust, a term coined by Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994, 139) that
describes trusting expectations that are limited to particular objects (people or organi-
zations). Similarly, thick trust and thin trust categorize trustees B into groups according
to the social distance they exhibit with regard to the truster (Putnam 2000, 466). There
is also the concept of identity, group or category-based trust (see e.g. Brewer 1981; Fre-
itag and Bauer 2013; Kramer 1999; Stolle 2002; Tajfel 1974; Tajfel and Turner 1979).
Here, the principal idea is that one might have a higher level of trust towards individuals
with whom one shares a common category, e.g. A might trust B because B is from the
same village. Finally, Uslaner (2002) contrasts moralistic trust with strategic trust. The
former is a general outlook on human nature and mostly does not depend upon personal
experiences or upon the assumption that others are trustworthy, as strategic trust does
(Uslaner 2002, 17). The main diﬀerence between these two trust subconcepts is the idea
that they are expectations based on diﬀerent thoughts or emotions CA. Besides, the
trustee B in moralistic trust are humans in general, but speciﬁc persons in the case of
strategic trust.
In sum, the various subconcepts coined by diﬀerent authors represent special cases of
the conception suggested in Section 1.2. Most trust concepts simply specify one of the
elements ABX or CA more restrictively, for instance B as humans in social trust. Hence,
the corresponding cases can be described systematically departing from our general con-
ception.
The concept of generalized trust is a special case. Similarly to trust, generalized trust has
been deﬁned in various ways (e.g. Bjornskov 2006; Nannestad 2008; Stolle 2002; White-
ley 2000). The fundamental idea seems to go back to the concept of basic trust (Erikson
1959). Erikson (1959, 57) regards the sense of basic trust as a component of a healthy
personality, as an attitude toward oneself and the world derived from the experiences
of the ﬁrst year of life.20 In another seminal work Rotter (1967, 653) suggests that
individuals possess a generalized expectancy regarding others. Among others general-
19 The original deﬁnition relates citizens' performance evaluations to their normative expectations.
Operationalization is diﬃcult since it requires measuring both individuals' normative expectations
and their performance evaluations (Seyd 2011).
20 Erikson (1959, 65) suggested that the task of building a sense of basic trust is foremost a task of
maternal care.
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Figure 1.2: Popularity of diﬀerent subconcepts of trust (Google books and Jstor)
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ized trust has been deﬁned as trust in most people (Uslaner 2002, 5) and as a standard
estimate or a general optimism regarding others' trustworthiness (Glanville and Paxton
2007, Rathbun 2011, 248). Generalized trust is also closely linked to some other trust
subconcepts, namely the concept of propensity to trust or trait trust which is regarded as
a facet of agreeableness, one of the Big Five personality traits in personality research
(Colquitt et al. 2007, McCrae and Costa Jr 2003, Mooradian, Renzl and Matzler 2006,
527).21 And the concept is very similar to Coleman's (1990, 104) idea that a person has
a standard estimate of the probability of trustworthiness, p*, for the average person he
[or she] meets.22
The conception provided in Section 1.2 clariﬁes that generalized trust describes an expec-
tation directed at the general category of humans (= B) and is not related to a speciﬁc
expected trustworthy behavior X. It is a general subjective estimate that others will be-
have as one expects them to. One could conceive it as a basic starting level from which
speciﬁc situational trust judgments deviate in diﬀerent directions. To this date, scholars
debate to what extent generalized trust is conditioned during childhood or is revised
through experiences at later stages in life.
1.3 A short history of trust measurement
In the previous section I tried to answer the question What is trust? drawing on the vast
conceptual literature on trust. The logical follow-up question is: How do we measure trust
in empirical research? In order to be able to locate the research of the present dissertation
within the broader ﬁeld of empirical trust research it is helpful to provide a quick overview
of the developments within trust measurement. Measurement can be seen as a topic of its
own, especially, since many measures did not originate from a sophisticated conceptual
literature. Below, I want to focus on innovations in measurement which mostly took
place within the last two decades. This is not surprising, given that trust research has
received an enormous boost in the wake of the popularization of the concept of social
capital (see Figure 1.2). I am convinced that it is in the area of trust measurement that
21 Generalized trust is also similar to general trust a belief in the benevolence of human nature (Ya-
magishi and Yamagishi 1994, 136).
22 However, we have to keep in mind that this is not Coleman's deﬁnition of trust that is in essence a
behavioral one.
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Figure 1.3: Timeline of trust measurement
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Office of Public Opinion Research, Survey 213 'War' (1942)
Do you think most people can be trusted? (Yes, No, Qualified answer)
Do you think Russia can be trusted to cooperate with us after the war is over? (Yes, No, No Opinion)
Rosenberg (1956)
Constructs a Guttman scale comprising five items which is termed the faith−in−people or misanthropy scale.
The scale also contains a version of the most−people question.
Deutsch (1960)
Uses the classical 'Prisoner's dilemma' to investigate trust, primes particpants' orientations and changes game's
rules to investigate the impact.
Stokes (1962)
Develops a set of questions to measure basic evaluative orientations towards government. Later on these items
are included in the American National Election Studies (1964) and are known as the trust−in−government
questions.
Rotter (1967)
Aims at measuring trust as a personality factor that predicts cooperative behavior and develops a measurement
instrument for interpersonal trust that contains 25 questions and 15 filler questions (agree−disagree scales).
Berg at al. (1995)
Attempt to control for alternative explanations of behavior such as reputation effects or punishment threats and
design an investment game that is played only once. Today, this game is known as the 'trust game'.
Buskens (2000)
Investigate the concrete situation 'buying a used car' and design one of the first trust vignette experiments to
measure trust as a decision/a choice between descriptions of situations.
Glaeser (2000)
Integrate both different self−report measures as well as behavioral measures of trust in the same study. Raise the
 question to what extent self−reports predict behavior.
Fehr et al. (2003)
Develop a method to integrate 'interactive', 'sequential' experiments in surveys, allowing for measuring self−report
and behavioral trust in more representative samples.
Burns et al. (2006)
Suggest that trust self−report measures may be biased by respondents' motivations of self−presentation and
attempt to measure trust with an implicit−association test.
Reeskens and Hooghe (2008)
Raise the issue of cross−cultural measurement equivalence and apply multigroup confirmatory factor analysis to
assess the three−item generalized trust scale.
Ermisch et al. (2009, also 2006)
Formulate a convincing critique of the classical trust game suggested by Berg et al. (1995). Suggest to use a
dichotomous trust game with modified rules.
Sturgis et al. (2010)
Investigate self−report measures (e.g. the most−people question) using probing questions. Find that the category
'most people' is vague and invites respondents to fill in their own, varying specifications threatening measurement
validity.
Future...
...in which direction will trust measurement develop?
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we are likely to see the biggest developments in the near future. In the conclusion in
Chapter 5 I will further comment on this important insight of my dissertation.23
Trust measurement  and here I focus on its systematic measurement across a large num-
ber of units  started in the ﬁrst half of the 20th century.24 The timeline in Figure 1.3
gives an overview of the developments described below. Broadly, one can diﬀerentiate be-
tween two approaches to measuring trust: We can either ask people directly (self-report
measures) or observe their behavior/decisions (behavioral measures).
Self-report measurement predates behavioral measurement in lab experiments and started
in the 40s. I found the ﬁrst record of the most-people trust question25, the most popular
measure of trust, in a questionnaire from 1942 (see Figure 1.3).26 Hence, we can even
set the date a bit earlier than Sturgis and Smith (2010, Footnote 1). Importantly, in
its earliest form the most-people question has not been introduced by Elisabeth Noelle-
Neumann or by Almond and Verba (1963) as suggested by some authors (e.g. Algan and
Cahuc 2013; Tao et al. 2014; Uslaner 2012).27
The most-people question is often attributed to Rosenberg (1956) who, to my knowledge,
was the ﬁrst to construct a systematic measurement instrument. Also Rosenberg (1956,
690) may have coined the balanced version of the most-people question: Some people
say that most people can be trusted. Others say you can't be too careful in your dealings
with people. How do you feel about it? . Rosenberg (1956) combined multiple items and
23 Existing reviews do not focus on measurement and and do not cover more recent developments.
For instance, Cook and Cooper (2003) focus on experimental studies, Nannestad (2008) focuses
on generalized trust and Levi and Stoker (2000) on political trust. For more or less complete
reviews one can also consult diﬀerent books that have been written on trust and discuss empirical
measurement such as Hardin (2002), Nooteboom (2002), Sztompka (1999) and Uslaner (2002).
Besides the focus on measurement, I want to zoom out and overcome the de-facto separation
of the research communities who are either doing survey or experimental research in the social
sciences (Fehr et al. 2003, 4, Footnote 3).
24 In his review article on generalized trust Nannestad (2008, 416) distinguishes between three methods
of measurement: Experiments, surveys and anthropological observation with thick descriptions. I
focus on the former two.
25 Throughout this dissertation I use the term most-people (trust) question to refer to this classic
measure of the concept of generalized trust: Generally speaking, would you say that most people can
be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? Importantly, over the last decades
this question has appeared in various forms, with various answer scales.
26 I scanned through various questionnaires that were accessible online through the Roper Center
Public Opinion Archives. The respective survey contains the questions: Do you think most people
can be trusted?  and Do you think Russia can be trusted to cooperate after the war is over?  (cf.
Walsh 1944) Respondents could answer Yes or No in either case (or give a qualiﬁed question to the
most-people-question) (Oﬃce of Public Opinion Research 1942).
27 This insight is based on an email exchange with Thomas Petersen of the Allensbach Institute which
was founded by Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann. Starting in 1948 trust questions where also asked in
the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) Surveys (Klapper 1955).
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constructed a faith-in-people Guttman scale.28 Ultimately, Rosenberg (1956) was inter-
ested in the relationship between faith in people and individuals' political ideologies,
evaluations of political systems as well as views on speciﬁc political questions. Later
on, Rosenberg's questions were used by Almond and Verba (1989, 213) (1963) in their
seminal comparative study on the civic culture. To this date researchers investigating
social trust continue to use modiﬁed versions of these questions. One important reason
is that these questions are included in various important longitudinal surveys such as the
General Social Survey (GSS) starting in 1972, the American National Election Studies
(ANES) starting in 1964 as well as some important comparative surveys such as the
European Social Survey (see e.g. Uslaner 2002, 6, Footnote 2).29
Some years later, Deutsch (1960) published his study The Eﬀect of Motivational Orienta-
tion upon Trust and Suspicion. In contrast to Rosenberg who uses self-report measures,
Deutsch (1960) observes participants behavior while letting them play the prisoner's
dilemma in a laboratory setting (see Cook and Cooper 2003 for a very good summary
of Deutsch's work). In doing so, he uses a behavioral measure and, essentially, measures
trusting behavior.
If we conceive trust as an expectation, the corresponding expectation in the prisoner's
dilemma would be a (probabilistic) judgment of the other prisoner's likelihood to coop-
erate or not. This judgment is certainly an important factor entering a player's decision
whether to defect or cooperate.
In fact, Ermisch et al. (2009, 751) mention the expectation that the trustee will do
X, framed in terms of a probability (Ermisch et al. 2009, 751) as one component that
leads to the decision to trust, i.e. to trusting behavior. A person's expectation of the
chances of return is strongly related to their experimental trust decision (Ermisch and
Gambetta 2010, 370). Generally and even if not labeled as such, early studies based on
game theoretic setups in laboratories such as the one by Deutsch (1960) can be seen as
trust research in the widest sense (Cook and Cooper 2003).30 But Deutsch was one of
the ﬁrst to use the label trust for his behavioral experiments.
Levi and Stoker (2000) take the work of Stokes (1962) as starting point to review re-
28 1. Some people say that most people can be trusted. Others say you can't be too careful in your
dealings with people. How do you feel about it? ; 2. Would you say that most people are more inclined
to help others or more inclined to look out for themselves? ; 3. If you don't watch yourself, people
will take advantage of you; 4. No one is going to care much what happens to you, when you get
right down to it ; 5. Human nature is fundamentally cooperative (Rosenberg 1956, 690).
29 These questions also found their way into various important national surveys in other countries
such as the German General Social Survey.
30 Deutsch (1960) did not depart from a very clear conception of trust in his work (Cook and Cooper
2003).
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search on political trust. In his study Popular evaluations of government: An empirical
assessment Stokes (1962) was interested in measuring basic evaluative orientations to-
wards political actors and, accordingly, developed a set of questions. The concept of
political trust never ﬁgured into Stokes's analysis, later however, his questions came to
be known as the trust-in-government questions (Levi and Stoker 2000, 477) and were
included in the American National Election Studies (ANES) starting in 1964 (Citrin and
Muste 1999, 470, see also Miller 1974).31 The questions are introduced as follows: Peo-
ple have diﬀerent ideas about the government in Washington. These ideas don't refer to
Democrats or Republicans in particular, but just to the government in general. We want
to see how you feel about these ideas. For example..., followed by 5 items to measure
trust in government.32 Thereafter the interest in political trust rose massively triggered
by the works of Easton (1965) and Gamson (1968) (Levi and Stoker 2000, 477). In Figure
1.2 (p.13) we can observe a ﬁrst spike in the 1970s around this time reﬂecting this early
popularity. Nowadays, many surveys contain questions that have the following basic
structure: Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally
trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all,
and 10 means you have complete trust. Firstly, the legal system?  (European Social
Survey 2012). Questions are mostly located in batteries and list a number of institutions
that can be rated by the respondent.
Another seminal work by Rotter (1967) departs from a relatively clear deﬁnition of trust
(see Table A1 in the appendix) and develops a measurement instrument for interpersonal
trust that contains 25 questions and 15 ﬁller questions.33 Rotter (1967, see also Rotter
and Stein 1971) was dissatisﬁed with social psychologists' focus on the prisoner's dilemma
game and wanted to measure trust as a personality factor that predicts cooperative be-
31 Citrin and Muste (1999) provide a comprehensive overview of various measurement instruments
that tap evaluations of political institutions.
32 1. How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what
is right: Just about always/most of the time/or only some of the time; 2. Would you say the
government is: Pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves/or that it is run
for the beneﬁt of all the people; 3. Do you think that people in government: Waste a lot of the money
we pay in taxes/waste some of it/or don't waste very much of it ; 4. Do you feel that: Almost all
of the people running the government are smart people who usually know what they are doing/or do
you think that quite a few of them don't seem to know what they're doing ; 5. Do you think that:
Quite a few of the people running the government are a little crooked/not very many are/ or do you
think hardly any of them are crooked at all (Citrin and Muste 1999, 483).
33 Examples are: 1. In dealing with strangers one is better oﬀ to be cautious until they have provided
evidence that they are trustworthy ; 2. Parents usually can be relied upon to keep their promises; 3.
Parents and teachers are likely to say what they believe themselves and not just what they think is
good for the child to hear ; Answer scales range from 1 strongly agree to 5 strongly disagree (Rotter
1967, 654).
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havior in a wide range of settings (Cook and Cooper 2003, 214).34 Because Rotter (1967,
653) was suspicious that such games measure competitive behavior, he tested the validity
of his scale against socio-metric ratings through student peers of the participants. How-
ever, the social trust questions coined by Rosenberg (1956) remained more popular. One
reason is certainly that the costs of including one or three trust questions in a survey are
considerably lower than including Rotter's sophisticated measurement instrument.35
The 70s and 80s did not see any path breaking innovations. However in 1995, Berg, Dick-
haut and McCabe acknowledge critique directed at classic games such as the prisoner's
dilemma and design an investment game that later came to be known as the classical
trust game. Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) aimed at controlling for alternative
explanations of behavior such as reputation eﬀects, contractual precommitments, and
punishment threats. In other words, in their experiment the authors aimed at isolating
the eﬀect of trust on the observed behavior.36
The general structure of the classical trust game is the following: Truster A is given a
certain amount of money. A then chooses to send all, some, or none of this amount of
money to the trustee (recipient) which is called the amount sent. The amount sent is
multiplied by some factor and received by trustee B. A keeps the rest to himself. B, the
recipient, chooses to send all, some, or none of the received money back to the sender
which is called the the amount returned (see, e.g. Ashraf, Bohnet and Piankov 2006,
197, Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe 1995, Camerer 2003, 44, Croson and Buchan 1999;
Glaeser et al. 2000). Trust is simply equated and measured with the (average) amount
sent across trusters, trustworthiness is equated and measured with the (average) amount
returned across trustees. In other words, the more A sends the higher is A's trust, the
more B returns the higher B's trustworthiness. To this day, the classic trust game is
immensely popular and used extensively, sometimes with slight modiﬁcations of the orig-
inal rules suggested by Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995).
Probably the ﬁrst to systematically contrast self-report measures with behavioral mea-
sures were Glaeser et al. (2000). In their study Measuring trust, the authors illustrate
that experiments can be integrated with surveys to measure individual-level variation in
34 Interestingly self-rated trust has long been an item within personality research, generally subsumed
under the factor agreeableness (e.g. McCrae and Costa Jr 2003).
35 Rotter (1980) gives a nice overview of psychological research about interpersonal trust at that time.
36 See Camerer (2003) for a review of lab game research up to 2003; See Glaeser et al. (2000); Belle-
mare and Kroeger (2007) for applications, i.e. modiﬁcations of the classic game. Participants in
these games were found to display irrationally high amounts of trust and trustworthiness which
challenges the behavioral foundations of micro-economic theory (Ermisch and Gambetta 2006, 3).
See Johnson and Mislin (2011) for a meta-analysis of data based on the game suggested by Berg,
Dickhaut and McCabe (1995).
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traditionally hard-to-measure characteristics such as trust and trustworthiness (Glaeser
et al. 2000, 812). Moreover, Glaeser et al. (2000) show to what extent trusting behavior
in the classic experiment  measured with a modiﬁed version of the Berg et al. game37 as
well as an envelop drop experiment  is predicted by trust self-reports and self-reports of
past trusting behavior.38 Thereby the authors test a wide variety of self-report measures
such as the trust questions included in the General Social Survey39, the Faith in People
Scale (Rosenberg 1956), the Interpersonal Trust Scale by Rotter (1967) and questions
querying past trusting behavior. The authors ﬁnd that self-report measures of past
trusting behavior are better than [the] abstract attitudinal questions in predicting sub-
jects' experimental choices (Glaeser et al. 2000, 813). However, to this date, evidence
on which trust questions are the best predictors of trusting behavior in experiments is
mixed (Capra, Lanier and Meer 2008; Ermisch et al. 2009; Fehr et al. 2003).
In another seminal study Buskens and Weesie (2000) investigate a concrete situation that
requires trust, namely the situation in which a buyer wants to buy a used car from a
car dealer. The innovation in their study lies in measuring trust as a decision by using
a survey experiment, i.e. a vignette experiment. Buskens and Weesie (2000) are inter-
ested in how far diﬀerent contextual characteristics impact the decision to buy. One
such contextual characteristic could be that the Autoshop is a well-known garage and
has many customers in the buyer's neighborhood. The authors assume that the larger
the probability that the dealer abuses trust, the smaller the probability that the buyer
will take the risk of placing trust (Buskens and Weesie 2000, 228). Buskens and Weesie
(2000) measure trust as a decision/a choice between two vignettes, i.e. descriptions of
situations. Studying trust relying on this and similar methods allows us to investigate
the impact of all sorts of hypothetical scenarios on trust judgments (or decisions between
vignettes).
Probably the ﬁrst to integrate a behavioral experiment into a large scale  representative
survey are Fehr et al. (2003). Experiments in which subjects do not interact with each
other can be added to surveys more easily. However, the signiﬁcant step forward pro-
vided by Fehr et al. (2003) is to develop a method suitable to integrate an interactive
37 Glaeser et al. (2000) double the amount sent instead of tripling it as in the classic trust game,
include a promise condition and remove subject-to-subject anonymity (Glaeser et al. 2000, 821).
38 In the envelop drop experiment subjects can place a value on an envelop that is addressed to
themselves and subsequently dropped by the experimenter. In the present study subjects had to
evaluate diﬀerent conditions (e.g. diﬀerent places where the envelop could be dropped) and an
average was taken. The higher the amount a subject places the higher the level of trust.
39 That includes the most-people question as well as questions concerning expected fairness (Do you
think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be
fair? ) and helpfulness (Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that they
are mostly just looking out for themselves? ) (Glaeser et al. 2000, 825).
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experiment. Fehr et al. (2003) use decisions in an investment game to measure behavioral
trust and diﬀerent survey questions to measure self-reported trust.40 Consequently, the
authors can identify which survey questions correlate well with behaviorally exhibited
trust in the experiment. However and in contrast to Glaeser et al. (2000), their sample
is far more interesting as it comprises groups that are normally not present in standard
laboratory experiments.
An interesting novelty is the study by Burns, Mearns and McGeorge (2006) that inves-
tigates the safety culture at a UK gas plant. Arguing that self-report measures may be
biased by respondents' motivations of self-presentation the authors try to measure trust
implicitly. Implicit measures were originally developed to measure prejudices (e.g. Fazio
and Olson 2003). In the study participants are shown diﬀerent categories of people on a
screen (e.g. the word Workmates). These terms may or may not trigger an automatic
attitude. Subsequently, participants are shown a trust-related or distrust-related target
word (e.g. Caring) and have to press a key labeled trust or distrust as quickly as
possible. The idea is that the presence of an automatic attitude will impact the latency
time of participants' answers. In other words, if a participant has an automatic attitude
towards a certain trustee category that mirrors trust (or distrust respectively), the par-
ticipant will be quicker to push the respective button labeled with trust (or distrust).
Although this is an interesting approach, more studies are needed to assess its validity.
Burns, Mearns and McGeorge (2006, 1149-1148) mention various potential problems.
Importantly, automatic attitudes should only matter when the motivation or opportu-
nity to deliberate are low. Presumably, individuals do have time for deliberation in most
real-life situations where trust is required. Moreover, it is unclear to what extent the
basic motivation behind this measurement approach  self-presentation bias  matters
as strongly for self-reported trust as it does for prejudices.
In 2009 Ermisch et al. (see also Ermisch and Gambetta 2006) publish a convincing cri-
tique of the classical version of the trust game suggested by Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe
(1995). Among other aspects, they point out that the game does not properly reﬂect
trust situations in real-life. Despite the attempt to isolate trust as an explanation, the
40 1. Do you think that most people try to take advantage of you if they got a chance or would they try
to be fair? ; 2. Would you say that most of the time people try be helpful or that they are mostly just
looking out for themselves? ; 3. a) In general, one can trust people b) In these days you can't rely
on anybody else c) When dealing with strangers it is better to be careful before you trust them; 4. In
the following you are asked to which persons, groups and institutions you have more or less trust ; 5.
Have you ever spontaneously beneﬁted from a person you did not know before? ; 6. How often does
it happen a) that you lend personal possessions to your friends (CDs, books your car, bicycle etc.)?
b) that you lend money to your friends? c) that you leave your door unlocked? (Fehr et al. 2003,
10-11).
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observed behavior in the classical trust game may be due to diﬀerent motivations such
as gift-giving. Moreover, the game in its classical version does not allow for including
factors that may matter strongly in real-life such as the possibility of sanctions (Ermisch
and Gambetta 2006, 12-13).41 Ermisch and Gambetta (2006, 11) conclude that to call
the standard form of TGE a trust game is a misnomer. Accordingly, they proceed with a
game with modiﬁed rules that reﬂects their criticism and they integrate their experiment
into a survey similar to the study by Fehr et al. (2003).
Among researchers relying on self-report measures the topic of measurement equivalence
has become a major concern in recent years. More and more scholars wonder whether
the standard survey questions measure the same across individuals. Due to their pop-
ularity, the most-people question and other questions measuring generalized trust are
scrutinized very closely. In his inﬂuential book Uslaner (2002, 73) analyzes think-aloud
responses to the most-people question and concluded that the question on trust brings
up general evaluations of society. Uslaner compares the most-people question to two
other trust questions: Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or
that they are just looking out for themselves?  and Do you think most people would
try to take advantage of you if they got the chance or would they try to be fair?  and
argues that the most-people question fares best (see also Uslaner 2002, 18-19, Footnote
7).42 In 2012 Uslaner reasserts his optimism regarding the dichotomous version of the
most-people question. Sturgis and Smith (2010) investigate to what extent diﬀerential
interpretation of the most-people question, and a second question measuring trust in
people in the local area, may aﬀect responses. They conclude that diﬀerences in the
interpretation of the trustee categories B  speciﬁcally most people and people in your
local area  may lead to a bias in responses.43 Other scholars rely on a diﬀerent method-
ological approach: Instead of probing questions, they use structural equation models to
assess measurement equivalence of latent trust constructs (Davidov et al. 2014; Freitag
and Bauer 2013; Reeskens and Hooghe 2008; van der Veld and Saris 2011). So far, these
analyses show that equivalence of self-report measures of generalized trust can not be
taken for granted across countries (Reeskens and Hooghe 2008). Recent research investi-
gates the same issue for self-report measures of political trust (e.g. Poznyak et al. 2013;
Schaap and Scheepers 2014). The issue of measurement equivalence concerns various
41 Diﬀerent studies try to test factors such as a truster's or a third party's control or sanctioning
ability with modiﬁed lab games. See for instance, Buskens, Raub and van der Veer (2010) and van
Miltenburg, Buskens and Raub (2012).
42 The think-aloud experiment is included in the American National Election Pilot Study 2000.
43 Delhey, Newton and Welzel (2011) make an attempt at solving the problem of this interpretative
radius and investigate to what extent the generalized trust question correlates with other, more
speciﬁc trust questions across countries.
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trust self-report measures as well as other survey questions and merits more attention in
future research (e.g. Bauer et al. 2014).
In sum, various self-report and behavioral measures have been introduced during the last
decades. As far as self-reports are concerned, researchers today primarily use modiﬁed
versions of questions that were introduced in the 1940s and 50s for social trust and in the
1960s for political trust. The most widely used question to measure generalized trust, is a
modiﬁed version of the most-people question presumably introduced in 1942. Regarding
lab game experiments, researchers started out with the prisoner's dilemma (see Deutsch
1960) and now mainly rely on the classic trust game (Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe 1995).
Despite the various developments and innovations in both research traditions, empirical
research is largely based on a few measurement instruments, the validity of which is in-
creasingly scrutinized. For this reason, measurement is likely to become one of the main
frontiers in future trust research.
1.4 Trust subconcepts in this dissertation and the relevant debates
In the two previous sections I discussed trust both from a conceptual and a measurement
perspective. Below, I outline which trust subconcepts are investigated in the following
chapters and summarize the debates to which the three chapters contribute.
All three chapters investigate trust as an expectation and rely on classical self-report
measures of trust. Whereas the ﬁrst two studies investigate social trust, the third study
investigates political trust. The concept of generalized trust is investigated in both Chap-
ter 2 (Freitag and Bauer 2013) and Chapter 3 (Bauer 2014b). In Chapter 2 (Freitag
and Bauer 2013) we diﬀerentiate generalized trust from particularized trust and identity-
based trust both theoretically and empirically. Each subconcept is measured with two
trust questions. Generalized trust is measured with the two strongly correlated items,
the most-people question (B = most people) and a question that refers to B = persons
one meets for the ﬁrst time.44 Chapter 3 (Bauer 2014b) solely investigates the concept
of generalized trust relying on the most-people question. Finally, Chapter 4 (Bauer and
Fatke 2014) is concerned with political trust as measured with an indicator querying trust
in B = cantonal authorities. All three chapters rely on self-report measures of trust that
are currently widely used and accepted within the research community. The conception
of the overarching trust concept proposed in Section 1.2 further suggests to specify an
44 Identity-based trust is measured with two indicators querying trust in B = persons of another
religion and B = persons of another nationality. Particularized trust is measured with two indicators
querying trust in B = friends and B = trust in neighbors.
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expected behavior X and deﬁnes trust as a subjective probability. Current self-report
measures do not reﬂect these subtleties. Hence, the speciﬁcation of both X and the use
of probability answer scales are areas in which future measurement of trust could become
more reﬁned as I will argue in the conclusion.
Essentially, there are three related important debates to which the following chapters
contribute. A ﬁrst debate discusses problems with current self-report measures. As sug-
gested in Section 1.3 scholars recently started to question whether the standard trust
questions really measure the same across individuals across countries and languages, i.e.
whether trust questions might suﬀer from measurement inequivalence/interpersonal in-
comparability (van der Veld and Saris 2011; Sturgis and Smith 2010; Delhey, Newton
and Welzel 2011). Chapter 1 (Freitag and Bauer 2013) engages in this debate. Using
data from Switzerland we investigate whether diﬀerent trust questions measure the same
latent trust constructs across individuals belonging to three diﬀerent cultural-linguistic
regions. The fundamental idea is that concepts such as generalized trust represent latent
constructs that can be measured with observed indicators. If one can show that the
observed indicators relate to the latent constructs in the same way across groups one can
assume that one measures the same construct across these groups.
The second debate concerns the so-named forms or dimensions of trust. As outlined in
Section 1.3, scholars originally developed measurement instruments that comprised sev-
eral questions tapping trust in diﬀerent trustee categories (e.g. Rosenberg 1956; Rotter
1967). More recently, scholars started investigating whether trust is a one-dimensional
construct, i.e. whether an individual's trust judgment diﬀers for categories of trustees
such as strangers, neighbors, family members and friends or not. In the latter case the
trustee category B would not matter for the trust judgment, i.e. a respondent would
report the same level of trust regardless of who is the target of the trust judgment. Al-
though it seems common sense that respondents diﬀerentiate between diﬀerent trustees,
evidence on this question is mixed and it is unclear how ﬁne-grained this diﬀerentiation
is (e.g. Omodei and McLennan 2000; Whiteley 2000). Using conﬁrmatory factor analysis
we investigate in Chapter 2 (Freitag and Bauer 2013) whether individuals really do make
a diﬀerence between diﬀerent trustee categories and to what extent these judgments can
be summarized into higher-order latent trust constructs.
The third debate is concerned with causes of diﬀerences in trust across humans. This
debate is linked to the above-mentioned debate on the dimensions of trust. Since trust
levels of single respondents vary across diﬀerent trustee categories, it is likely that the
respective trust judgments have diﬀerent foundations. In Section 1.2.1 I suggested to
use the letter C as a placeholder for the lines of thought on which trusting expectations
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might be based. Throughout his inﬂuential book The Moral Foundations of Trust Us-
laner (2002) argues that generalized trust as measured with the most-people question
is based on optimism which is essentially a function of early life parental socialization.
Some years later Uslaner (2008b, 291) explicitly argues that generalized trust is not
experience-based trust. The concept of experience is somewhat misused here since it
should also encompass early life experiences. In essence, Uslaner (2002) argues then that
early-life experiences matter for generalized trust, whereas later-life experiences do not.
Again evidence on this front is mixed. In Chapter 3 (Bauer 2014b) I focus on later-life
experiences, more precisely victimization experiences and investigate their causal rela-
tionship with generalized trust.
As argued in the introduction institutions matter for both trust relationships between
individuals as well as between citizens and political authorities. Research on political
trust has seen an ongoing debate on its potential causes (e.g. Mishler and Rose 2001). In
Chapter 4 (Bauer and Fatke 2014) we investigate the relationship between direct democ-
racy and trust in cantonal political authorities. Direct democratic institutions allow
citizens to participate and to intervene in the political process. They represent a sanc-
tioning instrument of the principal, the people, that hangs over the agent, the political
authorities, like the metaphorical Sword of Damocles. Consequently, we hypothesize
that direct democratic institutions, i.e. living in a context in which these institutions are
strong may raise trust in political authorities because political decisions are closer to the
median voter.
To sum up, the following chapters contribute to three important debates within trust re-
search, which concern the measurement and the causes of trust. They should be regarded
as small steps in the ﬁeld of trust research that push the boundary of knowledge a little
bit further. At the same time they open multiple avenues for further research. In that
sense, the conclusions of the single chapters point to possible directions into which future
research might develop. These are summarized in the overall conclusion in Chapter 5.
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in surveys: Dimensions of social trust
across cultural contexts*
Abstract
Our study evaluates the dimensionality and equivalence of social trust across cultural
contexts by using new data from Switzerland and the World Values Survey 2005-2008.
While some scholars assert that trust should be regarded as a coherent concept and
forms a single scale, others claim that trust is better conceived of as a multi-dimensional
concept. In contrast to the conventional dichotomy of the forms of social trust, we
identify three distinct forms of trust, namely particularized, generalized, and identity-
based trust. Moreover, we dispute the view that respondents understand the wording
of survey questions regarding social trust diﬀerently between diﬀerent cultural contexts,
which would imply that comparative research on trust is a pointless endeavor. Applying
multiple-group conﬁrmatory factor analysis to the various constructs of social trust, we
conclude that one may study relationships between the three forms of trust and other
theoretical constructs as well as compare latent means across cultural contexts. Our
analyses therefore provide an optimistic outlook for future comparative analyses that
investigate forms of social trust across cultural contexts.
* This chapter is identical to a manuscript, co-authored with Markus Freitag and published in Public
Opinion Quarterly (Freitag and Bauer 2013). First and foremost, my gratitude goes to my co-
author Markus Freitag. I'd also like to thank the editors of the POQ Special Issue on Measurement,
four anonymous reviewers, Georg Datler, Richard Traunmüller and various others for their helpful
comments.
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2.1 Social trust: Dimensions and measurement equivalence of a popular
concept
Trust has moved from being a bit player to center stage in contemporary social science
(Almond and Verba 1963; Delhey, Newton and Welzel 2011; Freitag and Traunmüller
2009; Gambetta 1988; Herreros 2004; Kramer 1999; Sztompka 1999; Stolle 2002; Uslaner
2002). Despite this growing popularity, eﬀorts to increase conceptual clarity have not
kept pace. Against this backdrop, the aim of the present study is to address ongoing con-
troversies concerning the dimensions and the measurement of social trust by evaluating
the dimensionality and measurement equivalence of social trust across cultural contexts.
Based on theoretical insights and new data covering a wide range of diﬀerent trust items
from Switzerland, we identify three distinct forms of trust, namely particularized, gener-
alized, and identity-based trust. Moreover, we dispute the view that respondents under-
stand the wording of survey questions regarding social trust diﬀerently in diverse cultural
contexts. Applying multiple-group conﬁrmatory factor analysis (MGCFA) to the various
constructs of social trust, we conclude that one may study relationships between the three
forms of trust and other theoretical constructs as well as compare latent means across
diﬀerent cultural contexts.1 We restrict our analyses mainly to the case of Switzerland.
Despite their shared national context, the three main Swiss language regions (German,
French, and Italian) are well-known for their striking cultural diﬀerences (Linder 1994;
Steiner 2001)). The vast literature on social trust encompasses numerous conceptual
variations. In general, social trust can be described as an expectation that people will
behave with good will, that they intend to honor their commitments, and that they will
avoid harming others (Glanville and Paxton 2007, 231, Barber 1983, Yamagishi and Ya-
magishi 1994).2
Fundamentally, a social trust attitude that is not related to any speciﬁc situation may be
expressed as A trusts B. B, the target of trust, may be replaced by individuals or groups
of individuals belonging to the universe of everyone else (Oﬀe 1999, 44). Consequently,
the question arises whether this trusting attitude is a coherent syndrome or whether
1 Testing cross-cultural equivalence of latent constructs can be implemented by various techniques;
however, previous research has demonstrated that the MGCFA approach is best suited for testing
measurement equivalence across groups and is therefore superior to other techniques (Reeskens and
Hooghe 2008).
2 Scholars agree that it is necessary to diﬀerentiate between political and social trust. Political trust
refers to trust in political institutions (e.g. parliament, government, etc.); social trust is an attitude
that people have toward each other (Newton 2001; Newton and Zmerli 2011; Zmerli, Newton and
Montero 2007). This article is concerned exclusively with social trust and we use 'trust' throughout
to refer to 'social trust'.
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there are diﬀerent forms of social trust depending on its target. Whereas in the former
case individuals are expected to display the same level of trust regardless of the target
of trust, in the latter case, however, they are thought to display diﬀerent levels of trust
toward diﬀerent targets.
Accordingly, a ﬁrst idea holds that trust is a one-dimensional coherent phenomenon
(Omodei and McLennan 2000; Whiteley 2000). On the basis of principal component
analyses, Whiteley (2000, 450), for example, argues that across a large number of soci-
eties, trust in both people we know and in people we do not know build a single factor.
In his analyses, trust in the family, in the fellow national citizens, and in people in
general are all elements of a single concept.
In general, however, trust research works with a multi-dimensional conception of so-
cial trust. Here, the literature primarily identiﬁes two distinct kinds of trust, namely
particularized trust and generalized trust (see Freitag and Traunmüller 2009; Oskarsson,
Svensson and Öberg 2009; Newton and Zmerli 2011; Stolle 2002; Uslaner 2002; Yamagishi
and Yamagishi 1994). Particularized trust is trust at close social range and is exhibited
toward people the individual personally knows from everyday interactions (e.g. friends,
neighbors, and co-workers). On the contrary, generalized trust is a rather abstract atti-
tude toward people in general, encompassing people beyond one's immediate familiarity,
including strangers (e.g. random people one meets on the street, etc.). Generalized trust
diﬀers from particularized trust in that it deals with unknown groups and/or strangers
and does not predominantly depend upon speciﬁc situations (Stolle 2002).
Apart from these two extreme forms of social trust one could think of trusting a per-
son with whom one does not have a personal relationship but with whom one shares a
common identity. This kind of trust is called identity, group, or category-based trust
(see also Kramer 1999; Stolle 2002). Drawing on the social identity theory developed by
Tajfel (1974) and Tajfel and Turner (1979), this conception of trust is based mainly on
identiﬁcation and categorization. Shared identity could include behavioral similarities,
geographical proximities, common fate, mores, ethnicity, or traditions (Stolle 2002, 401).
Social categorization is assumed to amplify the perceived similarity among individuals
who share membership in a social category, which in turn increases the perception that
others identify the situation in a similar manner (Stolle 2002, 402). In general, it is
assumed that people tend to trust those with whom they share a group identity or a
membership in a given category more than people with whom they do not (Brewer 1981;
Kramer 1999).
Identity-based trust diﬀers from particularized trust and generalized trust: Identity-based
trust is not particularized because the truster may confer this sort of trust on another
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person without knowing him or her personally. In the case of identity-based trust, per-
sonal experience with the target of trust is therefore not a prerequisite to having a high or
low level of this type of social trust. People may judge others to be trustworthy because
their membership in a given category bypasses the need for personal knowledge. For
instance, individual A might judge someone belonging to the same religious denomina-
tion or nationality as trustworthy, simply because he or she also belongs to this category
(Yuki et al. 2005). Identity-based trust may however be cognitively-based on personal
experience: Individuals may collect personal experience with people belonging to a cer-
tain category and subsequently project their positive experience on others belonging to
this category. Moreover, identity-based trust diﬀers from generalized trust because in
contrast to targets in the generalized trust view, individuals have at least some informa-
tion about the category of the target, and, as a consequence, experience should play a
far greater role than disposition.
In addition to the discussion of forms of social trust, we have observed a remarkable un-
ease among scholars regarding the cross-cultural measurement of social trust constructs.
An increasing number of studies have used survey data to compare the climate of so-
cial trust that exists in speciﬁc societies using various data sources (Adam 2008; Delhey,
Newton and Welzel 2011; Inglehart 2000; Pichler and Wallace 2007). At the same time,
however, critics argue that serious limitations exist-either in the form of a situational
or a semantic and culturally conditioned understanding of the wording of the question
or statement. Respondents potentially understand and interpret the meaning of a given
survey question diﬀerently in diﬀerent cultural contexts, which would therefore render
comparative research on trust a futile undertaking (Adam 2008, 164, 177, Reeskens and
Hooghe 2008; Miller and Mitamura 2003; Torpe and Lolle 2011; Sturgis and Smith 2010;
van der Veld and Saris 2011). Measurement equivalence of social trust constructs there-
fore cannot be considered as a given fact. Meaningful and interpretable comparisons of
trust constructs and their relations to other variables across contexts are however only
possible when equivalence is guaranteed (Deth 2009). We thus need to determine that the
measurement characteristics of the relevant constructs are in fact invariant across these
entities (Davidov 2009, 65). A growing awareness of this issue has been documented
in recent studies with regard to the concept of generalized trust (Delhey, Newton and
Welzel 2011; Torpe and Lolle 2011; Reeskens and Hooghe 2008; van der Veld and Saris
2011); however, to this date, and the best of our knowledge, no single study exists that
scrutinizes measurement equivalence of particularized, generalized, and identity-based
social trust.
In sum, the above discussion of diﬀerent forms of trust leads us to the following hypoth-
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esis: Individuals are likely to diﬀerentiate between three diﬀerent forms of social trust,
namely particularized trust, generalized trust, and identity-based trust. Moreover, we
believe that the diﬀerentiation between three diﬀerent forms of trust is valid across cul-
tural contexts. Therefore, we hypothesize that despite the apparent cultural diﬀerences
among the linguistic regions in Switzerland, our measurement model is equivalent across
the German, French, and Italian-speaking regions.
2.2 Data, operationalization, and methodology
Table 2.1: Items measuring trust in Volunteering in Swiss Municipalities 2010
Item Question wording
Most people Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that
you can't be too careful in dealing with people? Using a scale on which 0
means that you can't be too careful in dealing with people and 10 means
that most people can be trusted, where would you locate yourself on this
scale?
Friends And how does it look like for certain groups of persons. If you take again
the scale from 0 to 10, on which 0 means no trust at all and 10 a lot of
trust, how great is your trust in your friends?
Neighbors ..in your neighbors?
Meet ﬁrst time ..in persons that you meet for the ﬁrst time?
Other religion ..in persons of another religion?
Other nationality ..in persons of another nationality?
Data were collected as part of the survey Volunteering in Swiss Municipalities 2010
that provides us with an opportunity to inspect the measurement characteristics of the
distinct dimensions of social trust as outlined above. The survey collected data for 4955
individuals located in 60 diﬀerent communes in Switzerland.3 The overall response rate
was 30 percent (RR1, AAPOR 2011). The response rates cluster around 30% across the
60 communes or the three language regions (see online appendix A).
Like the World Values Survey 2005-2008, the Swiss survey contains questions referring
to trust in most people, in persons one meets for the ﬁrst time, in friends, in neighbors,
in people of another religion, and in people of another nationality. Each of these items
consists of 11-point answering scales ranging from 0 (do not trust at all) to 10 (trust
3 The individuals in these communes were randomly chosen and questioned by means of CATI. The
communes have been chosen according to certain criteria (size, cultural-linguistic region, rural-
ity) in order to represent the variety among Swiss communes. The data can be downloaded at
www2.unil.ch/fors/?lang=de.
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a lot) (see Table 2.1).4 Additional analyses were conducted using data from the interna-
tional World Values Survey 2005-2008 (see the online appendix B for more information
on the survey and questions used in this analysis).5
To test the above-assumed relations, we conduct a two-step procedure. First, to evaluate
the dimensionality of social trust, we conduct several conﬁrmatory factor analyses (Fig-
ure 2.1; Model A, B and C). Here, the indicators are regarded as manifest symptoms that
are inﬂuenced (caused) by one or more latent constructs (Brown 2006, 105). Against the
backdrop of our theoretical considerations, we test whether trust forms a single factor
(Model A) or if it is rather a multi-dimensional concept (Model B and C). Regarding
trust as a two-dimensional concept, conventional wisdom refers to the latent constructs
of particularized and generalized trust (Torpe and Lolle 2011). Most scholars suggest
that trust in people of other religions and ethnicities should be related to the form of
generalized trust (Delhey, Newton and Welzel 2011; Badescu 2003). According to this
account, trust in people of a diﬀerent religion or nationality, trust in people you meet
for the ﬁrst time, and trust in most people should belong to generalized trust, whereas
particularized trust should be measured with the items trust in neighbors, and trust
in her/his friends (Model B).6 In terms of trust as a three-dimensional concept, trust
in neighbors and trust in her/his friends refer to the realm of particularized trust and
trust in people of a diﬀerent religion or nationality belongs to the distinct dimension of
identity-based trust. To measure generalized trust we rely on the items trust in people
you meet for the ﬁrst time and trust in most people (Model C). Strictly speaking,
theoretical explanations concerning identity-based trust would require numerous ques-
tions querying trust in a wide variety of shared identities. Our data however precludes
4 The trust questions were located in a battery whereby the question order in this battery was changed
at random. The presence of 11 categories does not guarantee that respondents are distributed
across all possible answer categories. Additional analyses (not documented here) reveal that all
measurements except for the indicator trust in friends are quite dispersed. Some might argue that
unweighted least squares parameter estimations (ULS) should be used. Corresponding empirical
analyses do not change the reported empirical results (not documented here). Moreover, one could
argue that survey participation is related to levels of trust. In our case both respondents with
high as well as very low levels of social trust participated in the survey, e.g. the answers are quite
dispersed across our trust-scales.
5 See the World Values Survey website (http://www.wvsevsdb.com/) for general information about
this survey.
6 It is often argued that the trust question referring to most people is critically underspeciﬁed, lead-
ing respondents to ﬁll in their own speciﬁcations (Nannestad 2008, 417). Consequently, responses to
the generalized trust question may be partially or totally incomparable across individuals, groups,
or countries. Moreover, they may not be expressions of generalized trust at all, and instead focus
on people personally known or may simply evaluate the quality of political institutions (Beugelsdijk
2006; Delhey and Newton 2005; Torpe and Lolle 2011; Sturgis and Smith 2010). According to many
scholars, however, trusting most people means simply that we trust strangers (Uslaner 2002, 52).
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this possibility. We refer to categories/identities such as nationality or religion that sep-
arate individuals belonging to these categories from the respondent. In other words, the
trust we have in a certain group that shares our identity is deﬁned by the boundaries
that separate our group from other categories and groups (for this line of argumentation
see also Oﬀe 1999, 63-65.7 According to Meuleman and Billiet (2006), a factor analytic
measurement model can be represented as follows:
xgj   τ
g
j  λ
g
jξ
g
 δgj (Equation 1)
In this equation, each indicator xgj is modeled as a regression function of latent factor ξ
g,
with intercept τ gj , regression slope or factor loading λ
g
j , and stochastic error term δ
g
j . The
subscript j represents the diﬀerent items. The superscript g indicates a possible group
membership, which is of importance when investigating measurement equivalence later
on (Steenkamp and Baumgartner 1998, 79; Meuleman and Billiet 2006). Since our data
do not display multivariate normality, we use maximum likelihood parameter estimates
with standard errors and a mean-adjusted chi-square test statistic that are robust to
non-normality to estimate the parameters in our models (MLM). Listwise deletion was
used for missing values since MLM necessitates complete data.8
Second, we scrutinize the cross-cultural measurement invariance regarding the superior
conception of social trust using multiple-group conﬁrmatory factor analysis (MGCFA).
Measurement invariance (or equivalence) is deﬁned as whether or not, under diﬀerent
conditions observing and studying phenomena, measurement observations yield measures
of the same attribute (Davidov 2009, 68). Following the literature on this topic, we can
distinguish three diﬀerent levels of measurement invariance (see also Meredith 1993).
The basic level of measurement equivalence or measurement invariance is conﬁgural in-
variance. The presence of conﬁgural invariance implies that our latent constructs can
be measured by the same items across the investigated groups in a cross-cultural study.
Conﬁgural invariance is supported if (a) a single model specifying the items that measure
each construct ﬁts the data well, (b) all item loadings are substantial and signiﬁcant, and
(c) the correlations between the factors are less than one (Steenkamp and Baumgartner
1998, 80).
7 This line of argumentation also reﬂects seminal ﬁndings of the socio-psychological literature begin-
ning with Sumner (1906) that indicate that positive sentiments toward the in-group were correlated
with hostility toward out-groups and vice versa. Moreover, according to Brewer (1981) and Stolle
(2002), within these in-groups of shared identities the probability of reciprocity and trust is assumed
to be high.
8 In addition, MLM estimation corrects the chi-squared as well as the standard errors of the parameter
estimates for non-normality in large samples (Satorra and Bentler 2001; Brown 2006, 76).
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Conﬁgural invariance does not however ensure that people belonging to diﬀerent cultural
contexts understand the items in the same way. The factor loadings may continue to be
diﬀerent across contexts; therefore, the test of the second level of measurement invari-
ance, metric invariance, requires that the factor loadings between the observed items and
the latent construct are invariant across these contexts. This is tested by constraining
the factor loadings of each item on its corresponding construct to be the same across
groups (cf. equation 1: factor loadings λ of the respective items j are held constant
across the groups g).9 Only if metric invariance is assured, can scores on the item and
on the scale be compared cross-culturally. In other words, an increase of one unit in the
latent variable would have the same meaning for all groups being compared (Meuleman
and Billiet 2006, 4).
Conﬁgural and metric invariance are not suﬃcient to ensure a valid comparison of means
of both the observed and latent variables across cultural contexts. Here, a third level of
invariance, the so-called scalar invariance is necessary. Scalar invariance guarantees that
cross-context diﬀerences in the means of the observed items are a result of diﬀerences
in the means of their corresponding constructs. While factor loadings are kept constant
across groups to establish metric invariance, the scalar invariance test is even stricter,
as intercepts are also constrained across groups (cf. equation 1: loadings λ as well as
intercepts τ of the respective items j are held constant across groups g) (Steenkamp and
Baumgartner 1998, 80).
Altogether, meaningful comparisons of construct means across groups require three levels
of invariance: conﬁgural, metric, and scalar. Only if all three types of invariance are met
can we assume that scores are not biased. In other words, if we can demonstrate the
three levels of invariance for our appropriate conception of social trust across the cultural
contexts, it becomes clear that our preferred conception of trust can be reliably used in
cross-cultural research on the contexts under investigation.
To test the adequacy of our measurement models we rely on diﬀerent ﬁt indices, namely
the RMSEA (root mean square error of approximation), the SRMR (standardized root
mean square residual), the CFI (comparative ﬁt index), and the TLI (Tucker-Lewis in-
dex).10 When the RMSEA is smaller than 0.06 (0.08), one can assume the model has
9 Various scholars argue that partial invariance may be suﬃcient to allow cross-cultural comparison
(Steenkamp and Baumgartner 1998). In this regard, only two equal factor loadings per construct
across countries are necessary. To resort to partial invariance, however, one needs at least three
indicators per construct (Brown 2006; Byrne, Shavelson and Muthén 1989; Byrne 2010).
10 For the sake of convenience, we also report chi-square scores. One must however keep in mind that
the chi-square test statistic is very sensitive to sample size. Since the sample sizes in this analysis
are very large, the chi-square test statistic is a rather inaccurate indicator of model ﬁt (Davidov
2009; Reeskens and Hooghe 2008; Brown 2006; Byrne 2010).
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Figure 2.1: Model A, B and C
Note: In the empirical analysis factor loadings indexed by 1 in the ﬁgure were set to 1 for identiﬁcation
purposes.
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a good (acceptable) ﬁt to the data. SRMR (value smaller than 0.08) and both the
TLI and CFI (values larger than 0.95) provide further indications of a good model ﬁt
(Hu and Bentler 1999; Marsh, Hau and Wen 2004).11 In addition, to evaluate which of
our three trust models (see Figure 2.1) comparatively provides the best ﬁt, we rely on
the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). Comparably lower values indicate better model
ﬁt (Brown 2006, 175 f.). Finally, diﬀerences between ﬁt measures (CFI and RMSEA)
of the multi-group-models - representing conﬁgural, metric, and scalar variance - are
used to evaluate measurement invariance. [F]or testing loading invariance, a change
of B -.005 in CFI, supplemented by a change of C .010 in RMSEA [...] would indicate
non-invariance and a change of C -.005 in CFI, supplemented by a change of C .010
in RMSEA [...] would indicate non-invariance when testing intercept [...] invariance
(Chen 2007, 501).12 Moreover, Saris, Satorra and van der Veld (2009) strongly argue
that one should further evaluate (local) model ﬁt taking the expected parameter change
in combination with the modiﬁcation index (MI) and the power of the MI test into ac-
count. Following their recommendations we use the free software JRule for Mplus that
automates this procedure (Oberski 2009).
2.3 Empirical results
In the following we ﬁrst present our empirical results regarding the diﬀerent models of
social trust, i.e. one-dimensional, two-dimensional, and three-dimensional conceptions.
As one can see in Table 2.2 the three models diﬀer strikingly with regard to model ﬁt. To
begin with, the one-dimensional trust-model, with the exception of the SRMR (0.041 B
0.08), shows only poor ﬁt measures. Similarly, Model B where our manifest variables are
explained by two latent factors displays only acceptable values for the SRMR (0.033 B
0.08) and the CFI (0.953 C 0.95). In contrast, the three-dimensional trust-model (Model
C) exhibits by far the best ﬁt compared to the models that posit alternative structures:
All ﬁt measures pass the thresholds recommended by Hu and Bentler (1999). Addition-
ally, the values for the AIC are smallest for Model C, corroborating the fact that it ﬁts
the data better compared to the other two models.13 In other words, the analyses seem
to support the perspective that individuals diﬀerentiate between the three dimensions of
11 We conducted our analyses in R. R-version 2.12.1 relying on the R-package lavaan. Additionally,
the results were replicated with MPLUS 6.1.
12 Chen (2007, 501) suggests to use these more stringent cut-oﬀ values when the sample size is small
(total N B 300), sample sizes are unequal, and the pattern of non-invariance is uniform.
13 The classical chi-square diﬀerence test (not reported here) also shows that the 3-factor model ﬁts
the observed data signiﬁcantly better than the other two models. Moreover, taking sample sizes
into consideration, the modiﬁcation indices for Model C are acceptable (see online appendix C)
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social trust represented by the three latent factors in our models.14
Table 2.2: Dimensionality of social trust - model ﬁt
Model Chi-Squared Df SRMR RMSEA TLI CFI AIC
1: One dimension 271.46 9 0.041 0.082 0.884 0.93 99542
2: Two dimensions 185.58 8 0.033 0.072 0.911 0.953 99381
3: Three dimensions 24.71 6 0.012 0.027 0.988 0.995 99096
Note: N = 4289; Missing values were treated with listwise deletion; MLM-estimator with
robust standard errors and Satorra-Bentler scaled test statistic; RMSEA = Root mean square
error of approximation; CFI = Comparative ﬁt index; TLI = Tucker-Lewis Index; SRMR =
Standardized root mean square residual; AIC = Akaike Information Criterion;
Table 2.3: Loadings of the three-dimensional trust model
Estimate Std. err P(>|z|) Loadings
Particularized trust -> Friends 1 0.58
Particularized trust -> Neighbors 1.637*** 0.086 0 0.685
Generalized trust -> Most people 1 0.654
Generalized trust -> Meet ﬁrst time 1.057*** 0.037 0 0.716
Identity-based trust -> Other religion 1 0.754
Identity-based trust -> Other nationality 0.997*** 0.034 0 0.778
Note: N= 4289; Missing values were treated with listwise deletion; MLM-estimator with
robust standard errors and Satorra-Bentler scaled test statistic; *** = p<.01; Loadings
display standardized values;
In addition, if we deﬁne a standardized factor loading of 0.30 or above as a salient load-
ing (Brown 2006, 130), the loadings of the three-dimensional trust-model are satisfyingly
high and all are signiﬁcant (see Table 2.3). Moreover, it is apparent that in this sample
the indicator trust in most people loads on the same factor as trust in people you meet
for the ﬁrst time, indicating that both indicators measure the same latent factor that we
termed generalized trust. Finally, the standardized co-variances between the three trust
dimensions are relatively high and positive (particularized trust  generalized trust =
0.795; particularized trust  identity-based trust = 0.661; generalized trust  identity-
based trust = 0.788), but below a value of 0.85, which is often used as cutoﬀ criterion
in contrast to the modiﬁcation indices obtained in Model A and B that reach values of up to 178
(Model B) and 206 (Model A) (estimations are available upon request).
14 Following Uslaner (2002, 28) particularized trust uses group categories to classify people as members
of in-groups or out-groups (do you belong, or don't you). If we measure particularized trust
with trust in neighbors, trust in her/his friends, and trust in people of a diﬀerent religion or
nationality, whereas the items trust in people you meet for the ﬁrst time, and trust in most
people reﬂect generalized trust, the model exhibits an even worse ﬁt than our Model B.
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since it indicates problematic discriminant validity (Brown 2006, 166).
All in all, we conclude that compared to the alternative conceptions of social trust as a sin-
gle construct or two-dimensional formulation, our analyses support the three-dimensional
trust-model. In other words, particularized, identity-based, and generalized trust emerge
as three distinct constructs in our analysis. This holds also in separate analyses (not
shown here) for the three language regions in Switzerland.15
In the next step we turn to the aspect of measurement equivalence of the outstand-
ing three-dimensional trust-model. We ﬁrst present three single-group CFAs for the
three language regions of Switzerland (see Table 2.4). (Brown 2006, 269), for example,
highlights the importance of conducting single-group analyses prior to multi-group com-
parison. As Table 2.4 shows, our measurement model provides a good ﬁt for all of the
cultural regions. To test for conﬁgural, metric, and scalar invariance of our three-factor
solution of social trust, we further constructed one multiple-group measurement model.
Following other studies we employ a bottom-up test strategy to analyze our data. We
start with the weakest level of invariance (conﬁgural invariance) and then sequentially
test metric and scalar invariance (Brown 2006, 269; Byrne 2010; Davidov 2009). This
allows us to establish whether weak forms of invariance can be viewed as unproblematic,
a logical ﬁrst step given that we are confronted with a hitherto unexplored research area.
With regard to the ﬁt indices of the conﬁgural invariance model displayed in Table 2.4,
we cannot reject this model. That is, we can consider the speciﬁcation of the items that
index particularized, identity-based, and generalized trust as invariant for three cultural
regions of Switzerland. Moreover, as shown in Table 2.5 the respective model consists of
the same substantial and signiﬁcant item loadings, and correlations between the factors
are less than one.
Based on the results of the metric invariance model, which constrains the factor load-
ings of the indicators of the three trust dimensions to be equal across the three regions,
we also cannot reject the model. Finally, scalar invariance is necessary to compare the
means of the trust constructs across the three cultures. Accordingly, in the third model
the intercepts of indicators are set equal across the language regions in addition to the
factor loadings between the indicators and the constructs. Again, the ﬁt indices indicate
that this more restrictive model is not rejected.
15 We also estimated a second-order model. A single trust factor on the second level explains sub-
stantial parts of the variance in the three single trust constructs with standardized loadings of 0.97
(generalized trust), 0.82 (particularized trust) and 0.81 (identity-based trust). This could be due
to a latent 'trustingness' structure (e.g. variance in all trust judgments can be explained by an
individual's disposition to trust) or a battery eﬀect. Future studies are needed to evaluate these
two possibilities.
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Moving from the conﬁgural to the model of metric equivalence decreases the RMSEA
by 0.002 and does not change the CFI. Moving from metric to scalar equivalence model
increases the RMSEA by 0.007 and decreases the CFI by 0.006 (see Table 2.4). These
values are below the cut-oﬀ values for changes in ﬁt measures proposed by (Chen 2007)
and are indicative of measurement invariance across all three levels.16
In sum, conﬁgural, metric, and scalar invariance hold across the three cultural contexts in
Switzerland. In other words, comparing the means of the latent constructs particularized,
identity-based, and generalized trust between the three cultural regions is possible. The
constructs of particularized, identity-based, and generalized trust can therefore be con-
sidered as cross-culturally valid concepts in three cultural regions in Switzerland. This
result is encouraging as it indicates that despite the diﬀerent cultural regions within
Switzerland, this diversity does not constitute a hurdle for comparative analyses of con-
structs of social trust on the sub-national level.
These optimistic results notwithstanding, the general problem of how to approach the
arguments presented in a cross-national perspective remains. Although our research de-
sign permits us to make cross-cultural comparisons, it should be noted that all of the
comparisons took place within a single national context. To what extent, if any, does
a shared national context undercut our ability to make inferences about equivalency
across other cultural contexts? In theory, several scholars emphasized the diversity of
the three Swiss regions. For instance, Stein Rokkan once called Switzerland a microcosm
of Europe because of its cultural, linguistic, religious, and regional diversity (Linder
1994, xii). In addition, Switzerland has been described as composed of three groups that
stand with their backs to each other (Steiner 2001, 145). Studies have also shown that
the three Swiss cultural-linguistic regions have more in common with their neighboring
countries than with each other regarding speciﬁc aspects of civil society and cultural
life (Freitag and Stadelmann-Steﬀen 2008; Kriesi et al. 1996; Meier-Dallach 1991): The
French-Swiss stand facing towards France; the Italian-Swiss facing towards Italy; and
the German-Swiss facing towards Germany, each focused on their own internal cultural
life and the culture of the neighboring country whose language they share (Kymlicka
2003, 155). Against this backdrop, we carried out additional analyses with data from the
16 Additionally, local misspeciﬁcation of the diﬀerent MGCFA models was evaluated using JRule for
Mplus ﬁxing high power C 0.75 and a type I error rate of 0.05. No conclusive evidence of mis-
speciﬁcation was found using the following delta values for unstandardized parameters: conﬁgural
invariance model (0.3 for error covariances); metric invariance model (0.4 for loadings); scalar in-
variance model (0.4 for loadings, 0.4 for intercepts). Moreover, the ﬁxed loadings (both for the
metric and the scalar invariance model) were approximately equal to the freed loadings in the single
group models without equivalence restrictions (estimations not shown here, but are available upon
request).
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World Values Survey 2005-2008 for Switzerland and the neighboring countries (France,
Germany, and Italy) plus the Anglo-American world (Great Britain, the United States
and Canada) (see Table 2.6).
Table 2.6: Fit measures for three models for diﬀerent countries
Country Model A Model B Model C
Great Britain (n=771)
Chi =271.29 Chi =143.971 Chi =11.772
CFI =0.978 CFI =0.988 CFI =1
TLI =0.963 TLI =0.978 TLI =0.999
RMSEA =0.194 RMSEA =0.148 RMSEA =0.035
WRMR =2.508 WRMR =1.763 WRMR =0.442
Canada(n=1937)
Chi =457.634 Chi =334.21 Chi =24.298
CFI =0.97 CFI =0.978 CFI =0.999
TLI =0.949 TLI =0.959 TLI =0.997
RMSEA =0.16 RMSEA =0.145 RMSEA =0.04
WRMR =3.204 WRMR =2.63 WRMR =0.646
France(n=935)
Chi =177.889 Chi =143.843 Chi =17.79
CFI =0.938 CFI =0.95 CFI =0.996
TLI =0.896 TLI =0.906 TLI =0.989
RMSEA =0.142 RMSEA =0.135 RMSEA =0.046
WRMR =1.94 WRMR =1.731 WRMR =0.554
Germany (n=1593)
Chi =451.857 Chi =257.381 Chi =13.241
CFI =0.979 CFI =0.988 CFI =1
TLI =0.966 TLI =0.978 TLI =0.999
RMSEA =0.176 RMSEA =0.14 RMSEA =0.028
WRMR =2.998 WRMR =2.153 WRMR =0.437
Italy (n=821)
Chi =387.272 Chi =183.769 Chi =8.363
CFI =0.95 CFI =0.977 CFI =1
TLI =0.917 TLI =0.956 TLI =0.999
RMSEA =0.226 RMSEA =0.164 RMSEA =0.022
WRMR =2.924 WRMR =1.895 WRMR =0.338
Switzerland (n=1086)
Chi =326.821 Chi =254.884 Chi =5.48
CFI =0.967 CFI =0.975 CFI =1
TLI =0.946 TLI =0.952 TLI =1
RMSEA =0.18 RMSEA =0.169 RMSEA =0
WRMR =2.596 WRMR =2.252 WRMR =0.272
USA (n=1189)
Chi =286.845 Chi =217.729 Chi =38.922
CFI =0.974 CFI =0.981 CFI =0.997
TLI =0.957 TLI =0.964 TLI =0.992
RMSEA =0.161 RMSEA =0.148 RMSEA =0.068
WRMR =2.462 WRMR =2.128 WRMR =0.759
Note: Data = WVS 2005; Following Yu (2002, 41, 162) we used the WRMR
(Weighted Root Mean Square Residual) instead of the SRMR in combination with
other standard ﬁt measures to assess model ﬁt. AWRMR value of < 0.95 indicates
acceptable model ﬁt. Estimator: Weighted least square parameter estimator using
a diagonal weight matrix with robust standard errors and mean- and variance-
adjusted χ2 test statistic (WLSMV in Mplus); See online appendix B for a more
speciﬁc description of models estimated and the items/ﬁt indices cutoﬀ values
used in the analysis.
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The results obtained from these supplemental analyses seem to support our argument
regarding the dimensionality of social trust. The considerable increase in diﬀerent ﬁt
measures when comparing Models A and B to Model C indicates that social trust is
three-dimensional rather than one- or two-dimensional for all seven countries under in-
vestigation. Again, all ﬁt measures pass the thresholds recommended by Hu and Bentler
(1999) and Yu (2002) with regard to categorical data. The ﬁndings therefore support
the view that the conﬁguration of our measurement model is equivalent across these
countries. Hence, our analyses provide an optimistic outlook with regards to future com-
parative analyses that investigate forms of social trust across diﬀerent national cultures.
Moreover, as the majority of past research employs the conventional dichotomy of the
forms of trust: particularized vs. generalized trust, our study suggests testing for the
possibility of additional dimensions of trust. This could be particularly relevant when
using data from the World Values Surveys.
2.4 Conclusion
Despite the growing awareness in the social science literature of the importance of social
trust, little systematic research has explicitly addressed the question of which distinct
forms of social trust can be identiﬁed, both theoretically as well as empirically, and if
measurement of these forms of social trust is cross-culturally equivalent. If social trust is
to be considered a major asset for a society, it becomes absolutely necessary to develop
a valid measurement of this attitude. The aim of the present article was to provide a
ﬁrst step toward ﬁlling this gap as well as to spark a new debate. While most empirical
analyses hitherto propose two dimensions of social trust (Delhey, Newton and Welzel
2011; Freitag and Traunmüller 2009; Glanville and Paxton 2007; Uslaner 2002), we in-
troduce a three-dimensional concept of trust, referring to particularized, identity-based,
and generalized trust. To date, a systematic comparative investigation of these three
types of trust simply does not exist.
From our analyses we derive the following conclusions: First, drawing on the literature
on trust, we concluded that diﬀerent forms of trust can indeed be theoretically identi-
ﬁed. More speciﬁcally, we have distinguished an intimate form of trust toward personally
known people (particularized trust) from a more abstract trust in unknown people includ-
ing strangers (generalized trust). Additionally, we have referred to identity-based trust
that diﬀers from the other two concepts with regards to the corresponding targets of and
the foundations underlying the trust judgments. This theoretical structure was tested in
conﬁrmatory factor analyses using data from Switzerland and was contrasted with views
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positing that there are only one or two dimensions of social trust. As a main ﬁnding,
our empirical analyses support the three-dimensional trust-model. In other words, par-
ticularized, identity-based, and generalized trust emerge as three distinct constructs in
our analysis. While the ﬁrst two dimensions have already been the subjects of a few
survey-based analyses, the identity-based form of trust has yet to be investigated in a
comparative manner. This is somewhat surprising given the increasing cultural, religious,
and ethnic fragmentation of western societies and the growing body of diversity literature
that frequently makes reference to this form of trust.
Second, researchers often compare means and relations of latent variables across coun-
tries without subjecting their measurement to invariance tests. In the present study we
explain why these tests are necessary and applied them to the constructs of social trust
to test their comparability across cultural regions in Switzerland. In doing so, we checked
for conﬁgural, metric, and scalar invariance. Guaranteeing metric invariance leads us to
the conclusion that the meanings of particularized, identity-based, and generalized trust
are most likely the same across these contexts. This is a critical condition for the use
of the three constructs and their corresponding scales in cultural regions in Switzerland.
Additionally, the measurement model reached the level of scalar invariance. In this re-
gard, a comparison of the means of the three latent constructs between German, Italian,
and French-speaking Switzerland is justiﬁed. In sum, there seem to be no culturally
conditioned variations in the understanding and interpretation of the various forms of
social trust. Furthermore, additional analyses show that a three-dimensional conception
of social trust better reﬂects the empirical reality in several countries than a two- or one-
dimensional approach. Frequently employed conceptions therefore require re-evaluation.
Our results do not however challenge the value of previous analyses; instead, the present
ﬁndings should primarily serve to enrich the discussion in empirical trust research with
innovative considerations.
It has to be noted, however, that our results are only suggestive. Although they are a
step in the right direction, we still need further systematic analyses beyond the single
case of Switzerland. Future analyses should extend our preliminary cross-national stud-
ies and compare these models across a larger number of countries as well as investigate
cross-country measurement equivalence.
Another limitation concerns the measurement of concepts. For instance, in our empirical
analyses we relied on identity-based trust indicators that measure trust in people with
identities that diﬀer from the respondent's. We argue that the trust we have in a certain
group that shares our identity is deﬁned by the boundaries that separate our group from
other categories and groups (Oﬀe 1999, 63ﬀ). Clearly, these indicators leave room for
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discussion. More accurate data are however not currently available. At the same time
rejecting the use of these data would preclude the possibility of empirical research in this
area.
In this regard, future studies should draw on more diﬀerentiated data. Our analysis
shows that individuals do not simply diﬀerentiate between trust targets they know and
trust targets they do not know; trust judgments rather are much more complex. We
therefore need survey questions that capture trust in persons belonging to a wide range
of identities/categories, both shared and unshared by the respondent. Depending on the
context, certain identities may be more decisive than others (e.g. ethnic categories should
be more salient in ethnically heterogeneous contexts), and future analyses of identity-
based trust might reveal that there are multiple dimensions of this kind of trust. Ideally,
these trust questions should be as unambiguous as possible and should also specify the
precise object of trust or distrust (see e.g. Hardin 2002). This would allow researchers to
capture a more ﬁne-grained picture of the network of trust relations that exists between
individuals.
In addition, certain limits are imposed on our research design by the limited availability
and reliability of trust items. In order to pin down the given dimensions of social trust
in a more systematic manner, more precise estimates and measures of trust are needed.
To identify the factors, future studies should include a minimum of three indicators per
latent trust variable, as recommended by Brown (2006, 72). Moreover, when designing
questionnaires to investigate social trust the positioning of the given questions should be
considered very carefully so as to avoid methodological pitfalls (e.g. battery eﬀects due
to the location of questions).
Finally, while it was not our aim to investigate the consequences and foundations of
diﬀerent dimensions of social trust, future investigations of its causes and consequences
should take the multi-dimensionality of social trust revealed in this paper into account.
In this respect, using our ﬁndings and specifying how the distinction works to connect
to diﬀerent types of outcome measures would be another type of empirical contribution.
This, however, was beyond the scope of this paper; our study instead aimed to construct
the building blocks to be used as the foundation for similar future analyses.
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3 Negative experiences and trust: A
causal analysis of the eﬀects of
victimization on generalized trust*
Abstract
Generalized trust is praised by many researchers as the foundation of functioning social
systems. An ongoing debate concerns the question if and to what extent experiences im-
pact individuals' generalized trust, as measured with the standard trust survey question.
So far reliable empirical evidence regarding the causal eﬀect of experiences on general-
ized trust is scarce. Studies either do not directly measure the quality of experiences
or use designs that are prone to selection bias. In the present study we investigate a
unique panel data set from Switzerland that contains measures of trust and measures of
negative experiences, i.e. victimization. We employ change score analysis and genetic
matching to investigate the causal eﬀect of victimization on generalized trust and ﬁnd
no substantially strong eﬀect that is consistent across panel data waves.
* This chapter is identical to a manuscript published in the European Sociological Review (Bauer
2014b). I would like to thank Diego Gambetta, Rudi Farys, Fabrizio Bernardi, Markus Freitag,
Matthias Fatke, Marlène Gerber and four anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and
suggestions; This study has been realized using data collected by the Swiss Household Panel (SHP),
which is based at the Swiss Centre of Expertise in the Social Sciences FORS and ﬁnanced by the
Swiss National Science Foundation.
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3.1 Introduction
Do (negative) experiences inﬂuence generalized trust? Generalized trust is deﬁned as the
belief that most people can be trusted (Uslaner 2002, 21) and may be more generally
understood as a standard estimate of the trustworthiness of the average person one en-
counters (Coleman 1990, 104, Glanville and Paxton 2007). Besides praising generalized
trust as an important ingredient for the functioning of societies, organizations, political
and economic systems (Algan and Cahuc 2013; Barber 1983; Fukuyama 1995; Gambetta
1990; Herreros 2004; Kramer 1999; Nooteboom 2002; Uslaner 2002; Sztompka 1999) re-
searchers debate to this day to what extent experiences impact generalized trust. A ﬁrst
view is that generalized trust is a stable expectation, a propensity innate or learned in
early life but not linked to experience collected throughout one's life (Becker 1996; Gid-
dens 1991; Jones 1996; Uslaner 2008a, 2002; Wilson 1993; Wrightsman 1992). A second
view holds that experiences do very well matter for generalized trust (Coleman 1990; Fre-
itag and Traunmüller 2009; Glanville, Andersson and Paxton 2013; Glanville and Paxton
2007; Hardin 2002). The empirical evidence regarding this question is mixed. A re-
lated debate concerns the costs of crime and more speciﬁcally the eﬀects of victimization
(Averdijk 2010; Braakmann 2011; Brand, Price and Britain 2000; Entorf and Spengler
2002; Fischer 1984; Lejeune and Alex 1973). It has long been argued that crime hurts
societies because experiences in the form of victimization aﬀect individuals' generalized
expectations regarding others' trustworthiness and, as a consequence, individuals' incli-
nation to cooperate with others.
We contribute to these two debates in the following way: First, while most trust research
uses experience-based theoretical arguments (cf. Glanville, Andersson and Paxton 2013;
Ingen and Bekkers 2013; Sturgis, Patulny and Allum 2009), few studies (for notable ex-
ceptions see Section 2) directly measure the quality of the actual experiences. Mostly
studies assume that certain variables such as formal membership or frequent social inter-
actions stand for positive experiences. By focusing on and measuring negative experiences
we provide a direct investigation into the experience - generalized trust relationship. In
general, this gap in research is somewhat surprising, since it is commonly claimed that
trust is easily destroyed (Baier 1986; Slovic 1993). Second, while research on the direct
costs of crime is more straight forward (Brand, Price and Britain 2000; Cohen 2004),
the indirect costs have received far less attention. Evidence on the eﬀects of victimiza-
tion is largely based on interviews of non-randomly selected victims and not drawn from
comparisons with suitable control groups (cf. Averdijk 2010; Fischer 1984; Lejeune and
Alex 1973). Our study adds to these more qualitative studies and contributes to existing
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knowledge. Third, ours is the ﬁrst study to focus on the causal eﬀect of negative expe-
riences on trust. Instead of relying on cross-sectional data (cf. Brehm and Rahn 1997;
Salmi, Smolej and Kivivuori 2007) we rely on several panel waves and employ change
scores analysis in combination with matching which is a considerable step forward com-
pared to earlier research. Our benchmark is an ideal thought experiment that we use to
reveal potential threats to the validity of our ﬁndings.
Below we start by presenting arguments and evidence for two competing hypotheses.
Then we elaborate further on the design of the study. Subsequently, we outline the
data and the measures used. Then we present the empirical results before discussing the
ﬁndings and drawing a conclusion.
3.2 Experiences and generalized trust: Hypotheses and evidence
In developing our hypotheses we have to bear in mind that we investigate the impact of
negative experiences - that one collects with speciﬁc persons - on generalized trust, i.e.
a standard estimate or standard expectation regarding others' behavior. The idea that
individuals adapt their expectations regarding speciﬁc others and speciﬁc behaviors such
as a neighbor who misbehaves and doesn't return the borrowed lawn-mower is relatively
straightforward. In this case trust in the neighbor should change following the negative
experience. However, the idea of expectation adaption is less straightforward with re-
gard to the concept of generalized trust. Accordingly, a ﬁrst scholarly position holds that
experiences do not or do hardly matter for generalized trust. In contrast, it is a sta-
ble psychological propensity (Becker 1996; Jones 1996; Uslaner 1999, 2002; Wrightsman
1992; Couch and Jones 1997). Uslaner (2002) draws on Erikson (1968, 103) and suggests
that generalized trust is largely unaﬀected by experiences with others such as friends and
neighbors. Rather individuals will have high (or low) levels of generalized trust because
of their early life experiences which are largely connected to their parents.1 Therefore,
generalized trust is not experience-based trust (Uslaner 2008a, 291). Besides, as argued
above, experiences - negative or positive - are likely to aﬀect our expectations regarding
the speciﬁc trustees with whom we collect those experiences but less so our generalized
expectations: Although some victims reported a general mistrust of people as a conse-
quence of victimization, their mistrust is often focused on groups of people that share
demographic characteristics with the speciﬁc oﬀenders that committed violence against
them, notably immigrants and men (Averdijk 2010, 128).
1 There is also a debate on the impact of genes on trust (Oskarsson et al. 2012; Van Lange, Vinkhuyzen
and Posthuma 2014).
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Empirical research lends some support to this ﬁrst position by showing that there is a
strong correlation between generalized trust and optimism which, in turn, seems to be
a stable trait that is rooted in childhood socialization (Uslaner 2002) and that general-
ized trust is rather stable throughout an individual's lifetime (Uslaner 2002, 162-165).
Research investigating the impact of positive experiences (through proxy variables such
as voluntary engagement or membership) partly ﬁnds no causal relationship with gen-
eralized trust. Ingen and Bekkers (2013) analyze ﬁve panel studies and ﬁnd that the
presumed positive causal eﬀect of engagement on trust is most probably due to selection.
Bekkers (2012) ﬁnds no eﬀect of volunteering on trust relying on a 4-year panel study.
Finally, Sturgis, Patulny and Allum (2009) ﬁnd no causal eﬀect of formal or informal
connections on trust relying on the British Household Panel Study. Another study that
relies on a panel of immigrants from Turkey, Pakistan and former Yugoslavia living in
Denmark ﬁnds no eﬀect of discrimination experiences through teachers on generalized
trust (Dinesen 2010). Above arguments and evidence on the irrelevance of experiences
lead to a ﬁrst research hypothesis: Negative experiences do not have a negative eﬀect on
generalized trust (H0).
Other scholars argue that experiences do very well impact generalized trust (Coleman
1990; Glanville and Paxton 2007; Hardin 2002; Oﬀe 1999; Rotter and Stein 1971; Burns,
Kinder and Rahn 2003; Stack 1978; Yosano and Hayashi 2005), assuming that individuals
should generalize from experiences with speciﬁc others. Especially, with regard to neg-
ative experiences, i.e. victimization, scholars have long argued that it might undermine
individuals' sense of trust: [V]ictimization [...] changes one's perceptions of and beliefs
about others in society [...] by indicating others as sources of threat or harm rather than
sources of support (Macmillan 2001, 12). There are common psychological responses
across victims and varying victimization experiences. These come in the form of a shat-
tering of basic assumptions held about themselves and their world (Janoﬀ-Bulman and
Frieze 1983, 1). Even minor victimizations such as burglary or robbery may cause
considerable suﬀering and lead to reactions such as anxiety, fear and depression (Janoﬀ-
Bulman and Frieze 1983, 2). The process of victimization can then be seen as a process
that involves rebuilding one's assumptive world (Janoﬀ-Bulman and Frieze 1983, 1).
Hence, generalized trusting expectations regarding others' behavior may change in this
process (Bard and Sangrey 1986; Fischer 1984; Lejeune and Alex 1973; Macmillan 2001;
McCann, Sakheim and Abrahamson 1988).
Empirical research also supports this second position. Glanville and Paxton (2007) ﬁnd
that individuals develop a generalized expectation of trustworthiness based on their ex-
periences with diﬀerent groups of people in localized settings such as the neighborhood.
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Similarly, Freitag and Traunmüller (2009, 798) ﬁnd that trust in speciﬁc others such as
family members can represent a foundation for more generalized trusting expectations.
However, both of these studies rely on cross-sectional data. Glanville, Andersson and
Paxton (2013) ﬁnd that positive changes in informal social ties enhance trust relying on
two panel waves. Li, Pickles and Savage (2005) investigate the British Household Panel
Study and ﬁnd that embeddedness in informal networks and neighborhood attachment
(not simple membership) are related to higher generalized trust. Moreover, perceptions
that one is treated fairly by political authorities seem to matter for generalized trust
(Dinesen 2012; Kumlin and Rothstein 2010). Quantitative empirical evidence regarding
negative experiences is scarce. Research based on the European Social Survey ﬁnds that
individuals who perceive that they belong to a discriminated group have lower levels
of generalized trust (Dinesen and Hooghe 2010). Brehm and Rahn (1997, 1016) rely on
pooled cross-sectional data from the GSS and ﬁnd that burglary victimization undermines
generalized trust. Other cross-sectional analyses ﬁnd eﬀects of victimization experiences
on generalized trust among young people in Finland and Denmark (Dinesen 2012; Salmi,
Smolej and Kivivuori 2007). Generally, cross-sectional data is strongly limited when it
comes to causal inference. In addition, there are diﬀerent studies that investigate the ef-
fects of victimization with in-depth interviews. Fischer (1984, 169) interviews 50 victims
and ﬁnds that victimization experiences are similar to post traumatic stress disorders
with victims experiencing distrust and suspiciousness. Averdijk (2010, 118f) interviews
41 victims and ﬁnds that they report a general mistrust of people as a consequence of
their victimization, but often this mistrust is focused on groups similar to the oﬀend-
ers. Interviewing 24 mugging victims Lejeune and Alex (1973) ﬁnd that assumptions of
invulnerability and trust that were present before the event were abandoned thereafter.
Although these more qualitative studies lack control groups, they clearly point to the
negative reactions of victims. Altogether arguments and empirical evidence also give
weight to a second research hypothesis: Negative experiences do have a negative eﬀect on
generalized trust (H1).
3.3 Design
We investigate two competing hypotheses, H0 (no eﬀect) and H1 (negative eﬀect). Causal-
ity is generally investigated departing from the counterfactual framework (Holland 1986;
Rubin 1974) and we start by asking what experiment we could ideally carry out to cap-
ture the causal eﬀect of interest (Angrist and Pischke 2008, 4). Ideally we would conduct
a randomized ﬁeld experiment both to maximize internal as well as external validity.
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We would draw a large random sample from our target population (persons living in
Switzerland) and measure the level of trust of all sample members by directly accessing
their thoughts before and after the treatment. We would recruit homogeneous oﬀenders
that randomly treat half of the sample with exactly the same negative factual experience
(treatment group) and leave the other half in peace (control group). Random assignment
of the treatment would allow for estimating an unbiased (internally valid) causal eﬀect
since it assures that the treatment Di is unrelated to the potential outcomes (Angrist
and Pischke 2008, 15). This ideal experiment would have strong external validity since
the sample is representative of a larger Swiss population and the treatment is a real-life
experience. Besides, we would control the timing of both, outcome measurement and
treatment assignment. Clearly, this ideal experiment can not be realized for ethical and
practical reasons. Thus, we have to resort to natural variation of our treatment, i.e.
victimization across individuals. The described ideal experiment, however, serves as the
benchmark to which we can compare our research design to reveal potential validity
threats.
In what manner can we use observational data to approximate our ideal experiment (An-
grist and Pischke 2008, 7)? In this study we rely on a panel study design which diﬀers
from the ideal in several respects. First, the treatment is not assigned randomly and
there might be selection bias. Victimization is not random. Rather diﬀerent theories (cf.
Wilcox 2010) such as the lifestyle-exposure theory (Hindelang, Gottfredson and Garofalo
1978) emphasize that attributes such as gender or age are linked to diﬀerent patterns
of life that increase the risk of being victimized (see also Gottfredson 1984; Tseloni and
Pease 2004). These individual characteristics are also likely to be related to our outcome
variable generalized trust in that there are diﬀerences in trust levels between groups of
age or gender for instance (see e.g. Robinson and Jackson 2001, Uslaner 2002, 155-156,
167f). Second, we have a random sample of households rather than individuals and there
might be some inter-dependencies between household members. Third, although we have
repeated measures of both outcome and treatment just as in the ideal experiment we do
not control the timing of treatment and outcome measurement. The treatment occurs
sometime between the yearly panel surveys and potentially the causal eﬀect depends on
the timing. Also, we might not have access to all sample members after the treatment
(panel attrition). Fourth, in contrast to the benchmark we do not observe/measure out-
come and treatment directly. We have to rely on self-reports by survey respondents and
we have to think in how far these self-reports relate to factual reality. In our causal
investigation we have to take all of these points into account.
We deal with the ﬁrst problem, i.e. selection bias as follows: When assuming parallel
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trends that is the trend in generalized trust in the treatment group in absence of the
treatment is equal to the trend in generalized trust in the control group, we can identify
the average eﬀect of the treatment on the treated (ATET) by using change scores as
outcome and estimating the parameters of the following model (Allison 1990; Morgan
and Winship 2007):
∆Yi   Yit  Yit1   β0  β1  D

i  ei,
where ∆Yi is the change in the outcome between ﬁrst and second measurement, β0 is an
intercept term namely the average of the change in the untreated group, β1 is the causal
eﬀect, the amount added to β0 when the treatment dummy Di jumps to one. Finally, e
is some error for which we assume normal distribution and mean 0. This model assures
that any stable unobservable confounder cancels out of the equation (Wooldridge 2010).
In addition we match victims and non-victims using diﬀerent covariates to balance out
treatment and control group. While matching doesn't have any advantages regarding
selection bias it has some other advantages (see e.g. Legewie 2012): After the match-
ing process only those observations remain that are comparable between treatment and
control group, i.e. observations characterized by common support with regard to the
covariates (Morgan and Winship 2007, 117). Through this step we only include observa-
tions that are potentially exposable to the treatment (Holland 1986, 946). At the same
time, matching treatment and control group on various covariates increases justiﬁcation
of the parallel trends assumption, since both groups are more similar. Moreover, match-
ing procedures allow us to evaluate imbalance between treatment and control group and
force us to think clearly about potential selection processes. Thus, it makes sense to
add the matching step before estimating the change score model. To deal with the other
three mentioned validity threats (household dependency, treatment timing, i.e. intensity,
self-reports) we carry out robustness checks that are reported in the empirical section.
3.4 Data, measures and controls
The data come from the Swiss Household Panel study (SHP) that follows a random sam-
ple of households in Switzerland over time. It started in 1999 with 5074 households/12931
household members. In 2004 a second sample of 2538 households/6569 household mem-
bers was added. Annual data collection is carried out by means of CATI. Using relatively
reliable data from a single country is preferable when it comes to causal inference since
several factors that may vary across countries are held constant.
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Table 3.1: Trust and victimization questions across SHP waves
Panel wave '99 '00 '01 '02 '03 '04 '05 '06 '07 '08 '09 '10 '11 '12
Social Trust (Y ) Ì Ì Ì Ì Ì Ì Ì Ì Ì Ì Ì
Insulted or threatened (DThreat) Ì Ì Ì Ì Ì
Hit or injured (DInjury) Ì Ì Ì Ì Ì
Harassment (DHarassment) Ì Ì
Table 3.1 gives an overview of panel waves that contain measures of trust and victimiza-
tion. Starting in 2002, the SHP contains the most widely used trust measure: Would you
say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people,
if 0 means Can't be too careful and 10 means "Most people can be trusted" ? This ques-
tion has received some criticism (Miller and Mitamura 2003; Nannestad 2008; Sturgis and
Smith 2010), but it is the only question for which data is available across time both in
national survey and international surveys and has been widely used in recent studies (e.g.
Delhey, Newton and Welzel 2011; Dinesen 2013; Mewes 2014; Sønderskov 2011; Traun-
müller 2011). Refraining from its use would mean to discard data from numerous surveys
such as the here investigated panel survey. Besides, this question seems to function fairly
well within the Swiss context despite cultural and linguistic barriers and strongly cor-
relates with trust in strangers (Freitag and Bauer 2013). And there is further evidence
that especially in Switzerland respondents associate this question with outgroups (Del-
hey, Newton and Welzel 2011). We explicitly assume (as previous researchers have done
implicitly) that diﬀerences in question interpretation across respondents are not linked
to our treatment net of covariates.
There are several questions querying negative experiences from wave 2004 to 2008. Re-
spondents were asked: Have you been insulted or threatened verbally since (month, year)?
Have you been hit or injured since (month, year)? Have you been sexually harassed or
forced to perform sexual acts since (month, year)? 2 Therefore, we can draw on consider-
able amounts of data for the treatments we are interested in. Figure 3.1 gives an overview
of our data and of the whole sample of respondents and shows how many respondents
in the respective year have been victimized. It illustrates that the share of individuals
suﬀering graver victimization such as harassment is relatively low which represents a
challenge in terms of estimation.
2 In wave 2002 and 2003 respondents were asked if they had been attacked or threatened. This
question was dropped in 2004 because it confounds verbal and physical victimization.
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Figure 3.1: Full sample and absolute number of victims
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In general, we assume that selection on stable covariates is the main problem regarding
our causal relationship. Certainly, there are attributes that might change between t-1
and t, but they only represent a problem if they are systematically linked to victimiza-
tion and generalized trust. For instance, one can hardly make a strong argument for a
directed impact of changes in civic engagement (Ingen and Bekkers 2013) or informal
social ties (Glanville, Andersson and Paxton 2013) (see also Section 2) on the probability
of being victimized. Thus, we mainly control for the classic sociodemographic variables.
We control for gender, age, education, income and minority status. All of these at-
tributes tend to be linked to certain life patterns and, thus, potentially to victimization
(Averdijk 2010) and may also be linked to generalized trust. Moreover, we control for
unemployment status, job loss since the last panel wave and active membership in or-
ganizations. Finally, repeat victimization is increasingly discussed among criminologists
(Averdijk 2010; Farrell, Phillips and Pease 1995; Polvi et al. 1991). Just as some of the
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variables above, repeat victimization can be seen as a proxy for other factors. For in-
stance, repeat victims are likely to live in deprived contexts which might also aﬀect their
levels of generalized trust. Table A6 in the appendix presents summary statistics for all
variables used in the analysis.
3.5 Empirical results
Figure 3.2: Naive estimates for negative experiences on trust (Table A7)
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Note: Symbols are point estimates for 12 bi-variate regression models; N = Number observations of
which T are victims and C are non-victims; Bars are 95% conﬁdence intervals; Source: Swiss Household
Panel (SHP).
Due to the vast amount of data and the resulting high number of models we analyze
(across panel waves and treatments), we chose to display the results graphically. Model
summaries can be found in the appendix. Figure 3.2 (see Table A7) summarizes the
estimates of 12 bi-variate regression models, each estimating the naive treatment eﬀect for
the respective year. The outcome variable in M1-M12 is trust at time t. The victimization
experience has occurred sometime during the year before t, but is also queried at t. In
other words, the eﬀects displayed are simply the diﬀerence between the trust average of
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those that reported an insult/threat, being hit/injured or being harassed with those that
did not respectively. For all the victimization experiences the naive estimate of the causal
eﬀect is negative and substantially high, considering that generalized trust is measured
on an 11-point scale. Logically, uncertainty is higher for those victimization experiences
for which we have fewer data points. Unfortunately, scarce data precludes any inference
for victims of harassment. Although the point estimate is negative, the 95% conﬁdence
intervals are larger and cross 0. For this reason we exclude the harassment treatment in
subsequent analyses. Clearly, these naive estimates of the causal eﬀect are likely biased
in either negative or positive direction because of selection.
Therefore, in a second step we use the change score ∆Yi   Yit  Yit1 instead of Yit as
outcome variable. Following H0 we would assume that the naive eﬀect of victimization
on generalized trust is due to selection rather than due to a direct eﬀect of victimization
on generalized trust. Hence, our second analysis should result in lower estimates of the
treatment eﬀect. H1, on the other hand, holds that victimization experiences do matter
for generalized trust. Figure 3.3 displays the estimates for the diﬀerent panel waves (see
Table A8). We see that this design changes the picture substantially. The eﬀects of
most of the victimization experiences become weaker and insigniﬁcant on usual levels.
Although, we still ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects for threats in 2004, 2005 and 2007 using this
more rigorous strategy, these are much smaller in substantial size than before.3 In general,
these results illustrate how important it is to investigate causal eﬀects across panel data
waves. Results obtained for single panel waves may not hold across waves. The presented
eﬀects correspond to the diﬀerence in trust trends comparing the treatment group with
the full control group of untreated that is all respondents who did not report to have
been victimized at that point in time.
In a third step we balance treatment and control groups using genetic matching (Sekhon
2011). We match individuals on gender, age, education, membership, income, victimiza-
tion (in the previous year), unemployment status, job loss within the respective panel
period and minority status.4 The diﬀerence to M13-M22 is that we now estimate eﬀects
using a control group that is comparable regarding these matching variables. Results are
displayed in Figure 3.4 and Table A9. Balance statistics across panel data waves show
that there are strong diﬀerences between the unbalanced treatment and control groups
we used in step two. Before the matching procedure individuals in the control groups
3 Uncertainty, for the 2004 estimates are higher because the sample of respondents in 2003 which we
need to calculate the trust change score was smaller.
4 In additional models we controlled for the cumulative history of victimization i.e. the sum of
victimizations in previous years. However, this did not change the results (analyses available upon
request).
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Figure 3.3: Estimates for victimization on ∆ trust (Table A8)
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Note: Points are point estimates for 10 bi-variate regression models; N = Number observations of which
T are victims and C are non-victims; Bars are 95% conﬁdence intervals; Source: Swiss Household Panel
(SHP).
were generally older, better educated and had higher income. Besides, there were diﬀer-
ences in gender composition. After matching these diﬀerences are reduced massively and
generally not signiﬁcant (see Table A10). The results seem to corroborate our ﬁndings
above. With few exceptions the point estimates are now very close to zero and 95%
conﬁdence intervals mostly cross the zero. In addition we pooled the matched data sets
across years: The weighted average of the estimates is -0.04 for threat (s.e.= 0.06, N
= 4616) and -0.17 for injury (s.e.=0.16, N = 692). Using this more rigorous estimation
strategy and design we conclude that we do not ﬁnd a substantially strong causal eﬀect
that is stable across panel data waves.
In a fourth step we consider further threats to the validity of our conclusions above as
exposed by our ideal experiment. First, we measure victimization through self-reports at
the end of each time period. Factual experiences of diﬀering objective intensity could lurk
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Figure 3.4: Estimates for victimization on ∆ trust after matching on gender, age, ed-
ucation, membership, income, victimization (previous year), unemployment
status, job loss and minority status (Table A9)
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Note: Symbols are point estimates for 10 multivariate regression models; N = Number of weighted
observations of which T are victims and M are matched non-victims; Bars are 95% conﬁdence intervals;
Source: Swiss Household Panel (SHP).
behind an individual's Yes (Measurement inequivalence).5 Also, negative experiences
might occur at diﬀerent points in time between the two panel waves (Timing of the
victimization experience). Assumably eﬀects of victimization are immediate psychological
eﬀects most of which disappear after some months (Denkers and Winkel 1998). From
2004 to 2008 respondents that answered that they had been victim of a threat or insult
were also asked: Are you still aﬀected by this [victimization], if 0 means not at all and
5 Above we had questions for diﬀerent victimization experiences, however, we could not ﬁnd reliable
evidence that being hit or injured has a stronger eﬀect than e.g. an insult or threat (see Figure
3.2). The low numbers of respondents for the more harsh victimization experiences preclude any
feasible conclusions in this regard (even more so since social desirability may decrease reports of
the latter).
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10 a great deal?. In this additional analysis we solely focus on threats.6 Potentially,
individuals who score higher on this scale do so because of one of the above mentioned
reasons (stronger factual experience, recent timing of the experience), in other words,
a causal eﬀect might only be found for intense negative experiences. Accordingly, we
reestimated Models M 23, 25, 27, 29, 31 (change scores + matching), but now we compare
the non-victims7 with those that were insulted/threatened and score from 7 to 10 on the
intensity scale. Figure 3.5, Table A11 and Table A12 summarize the results. We ﬁnd
that the eﬀects are substantially weak and insigniﬁcant across the ﬁve waves. Hence,
there is no strong counter evidence against our previous conclusions.
Figure 3.5: Estimates for victimization of high intensity on ∆ trust after matching on
gender, age, education, membership, income, victimization (previous year),
unemployment status, job loss and minority status (Table A11)
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Source: Swiss Household Panel (SHP).
6 We assume that individuals that have been hit/injured or harassed are contained in the group that
reports an insult or threat. Besides, we assume that there is less underreporting for this question
than for the other two indicators which is desirable.
7 Control groups are generated from individuals in the same panel wave that did not experience an
insult or threat.
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Second, when comparing victims with non-victims we make the assumption that non-
victims are not inﬂuenced by victims' negative experiences. However, this assumption
may be violated when a non-victim lives in the same household as a victim. The victim's
negative experiences might also aﬀect the trust levels among other household members.
If these other household members are part of our control group it biases our estimates.
We checked whether there are households with multiple victims. This number is very
low and thus can be neglected in our view.8 Thereafter, we reestimated Models 23-32
with a modiﬁed data set that excludes non-victimized individuals that live together with
a victim. The results do not deviate signiﬁcantly.9 Third, we account for the fact that
the causal eﬀect might be heterogeneous for diﬀerent levels of our outcome variable. For
instance, individuals with extremely low levels of trust may remain unaﬀected, i.e. a trust
starting value of 0 at t-1 cannot decrease. In general, individuals with extreme values
might be less aﬀected by experiences. To test for this possibility we reestimate Models 23-
32, using only respondents with moderate initial trust levels (3 to 7) and subsequently
only respondents with high trust levels (7 to 10). All eﬀects in the 20 models we re-
estimated (for threat and injury) are of negligible substantial size. In other words, our
overall conclusions seem to hold in light of these additional robustness checks.10
3.6 Discussion and conclusions
The aim of this article is to contribute to the debate on the relationship between experi-
ences and generalized trust. Using change score analysis combined with matching we ﬁnd
no causal eﬀect that is substantially strong and consistent across panel data waves. Our
ﬁndings support the notion that generalized trust as measured with the standard sur-
vey question represents a rather stable expectation that is only marginally inﬂuenced by
victimization experiences. This, somewhat contradicts earlier ﬁndings for victimization
or proxy variables of positive experiences (Brehm and Rahn 1997; Glanville, Andersson
and Paxton 2013; Li, Pickles and Savage 2005; Salmi, Smolej and Kivivuori 2007) and
8 Across waves 2004-2008 the number of households that contain more than one victim never exceeds
21 out of 1600 to 2005 households respectively.
9 Results are available upon request.
10 Another issue is panel attrition: In general the SHP is not particularly selective with respect to
important socio-demographic or -economic variables (Lipps 2007, 63). Attrition might potentially
bias our estimates. If victims drop out between two waves and they are special in that they display
higher negative changes in trust than those victims that stay in the survey we would underestimate
the causal eﬀect. Unfortunately, we cannot know whether respondents that dropped out have
been victims because they are not present in the second wave when we ask for the victimization
experience. However, we carefully assume that this is not the case or otherwise that the numbers
of drop out victims with a stronger trend in trust is so small that they do not matter.
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is more in line with results that ﬁnd no eﬀect of experiences (Ingen and Bekkers 2013;
Uslaner 2002).
Nonetheless, more studies are needed to corroborate our ﬁndings, opening multiple av-
enues of further research. First, our results need to be embedded in the larger context
of experience-trust research. Despite our ﬁndings it is still possible that negative expe-
riences do change victims' speciﬁc expectations regarding the oﬀender and others that
share his or her characteristics (Averdijk 2010). These more speciﬁc trust expectations
should matter when it comes to (non-)cooperation with these persons or groups. Apply-
ing the idea of trust radius (e.g. Delhey, Newton and Welzel 2011) we would probably
ﬁnd that victims' trust levels remain unchanged for the majority of people, however, trust
in persons or groups with oﬀender characteristics decreases. As a consequence they are
excluded from a certain trust radius. To capture these more subtle facets it is necessary
to collect data that include more information on the attributes of the respective oﬀenders
and subsequently also data on victims' and non-victims more speciﬁc trust expectations
regarding diﬀerent trustees. Generally, more speciﬁc trust measures would allow for more
sophisticated analyses of the experience - trust nexus (Bauer 2014a).
Second, in this study we ﬁnd almost no evidence for a direct causal eﬀect of victim-
ization experiences. The strong selection bias shows that other factors do matter, in
particular factors that aﬀect both individuals' generalized trust and their probability of
victimization. Presumably individuals form their expectations from directly observing
others' behavior and apprehending others' negative experiences. Hence, even without
direct victimization, contexts such as a deprived dangerous neighborhood should mat-
ter. In line with this idea, there is evidence that fear of crime is related to generalized
trust (Uslaner 2002, 109). More reﬁned longitudinal data on individuals' observations of
others' untrustworthy behavior, on experiences in their social networks and the contexts
in which they live is necessary to test these arguments and enhance previous contextual
analyses (cf. Marschall and Stolle 2004; Ross, Mirowsky and Pribesh 2001; Traunmüller
2011).
Third, further systematic analyses beyond the single case of Switzerland would be in-
sightful. To our knowledge the Swiss panel data set used in this study is the only data
set that contains appropriate measures and is suited for causal inference. However, it is
likely that the impact of victimization on generalized trust depends on the context. Swiss
victims can rely on arrangements to deal with the psychological consequences of their
experience. Besides, Switzerland possesses a comparably eﬃcient system of justice that
punishes oﬀenders. In less developed countries these conditions might not apply and vic-
timization experiences may be more extreme on average. These speculations need to be
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investigated empirically. In general, a more thorough understanding of the foundations
of trust can only be attained if we are successful in unraveling the complex relationship
between trusting expectations, childhood experiences, experiences in later life and the
contexts and social networks in which humans are embedded.
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4 Direct democracy and political trust:
Enhancing trust, initiating distrust - or
both?*
Abstract
This study investigates the relationship between direct democracy and political trust. We
suggest a solution to the controversy in research centering on positive versus negative
eﬀects of direct democracy by analytically diﬀerentiating between the availability of direct
democratic rights and the actual use of those rights. Theoretically, greater availability
of direct democratic rights may enhance political trust by increasing citizens' perception
that political authorities can be controlled as well as by incentivizing political authorities
to act trustworthily. In contrast, the actual use of the corresponding direct democratic
instruments may initiate distrust as it signals to citizens that political authorities do
not act in the public's interest. We test both hypotheses for the very ﬁrst time with
sub-national data of Switzerland. The empirical results seem to support our theoretical
arguments.
* This chapter is identical to a manuscript, co-authored with Matthias Fatke and published in the
Swiss Political Science Review (Bauer and Fatke 2014). First and foremost, my gratitude goes to
my co-author Matthias Fatke. Also, I'd like to thank Markus Freitag, Adrian Vatter and Marc
Bühlmann for valuable feedback on earlier versions of this manuscript as well as the editors and
anonymous reviewers of the Swiss Political Science Review for their comments and suggestions.
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4.1 Introduction
Can direct democracy enhance citizens' trust in political authorities or does it indeed
initiate distrust (Dyck 2009)? The concept of political trust has been the subject of
numerous studies and its supposed decline is an evergreen in the public debate (Levi
and Stoker 2000). Moreover, trust is regarded as an essential resource for the function-
ing of democratic systems as it provides leaders more leeway to govern eﬀectively and
institutions a larger store of support regardless of the performance of those running the
government (Hetherington 1998, 803).1
Or put more metaphorically, political trust functions as the glue that keeps the system
together and as the oil that lubricates the policy machine (van der Meer and Dekker
2011, 95). In recent years scholars as well as commentators were quick to diagnose a lack
of trust in political authorities (Norris 2011, cf.), be it due to the ﬁnancial crisis, political
scandals, lack of accountability, or a political system that fails to give citizens a voice.
In this respect, participatory democrats and proponents of direct democracy invoke that
citizens can be educated by direct democratic institutions (Smith and Tolbert 2004), in
a sense that people in direct democracies participate more in politics (Dyck and Seabrook
2010; Tolbert and Bowen 2008; Tolbert, Grummel and Smith 2001; Tolbert and Smith
2005), are more socially engaged (Boehmke and Bowen 2010; Tolbert, McNeal and Smith
2003), protest less (Fatke and Freitag 2013), show more interest and knowledge in politics,
and are more supportive and eﬃcacious (Bowler and Donovan 2002; Bühlmann 2007;
Mendelsohn and Cutler 2000; Schlozman and Yohai 2008; Tolbert, McNeal and Smith
2003; also contrary Dyck and Lascher Jr. 2009). This suggests that increasing people's
inﬂuence in politics promises to be a cure against the current crisis of democracy (Cain,
Dalton and Scarrow 2003). But can direct democracy really repair the frayed ties
between citizens and political authorities (Citrin 1996, 268)?
Recently, researchers lay greater focus on the impact of context for political trust (Zmerli
and Hooghe 2011). In view of the relevance of the relationship between direct democracy
and political trust, it is thus even more surprising how little research has been carried
through so far that actually tests the inﬂuence of direct democracy on political trust.
Indeed, to our knowledge only three empirical studies can be found:2 Hug (2005) presents
a macro-analysis of 15 post-communist countries and ﬁnds no signiﬁcant relationship;
Citrin (1996) and Dyck (2009) analyze data from the United States whereas Citrin ﬁnds
no diﬀerence in aggregate trust between initiative and non-initiative states, Dyck in fact
1 Cf. Sztompka (1999, 156) and a recent study by Marien and Hooghe (2011) for further arguments.
2 Despite the title of their book chapter, Smith and Tolbert (2004) analyze external political eﬃcacy
rather than political trust.
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reports a negative inﬂuence of direct democracy on political trust. Hence, he contradicts
the optimistic expectations of participatory democrats. In general, empirical studies so
far have been limited to the USA (and some Eastern European countries).
Therefore, we want to shed further light on the relationship and suggest an answer to the
controversy between direct democratic promises and the negative (or, at least, ambigu-
ous) empirical evidence. First, we argue that controversial scholarly positions might to
some extent be based on diﬀerent conceptions of direct democracy. A ﬁrst conception fo-
cuses on the institutional barriers to the use of direct democratic instruments. A second
conception focuses on the actual use of direct democratic instruments. For both of these
conceptions of direct democracy we expect diﬀerent eﬀects on political trust. Second, we
investigate this relationship for the very ﬁrst time in a country considered to be the most
direct democratic country in the World, Switzerland. With both a long tradition and a
wide array (and variation) of direct democratic instruments, the Swiss cantons provide
ideal grounds for our empirical analyses.
The article is organized as follows: We start by presenting the two concepts that are
of interest here, direct democracy and political trust in the Swiss context. Next, we
outline and explain the mechanism between those two concepts, in other words why one
should expect direct democracy to increase or decrease political trust. Subsequently,
we elaborate on the operationalization of concepts, discuss potential confounding factors
and present our methodological approach. Afterwards, we present our empirical results
as well as robustness checks and some further analyses. Finally, our ﬁndings will be
summarized and discussed in the conclusion.
4.2 Direct democracy and political trust
Direct democracy and political trust are widely-studied concepts in political science. In
its most basic sense, trust is a relational concept in that it exists between a truster and
a trustee, and the former makes herself vulnerable to the latter since the trustee has the
capacity to do her harm or betray her. Trust is seldom unconditional in that it is given
to speciﬁc individuals or institutions over speciﬁc domains (Levi and Stoker 2000, 476).
Trust judgments generally reﬂect beliefs about the trustworthiness of the trustee. Trust-
worthiness can be generally equated with a trustee's commitment to act in the truster's
interest (Levi and Stoker 2000, 476; cf. also Hardin 2002). Political trust, a subconcept
of trust, can be conceived as a judgment made by an individual with regard to a speciﬁc
political actor or institution, for example governments, parties and administrations (Levi
and Stoker 2000). In sum, political trust then can be understood as an individual's ex-
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pectation that a political actor will act in her interest.3
Generally, it is important to diﬀerentiate diﬀerent targets of political trust. For instance,
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995, 15 et seq.) investigated attitudes toward diﬀerent po-
litical institutions and lamented that explanations of (the crisis of) conﬁdence in the
political system display a major deﬁciency, namely the inattention to components of the
political system.4 Empirically, trust levels diﬀer considerably across sub-national enti-
ties and for diﬀerent political institutions (Freitag 2001). Thus, diﬀerentiating between
institutions as well as sub-national entities seems essential. Since we compare cantons,
trust in cantonal authorities is the variable of interest in our analysis.
Direct democracy, our explanatory variable, is an inherent feature of the Swiss political
system. In fact, Switzerland with its long tradition of direct democratic participation
is often considered to be the most direct democratic state in the World (Schmitter and
Trechsel 2004). Swiss citizens have a wide array of direct democratic instruments at
their disposal to decide directly on issues through popular votes. On the cantonal level,
these instruments consist of the constitutional initiative, the legislative initiative, the
legislative referendum (in optional and mandatory form), and the ﬁscal referendum (also
in optional and mandatory form). The speciﬁc conﬁgurations of these direct democratic
rights, however, vary substantially from canton to canton. Institutional barriers to a
direct democratic process are the number of signatures needed, the respective time span
allotted to launch initiatives and optional referendums, as well as the ﬁnancial threshold
for ﬁscal referendums. Whereas in some cantons these barriers are low, facilitating the
exercise of direct democratic rights, in other cantons the requirements are so high that
direct democratic processes are hardly possible.
However, extensive direct democratic rights do not necessarily imply that the correspond-
3 Regarding the origins of political trust, Mishler and Rose (2001) refer to two large theoretical
traditions. On the one hand, cultural theories hypothesize that trust in political authorities is
exogenous with regard to political variables. Accordingly, these theories assume that political trust is
generated outside of the political sphere. People have beliefs that are based on cultural norms which
they have learned during early-life socialization (Mishler and Rose 2001). For instance, scholars like
Putnam (1993) and Inglehart (1997) argue that political trust is an extension of interpersonal trust
that is projected onto political authorities. On the other hand, institutional theories hypothesize
that political trust is politically endogenous and a consequence of the performance of political
authorities (Mishler and Rose 2001). This is, obviously, much in line with the reasoning of neo-
institutionalism. Citizens evaluate performance more or less rationally. Political authorities that
do not perform well generate distrust; political authorities that perform well generate trust.
4 Well known is also the debate about the meaning of the decline of trust in government in the
United States. Miller (1974) and Citrin (1974) argued whether this decline mirrored a rejection of
the political system and the institution government per se or rather a rejection of the incumbent
government. This debate emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between regime and the
authorities, but failed to acknowledge the diﬀerent vital objects of support in modern political
systems namely political institutions (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995, 16).
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ing instruments are frequently used by citizens. Although neither institutional barriers
nor use of direct democratic instruments can be viewed as entirely independent (Eder,
Vatter and Freitag 2009), they are not highly correlated with one another in the Swiss
case (Barankay, Sciarini and Trechsel 2003; Stadelmann-Steﬀen and Vatter 2012). When
investigating the relationship between direct democracy and political trust, it is crucial
to take this distinction into account. Reﬂecting the nuanced conception of institutions as
both rules-in-form as well as rules-in- use (Sproule-Jones 1993), we also diﬀerentiate
between the formal institutional rights and the actual use of direct democratic instru-
ments in our analysis. Especially, with regard to their impact on citizens' attitudes and
evaluations, the theoretical arguments diﬀer fundamentally as we will outline below.
4.3 Theory and hypotheses
Whether direct democracy has a positive or negative (or, for that matter, no) eﬀect on
trust is, of course, ultimately an empirical question. Nevertheless, diﬀerences in theoret-
ical predictions and ambiguous empirical evidence may be due to diﬀerent conceptions
of direct democracy. As noted earlier it is important to make a distinction between the
availability of direct democratic rights and the actual use of the corresponding direct
democratic instruments. It seems worthwhile considering these conceptions separately
and discussing in what way these conceptions are related to political trust. Moreover, we
take the above mentioned distinction between the individual truster and the trustee (the
cantonal authorities) into account when arguing how individual political trust is aﬀected
by direct democracy.5
4.3.1 Availability of direct democratic rights and political trust
How does the institutional availability of direct democratic rights aﬀect the trust relation
between citizens and political authorities? As noted previously, direct democratic instru-
ments may enhance citizens' control of and inﬂuence on political authorities. Departing
from a veto player perspective Hug and Tsebelis (2002) analyze multi-dimensional mod-
els and show that the availability of direct democratic instruments enhances the agenda-
5 In doing so, we depart from a neo-institutional perspective, which focuses explicitly on the relation
between institutions and individuals (Huckfeldt, Plutzer and Sprague 1993). In that sense, insti-
tutions oﬀer and alter incentive structures that in turn aﬀect individual behavior and preferences
(Kaiser 1997, 421; Mayntz and Scharpf 1995, 43). Put diﬀerently, individuals form their preferences
within a contextual framework of institutions that incentivize behavior (Hall 1986; Immergut 1998;
Oﬀe 2006). Hence, direct democratic institutions adopt the role of explanatory variables aﬀecting
individuals.
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setting power of the median voter. Elaborating further on this argument, Hug (2004)
investigates policy consequences of direct democracy and argues that policies are closer
to the median voter's preferences than without direct democratic instruments present.
This, as Hug (2005) claims, should also manifest itself in higher levels of political trust
because policies in direct democracies are more in line with the voters' wishes. Similarly,
Citrin (1996, 286) hypothesizes that initiatives and referenda impel governments to re-
vise their policies so as to take account of majority opinion and that doing so ultimately
raises the public's trust in established institutions.
Hence, extensive direct democratic rights enhance a citizen's role as a veto player in the
political process. Whereas political authorities in purely representative democracies are
not that closely tied to their citizens as they can only be voted out of oﬃce at the end of
the legislative turn, by contrast in direct democracies citizens can keep their agents on a
much shorter leash. More precisely, availability of direct democratic rights should aﬀect
both truster and trustee in the trust relation. Directly, the truster perceives that she
has a better capability to control the trustee. Put diﬀerently, extensive direct democratic
rights give citizens the perception of ability to ensure the trustee's commitment to act in
the interest of the truster. With such instruments at hand, citizens as principal in the
democratic process are aware that they can make sure that their agent acts the way they
want him to. The result is a more favorable trust judgment.6
Second, there is an indirect eﬀect via the trustee. The trustee may anticipate the possibil-
ity of control and corrections by the truster and accordingly behaves more trustworthily.
Hence, extensive direct democratic rights do not only aﬀect the truster directly, they
also provide an incentive for the trustee to behave more trustworthily and to act in
the interest of the truster. As a result political authorities should be more responsive
when direct democratic rights are available in the sense that they anticipate citizens'
preferences and take them into account in their policy-making and political decisions
(Papadopoulos 2001).7
6 Underscoring this connection, Bühlmann (2007, 244) concludes in his study that already the mere
presence of direct democratic rights (and not their actual use) has an eﬀect on political support.
Moreover, Bernhard and Bühlmann (2011) ﬁnd that direct democratic rights increase political
eﬃcacy and Scheidegger and Staerklé (2011) ﬁnd that the perceived political powerlessness is related
to political trust.
7 Akin to this logic it is argued that direct democratic rights result in less mismanagement, less cor-
ruption and less abuse of power (Citrin 1996). Moreover, Kirchgaessner, Feld and Savioz (1999)
ﬁnd that there is less public spending, less public debt, and higher GDP in direct democracies.
Similarly, Freitag and Vatter (2000) show a positive eﬀect of direct democracy on economic perfor-
mance. Generally, such positive eﬀects of direct democracy are crucial for the citizens' perception
of government performance, which in turn could positively aﬀect political trust.
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Increased trustworthiness by the trustee should, in turn, positively inﬂuence the trust
judgment by the truster. Just as van der Meer and Dekker (2011) link trustworthy
behavior of the state to the subjective evaluation by trusting citizens, it seems reasonable
that a successful trust relation as such facilitates a virtuous circle of trustworthiness and
trust development. All in all this leads us to hypothesize: The more extensive direct
democratic rights in a canton, the higher political trust should be (H1).
4.3.2 Actual use of direct democratic rights and political trust
As we outlined before, the positive eﬀect of direct democratic rights does not necessarily
apply to the actual use of these rights. Above we argued that the mere possibility
to sanction the trustee via direct democratic instruments can enable a trust relationship
between citizens and political authorities. These sanctioning instruments of the principal
hang over the agent like the metaphorical Sword of Damocles. However, just with any
trust relation, the trust relation between citizens and political authorities suﬀers if the
truster observes the necessity of her sanctions. Hence, frequent use of direct democratic
instruments should have the opposite eﬀect than the mere availability thereof.
Again, the actual use should aﬀect both the truster directly, as well as indirectly via the
trustee. First, the direct eﬀect on the truster is precisely that citizens, who frequently
observe sanctioning of political authorities through the application of direct democratic
instruments gain the belief that their agents do not act how they are supposed to since
direct democratic processes are obviously necessary to correct their actions. In short,
political authorities that need correction cannot be trusted. To this point Citrin (1996,
286) notes that the application of direct democratic instruments decreases the authority
of elected oﬃcials. Perceiving the necessity of sanctions despite the very existence of
such a Sword of Damocles intensiﬁes the disappointment by citizens as the trust they
have put into their political authorities by voting them into oﬃce is betrayed (Dyck 2009,
544).
Second, frequent use of direct democratic instruments aﬀects the trustee, too. If political
authorities are constantly sanctioned and corrected they do not feel the same obligation
to honor the trust of being voted into oﬃce. They might simply follow their own agenda
rather than acting trustworthily toward their citizens.8
Moreover, the implementation of direct legislation is generally beyond the inﬂuence of
citizens. Political authorities can therefore steal initiatives at the implementation stage
8 Even if political authorities are more responsive as a result of these institutions this might have a
negative eﬀect. Acknowledging higher responsiveness through direct democracy, citizens become
more aware that without their input, elected representatives shirk (Dyck 2009, 546).
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(Gerber et al. 2001). Obviously, citizens perceiving this dilution lose trust as a conse-
quence. As repercussion on the citizens, untrustworthy behavior by political authorities
inhibits any successful trust relation with the citizenry. Instead, a setting of frequent
votes on initiatives and referendums widens the scope and intensity of political conﬂict
between citizens and political authorities (Dyck 2009, 545). In sum, we hypothesize that
there is a negative eﬀect of the actual use of direct democratic instruments: The more
extensive the actual use of direct democratic instruments in a canton, the lower political
trust should be (H2).
4.4 Research design
Before turning to the empirical investigation, we brieﬂy outline how the concepts are
measured and present other individual as well as contextual factors that should be con-
trolled for. Table A13 in the appendix summarizes the operationalization of all variables,
Table A14 in the appendix provides descriptive statistics.
Political trust in cantonal authorities is measured with the following question: I will read
the names of some important institutions and organizations to you. Please tell me each
time, how much trust you have in this institution, if `0' means `no trust' and `10' means
`complete trust'. Respondents can then choose how much trust they have in cantonal
authorities on an 11-point scale. We measure the availability of direct democratic rights
with an index calculated by Fischer (2009). First suggested by Stutzer (1999), this index
considers availability and barriers for each of the four direct democratic instruments in
the Swiss cantons: the constitutional initiative, the legislative initiative, the legislative
referendum, and the ﬁscal referendum. Values between one and six reﬂect the legal
requirements for each instrument in terms of required signatures, time period to collect
signatures, in the case of the legislative referendum, whether it is optional or mandatory,
and for ﬁscal referendums, the ﬁnancial threshold. The resulting four sub-indices are
averaged into one index.9
9 Some cantons require many signatures, oﬀer only a short time period in which to collect them, do
not have a mandatory (only an optional) legislative referendum, and a high ﬁnancial threshold.
Such cantons thus exhibit high legal requirements and score low (i.e. close to one) on the index of
direct democracy. Cantons with low legal requirements score high (i.e. close to six). Coding for
thresholds and corresponding index points is described in detail by Stutzer and Frey (2000).
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Table 4.1: Overview of direct democracy scores as well as cantonal means of trust
Canton Num-
ber of
Obs.
Direct democracy:
Availability of
rights 2003
Direct
democracy:
Actual use
20022006
Trust toward
political
authorities
Geneva 595 1.75 3.8 5.57
Ticino 519 2.25 2 6.45
Vaud 156 2.42 2.6 6.43
Neuchâtel 107 2.73 1.2 5.56
Fribourg 104 2.79 0.6 6.57
Bern 299 3.02 1.4 6.58
Zurich 648 3.5 3.2 6.56
St. Gallen 123 3.52 1.6 6.83
Valais 90 3.58 0.2 6.69
Jura 118 3.71 0 5.8
Thurgovia 110 4.33 0.4 6.76
Basel-Town 107 4.4 4 6.63
Lucerne 102 4.42 2.2 6.85
Zug 102 4.48 1.4 7.29
Obwalden 110 4.63 0 6.97
Grisons 98 4.83 0.6 6.68
Appenzell O.R. 116 4.92 0 7.03
Schwyz 123 4.93 0.8 6.8
Schaﬀhausen 117 5.02 0.8 7.06
Uri 102 5.13 0.6 7.29
Solothurn 89 5.25 2.6 6.27
Argovia 145 5.44 1.4 6.29
Appenzell I.R. 109 5.44 0 7.84
Basel-Country 97 5.48 3.2 7.07
Glarus 106 5.5 0 6.9
Mean 176 4.14 1.38 6.67
Std. dev. 161 1.13 1.26 0.52
The second conception, the actual use of direct democratic instruments, is measured by
averaging the number of all cantonal initiatives and optional referendums per year from
2002 to 2006 (Année politique Suisse). The number of mandatory referendums is de-
liberately excluded from the measure as it does not ﬁt to our theoretical argument: An
institutionally required and automatically triggered referendum can hardly be perceived
by citizens as necessity to sanction political authorities. We test both operationalizations
of direct democracy separately to ensure a comprehensive account of direct democracy
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and to strengthen our empirical investigation. Table 4.1 provides an overview of the
direct democracy scores as well as aggregate measures of political trust in 25 cantons.10
Moreover, our analysis accounts for several alternative factors that are commonly re-
ferred to in the literature (e.g. Rahn and Rudolph 2005) by including them as control
variables. On the individual level several factors should inﬂuence political trust (cf.
Bühlmann 2007). Presumably, political trust varies systematically with gender, age and
level of education. Women are supposed to be more critical toward political authorities
as they are less well represented. Elderly citizens have more experience with political
authorities and thus should display a higher level of trust (Richardson, Houston and
Hadjiharalambous 2001). Besides, it is assumed that education enables citizens to bet-
ter understand and to take part in politics and thereby gather experience, which in turn
facilitates the development of political trust and diﬀuse support (Milbrath 1965; Richard-
son, Houston and Hadjiharalambous 2001; Scheidegger and Staerklé 2011). Moreover, we
assume that Catholics display higher levels of trust. In contrast to Protestantism that
emphasizes individualism and self-reliance, Catholicism is more at ease with the reliance
on authorities (Bühlmann 2007; Elazar 1966). Furthermore, Scheidegger and Staerklé
(2011) show that a feeling of being materially at risk is connected to trust. Following a
similar logic we include unemployment status as a variable in our models. Finally, the
perception whether the state of economy has worsened is included as a further individual-
level control. Therefore, we model age, sex, level of education, catholic denomination,
unemployment status and perception of the economic development as individual control
variables.
Just as we include these variables on the individual level, we also need to account for
systematic diﬀerences between contextual units. Obviously, cantons in our sample display
certain idiosyncrasies that may be related to both direct democratic institutions and
political trust. In order to avoid systematically biased or spurious relationships we add
two further contextual controls to our analysis. To some extent these should be objective
performance measures of political authorities. National income might be regarded as a
broad indicator of performance, which has shown to be a determinant of political trust
levels in cross-country studies (Mishler and Rose 2001). In addition we include a measure
of the ﬁnancial state of cantons that takes into account several indicators of how well a
canton manages its ﬁnancial state. As argued above, more extensive direct democratic
settings should be paralleled by less mismanagement and less public debt (Citrin 1996;
10 The Selects survey did not collect data for the canton Nidwalden because the number of candidates
did not exceed the number of seats, i.e. the only candidate who presented himself was automatically
elected in this canton (Lutz 2008, 52).
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Kirchgaessner, Feld and Savioz 1999). Individual data used in the analysis comes from
the Swiss Electoral Studies which is part of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems
(CSES) project. The 2007 survey used in our analysis included 4,392 telephone interviews
in 25 cantons (except the canton Nidwalden).11 Contextual data was taken from oﬃcial
statistics.
From a comparative perspective it seems advantageous to use the context of Swiss sub-
national entities to investigate our research question. Compared to country-level anal-
yses, Swiss cantons exhibit a substantial degree of similarity with respect to several
institutional and societal aspects. In other words, the cantons have many characteristics
in common that can be treated as constants, while they diﬀer regarding the conﬁguration
of the here investigated concepts. Finally, the individuals investigated here are nested
within institutional contexts that are thought to exert an inﬂuence on them. To esti-
mate these contextual eﬀects we apply varying-intercept models (Gelman and Hill 2007;
Steenbergen and Jones 2002).
4.5 Empirical results
We estimate several models to investigate the eﬀect of direct democracy on political
trust. Preliminary analyses reveal that trust in cantonal authorities systematically varies
between cantons (e.g. 0-Model context variance is 0.23). Thus, there seems to be con-
textual diﬀerences that aﬀect political trust making it methodologically appropriate to
model contextual eﬀects such as that of direct democracy.
The empirical results of six models are displayed in Table 4.2. Model 1 includes only
individual control variables. In Model 2 and 3 the variables of direct democratic rights
and actual use of direct democratic instruments are added. Model 4 and 5 test the
robustness of the eﬀect by adding contextual controls. In Model 6, ﬁnally, both direct
democracy and all control variables are included, thus representing the strongest test of
the theoretical argument.
The main results can be described as follows: First of all, most of the individual control
variables in Model 1 are signiﬁcant and aﬀect political trust in the expected direction.
Namely, age, education and catholic denomination have a positive eﬀect and a nega-
tive economic evaluation is associated with lower political trust. This suggests that the
estimated model is in principle useful for the explanation of political trust. More impor-
11 2,005 of these interviews were from a national representative sample and a further 2,387 interviews
were conducted in order to ensure at least 100 respondents in small cantons. Additionally, in three
cantons (Ticino, Geneva, and Zurich), the number of interviews was increased to a total of 600 per
canton.
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Figure 4.1: Predictive margins of political trust
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tantly, however, Model 2 and 3 show the eﬀect of direct democracy: While the availability
of direct democratic rights measured by Fischer's (2009) index of institutional barriers
have a positive eﬀect on political trust, the number of popular votes on initiatives and
optional referendums has a negative eﬀect. Both eﬀects are statistically signiﬁcant and
are able to reduce context variance to 11.3 and 17.5 respectively. Moreover, the di-
rect democracy variables remain signiﬁcant in Models 4 and 5 even after controlling for
contextual characteristics of cantons. They also pass the last test in Model 6 with both
direct democracy variables included. These results are in line with both our hypotheses
about the diverging eﬀects of direct democracy: More extensive direct democratic rights
lead to higher political trust. More extensive use of these rights, however, leads to lower
political trust.12
To evaluate the substantive size of the eﬀect, we plot predictive margins of political trust
for all levels of our direct democracy variables for Model 4 and 5. Figure 4.1 shows a
change in political trust of roughly one point (on the 11-point scale). On the left side,
political trust increases from 6 to 7 going from the cantons with the least to the cantons
with the highest availability of direct democratic rights. On the right side, we observe the
corresponding decrease from the least to the most direct democratic canton in terms of
12 Sometimes urbanization and size of canton are found to aﬀect the number of popular votes and are
also possibly connected to political trust (Trechsel 2000). In analyses not documented here, we, thus,
added further control variables to our models: a dummy indicating whether an individual lives in a
rural or urban area, the size of the canton in km2 and the number of inhabitants. These variables
are, however, not signiﬁcant in our models, do not change the model estimates substantially, and
are therefore excluded. Results are available from the authors upon request. This ﬁnding is also in
line with Eder (2010, 144) and Vatter (2002, 328), who ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀect of urbanization on
the number of initiatives and referendums when controlling for other factors.
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Figure 4.3: Eﬀect of direct democracy on political trust excluding single cantons
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actual use. At ﬁrst, the diﬀerence of one point might not seem great but considering how
many (individual as well as contextual) factors are crucial for the development of political
trust in general, the eﬀect size of direct democracy is substantial and quite remarkable.
Furthermore, observed means of cantonal trust (as indicated by circles) can be found
in most (about 19) cases within the conﬁdence intervals of predictive margins. Only
means in about six cantons with more extreme values for direct democracy and fewer
respondents diﬀer from predicted levels of trust. The relationship remains nonetheless
the same: A ﬁtted OLS regression line (not shown in the plot) between direct democracy
and aggregated means of political trust closely resembles the predictive line in the plot.
4.6 Robustness and further analyses
The empirical results certainly require further testing. Three issues in particular arise.
A ﬁrst issue concerns outliers. As we are dealing with a limited number of level-two
units (here, cantons), the danger exists that results are dominated by a few observations,
thereby casting doubt on the reliability of estimates as well as conclusions. Therefore,
we re-estimate our Models 4 and 5 (Table 4.2) several times, each time excluding one
canton (and its respondents). Although this kind of manual jackkniﬁng represents a
strict test for inﬂuential cases (excluding in some cases several hundred observations),
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the coeﬃcients of the direct democracy variables remain statistically signiﬁcant in all
25 separate models. Figure 4.3 illustrates the direct democracy coeﬃcients in the 25
separate models excluding single cantons. Based on these results, we can conclude that
the signiﬁcant relationship is not due to single outlying cases.
A second issue concerns causality. It has long been argued that institutions are endoge-
nous to collective action by individuals (Foweraker and Landman 1997). With regard
to the formal institutional conception, though, direct democratic rights represent an in-
herent feature of the Swiss democratic system, which has been stable for decades (Geser
1999). Direct democratic rights that have been formally present during the socialization
processes of several generations leave their imprint on attitudes rather than the other
way round. Therefore, in our view, it seems only plausible to argue that the long-term
contextual condition of the formal institutional conception of direct democratic rights
causally aﬀects volatile individual attitudes, and not vice versa (Davis 1985). However,
with regard to the actual use of direct democratic instruments this argument is less ap-
plicable. On the one hand, it could well be that low levels of political trust are the cause
of more frequent use of direct democratic instruments. On the other hand, one may
argue that direct legislation in Switzerland is primarily initiated by unions, parties, local
action groups or other organizations and not by the broad citizenry. In other words, the
vast majority of people does not initiate direct democratic processes actively, but rather
experience processes passively after their initiation.
The models we estimated up to this point do not allow for solving this causal puz-
zle empirically; rather, they merely reveal a negative association between the use of
direct democracy and political trust. One approach to estimate causal eﬀects with cross-
sectional data is to resort to instrumental variables. In general, it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd
proper instruments that satisfy the necessary assumptions (cf. Bound, Jaeger and Baker
1995; Sovey and Green 2011). An instrument should be related to the independent vari-
able of interest, and second, should not be related to the dependent variable other than
through the independent variable (Legewie 2012, 137).
While reasons to initiate direct democratic processes are manifold, whether those result
in actual popular votes hinges on the capability to collect enough signatures. And meet-
ing this requirement is obviously easier where many people are around to sign petitions.
As stated by Verbrugge and Taylor (1980, 138): [h]igh density provides more opportuni-
ties for informal contact and assistance because people are more accessible. Hence, we
argue that population density inﬂuences the frequency of popular votes and instrument
the actual use of direct democracy with the population density of a canton. Regard-
ing the ﬁrst assumption, population density is indeed highly (r   0.63) and signiﬁcantly
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Table 4.3: Instrumental variable regression: Actual use instrumented with population
density
(1) (2)
Constant 4.612 6.369
0.590 0.593
Age 0.007 0.007
0.002 0.002
Sex 0.036 0.006
0.065 0.067
Education 0.025 0.021
0.009 0.009
Catholic (Dummy) 0.251 0.219
0.073 0.080
Economy worse (Dummy) 0.522 0.587
0.171 0.165
Unemployed (Dummy) 0.421 0.443
0.170 0.162
Urban or rural area (Dummy) 0.029
0.211
Direct democracy: Actual Use 0.306 0.310
0.092 0.182
Financial state 0.061 0.027
0.060 0.069
National income 4.914 0.000
1.401 1.732
Size of canton 0.000
0.000
Inhabitants 0.000
0.000
Observations 4,225 4,225
R2 0.050 0.039
Note: Robust standard errors (clustered by Canton) in parentheses; *** p@0.01, ** p@0.05, * p@0.1
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Table 4.4: Random-intercept models controlling for language region
(1) (2) (3)
Models control for individual and contextual variables of Model 4 and 5 in Table 2
Direct democracy:
Availability of rights
0.126 0.050
0.096 0.100
Direct democracy:
Actual use
0.145 0.130
0.066 0.073
German language canton (Dummy) 0.522 0.611 0.526
0.268 0.189 0.255
Constant 5.553 5.513 5.366
0.733 0.637 0.702
Observations 4,225 4,225 4,225
Number of groups 25 25 25
2 log likelihood 17,643 17,640 17,640
Context variance 0.093 0.080 0.079
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p@0.01, ** p@0.05, * p@0.1
(p @ 0.01) correlated with the use of direct democratic instruments. In what regards the
second assumption we assume that population density aﬀects political trust solely via
the use of direct democracy conditional on diﬀerent control variables. Accordingly, we
estimate two-stage least squares regression models with robust standard errors clustered
by cantons and accounting for all control variables mentioned before. As can be seen
from both models in Table 4.3, the now instrumented eﬀect of direct democratic use
is still negative, of substantive size and statistically signiﬁcant. Even when controlling
for additional variables such as urbanization and size of canton, which could potentially
mediate an indirect eﬀect of population density on political trust, the estimates do not
change.13
Bearing the limitations of our instrument and potential selection bias in mind, we care-
fully interpret this result as indication that there really is an eﬀect running from the use
of direct democracy to political trust.
13 For instance, population density could have other indirect eﬀects on political trust via other variables
such as economic development, etc. However, we are fairly conﬁdent that we control these indirect
eﬀects for the most part. Hence, that part of the instrument should be left over that really has no
direct or indirect relationship with trust.
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Figure 4.5: Political trust of diﬀerent language groups within bilingual cantons. Lan-
guage group depending on Language of the interview in Selects 2007 data.
Number of observations in brackets.
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Thirdly, often in cross-cantonal comparative research on Switzerland, the signiﬁcance of
language regions is raised. Diﬀerences between German-speaking and Roman parts have
shown to be important factors in Swiss politics and relevant for many societal aspects
(Freitag and Stadelmann-Steﬀen 2010, 477). In fact, language regions roughly coincide
with the prevalence of direct democratic rights as can be seen in Table 4.1: While direct
democratic rights are more extensive in the German-speaking part, cantons in the Roman
part are more oriented toward a representative model of democracy (Kriesi 1998; Ladner
2002). We, therefore, test our model again accounting for language regions by including
a dummy variable. Table 4.4 shows that trust levels indeed diﬀer signiﬁcantly between
language regions. The negative eﬀect of actual use of direct democracy on political trust
does not change under this additional control.14
But the eﬀect of formal direct democratic rights is not signiﬁcant anymore when control-
ling for language regions. This is hardly surprising since the extent of direct democratic
rights and language regions run along the same boarder and are highly correlated. In
other words, language regions might work as proxy for formal rights of direct democracy
(and vice versa).
14 We also re-estimate the instrumental regression in Table 4.3 with a dummy variable for language
regions as in Table 4.4. The results (not documented here) remain the same. While decreasing
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How should we interpret this ﬁnding? On the one hand one might argue that the cultural
traditions of the language regions are crucial for the development of trust (Mishler and
Rose 2001; cf. Footnote 3). In that respect, direct democratic rights are shaped within the
cultural tradition that embodies a favorable, trustworthy view of political authorities. It
remains, however, unclear how political trust should be aﬀected by the cultural context if
not precisely by institutions such as direct democracy, which are speciﬁc to the respective
context. In an attempt to disentangle the eﬀects of language regions and formal direct
democratic rights, we further test whether political trust diﬀers signiﬁcantly between
language groups within the three bilingual cantons Bern, Fribourg, and Valais. From
the box plots in Figure 4.5 it is clear that this is not the case. Evidently, there is
no signiﬁcant diﬀerence of political trust between language groups in the same direct
democratic context. Although this result is obviously not suﬃcient to dismiss cultural
explanations of political trust in the Swiss case, it supports the role of institutions such
as direct democracy as factors (among others) inﬂuencing political trust.
4.7 Conclusion
Little systematic research has explicitly addressed the question of how direct democracy
and political trust are related to each other. However, if political trust is to be considered
a major asset for societies and if its decline is as urgent as claimed, it becomes absolutely
necessary to investigate the impact of institutions that might eventually increase this
resource. Although contextual factors receive more and more attention in political trust
research (Zmerli and Hooghe 2011), only very little empirical evidence exists regarding
the question whether direct democracy represents such an arrangement and fulﬁlls the
promise of participatory democrats or in contrast initiates distrust (Dyck 2009). And so
far no study has examined this relationship in Switzerland. In this study we make a ﬁrst
step to ﬁll this gap.
In contrast to previous studies, we emphasize the necessity of a clear theoretical distinc-
tion between two conceptions of direct democracy, namely the formal strength of direct
democratic rights and the actual use of those rights. Taking this distinction into account
we develop arguments that suggest positive eﬀects of extensive direct democratic rights
and negative eﬀects of actual use of direct democratic instruments on political trust.
Our empirical analysis of the Swiss cantons seems to support this reasoning: Holding
alternative variables constant political trust is higher in cantons with extensive direct
in size (to 0.133), the coeﬃcient of actual use of direct democracy is negative and signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero.
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democratic rights and lower in cantons with frequent use of these rights. This may serve
as explanation for the ambiguity of previous results (Citrin 1996; Dyck 2009; Hug 2005).
These results, however, have to be taken with a pinch of salt. First, we need to acknowl-
edge the role of cultural traditions in the Swiss language regions. While the negative
eﬀect of use of direct democratic instruments is not aﬀected, the positive eﬀect of the
availability of direct democratic rights vanishes when controlling for language regions.
Since extensiveness of direct democratic rights is closely related to the language regions
in Switzerland, we cannot ultimately judge empirically whether cultural or institutional
inﬂuences prevail in the development of political trust. From a neo-institutional per-
spective the latter seems obviously preferable. This institutional perspective does not
deny the importance of early-life cultural inﬂuences (Mishler and Rose 2001, 31). If in
fact political authorities have performed well and consistently over long periods of time
(e.g. due to extensive direct democratic rights) cultural socialization as well as evalua-
tion of this performance assumably result in similar levels of political trust (Mishler and
Rose 2001, 32). Nevertheless, more studies are needed that scrutinize the relationship in
diﬀerent institutional and cultural settings.
Second, theoretically it seems plausible that the relationship between the actual use of
direct democracy and political trust may run in both ways. In this study we made a
ﬁrst step trying to get a better estimate resorting to an instrumental variable approach.
However, we strongly recommend that future studies further scrutinize this potentially
reciprocal relationship. One possible venue could be the analysis of panel data, given
that there are measures for both variables at diﬀerent points in time. Another approach
would be more qualitatively oriented analyses of the causal mechanism.
Finally, our study represents the most recent attempt so far to analyze the relationship of
direct democracy and political trust and provides evidence from an exemplary empirical
case, namely Switzerland. Thereby, our contribution of the eﬀects of direct democracy
on political trust contributes to the on-going dialogue about the introduction of direct
democratic procedures around the world (Butler and Ranney 1994; Scarrow 2001). With
all limitations in mind, we carefully conclude from our results that from a normative point
of view extending direct democratic rights is a desirable step. Lowering institutional
barriers for direct democratic instruments provides citizens with participatory means to
keep their authorities on a short leash and ultimately seems to raise political trust.
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for the future of trust research
What are the fundamental insights of the three studies presented in the preceding chap-
ters? Chapter 2 (Freitag and Bauer 2013) illustrates that self-reported trust judgments
are much more complex and diﬀerentiated than was previously held in the relevant empir-
ical literature. Individuals do diﬀerentiate between diﬀerent trustees and do not simply
divide trustees into persons they know and persons they do not know. In other words,
it is a mistake to reduce various trust indicators that diﬀerentiate between trustees such
as neighbors, friends, strangers, foreigners, to just two latent dimensions. Moreover, we
investigate the measurement equivalence of three latent trust subconcepts, based on six
diﬀerent self-report measures. Across Swiss respondents belonging to diﬀerent language
regions, there seem to be no or only negligible culturally conditioned variations in the
understanding and interpretation of the six trust scales. This is encouraging, given that
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 rely on similar self-report measures and data sets from Switzer-
land that include respondents from all three language regions.
Chapter 3 (Bauer 2014b) focuses on generalized trust, a trust subconcept, measured with
the most-people question. Expectations measured with this question seem to be unaf-
fected by direct victimization experiences. Hence, Chapter 3 furnishes empirical evidence
supporting the notion that generalized trust is immune to later-life experiences. However,
even if generalized trust is unaﬀected, more speciﬁc expectations could be aﬀected. As I
outline at the end of Chapter 3 we can not exclude the possibility that negative experi-
ences do change victims' expectations regarding speciﬁc trustees that share characteristics
with the oﬀender. These expectations might matter when it comes to (non-)cooperation
with persons or groups sharing oﬀender characteristics (e.g. young people). Accordingly,
we need more diﬀerentiated survey questions to capture them empirically.
Chapter 4 (Bauer and Fatke 2014) focuses on another trust subconcept, political trust
measured with a standard question. The chapter illustrates two major points: First, it
is necessary to make a clear theoretical and empirical distinction between two concep-
tions of direct democracy, namely the formal strength of direct democratic rights and
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the actual use of those rights. Second, it provides empirical evidence that political trust
is higher in cantons with extensive direct democratic rights and lower in cantons with
frequent use of these rights, which serves as an explanation for the ambiguity of previ-
ous research ﬁndings. Although there is some evidence, we are very cautious in giving
these ﬁndings a causal interpretation. Yet, we suppose that extending direct democratic
instruments should have an overall positive eﬀect on the trust relationship between citi-
zens' and political authorities in developed countries.
Beyond these conclusions, I would like to make some more general remarks that, in part,
reﬂect recommendations made in the preceding chapters. First, as already argued in
the introduction, a common understanding of a concept among researchers in a certain
area is a prerequisite for accumulating knowledge. Without such an agreement, research
will merely produce endless discussions on conceptualizations rather than new empiri-
cal insights. The sheer number of trust deﬁnitions (cf. Table A1) reﬂects that such a
development has taken place within trust research. At the same time, any good theory
that relates concepts to other concepts needs to stand on clear deﬁnitions of these con-
cepts. The history of trust research has seen such attempts (e.g. Rotter 1967 in Table
A1). However, nowadays empirical research  both in the self-report and the behavioral
tradition  is, with very few exceptions, not based on very elaborate conceptualizations.
Future research should adopt a common understanding, a common conception of trust.
Section 1.2 (cf. Bauer 2014a) provides such a general conception of trust that easily
comprises the various subconcepts coined by diﬀerent scholars. Eventually, such a gen-
eral conception could prove to be a more solid foundation for future research on trust
and trustworthiness. The one presented is more formal than many earlier deﬁnitions,
can be applied to manifold real life cases and realizes the long neglected but necessary
diﬀerentiation between trust and trustworthiness (Hardin 2002).
Second, this leads us to the issue of concept-measurement inconsistency. Ideally, some
decades ago trust research would have departed from a clear deﬁnition that would have
led to more precise measures. But as the review of trust measurement in Section 1.3 has
shown, the opposite is true and various measures were developed. Sometimes scholars
departed from a rather clear deﬁnition (e.g. Rotter 1967), but more commonly mea-
surement has driven the research agenda. For instance, most research on the concept of
generalized trust is based on a modiﬁed question from 1942.1 Levi and Stoker (2000)
observe the same problem for political trust. Likewise, authors did not deﬁne trust very
1 This is not surprising. There are strong incentives to use measures that have been used previously
by other researchers. First, researchers want to compare their data to older data sets. Second,
researchers take the repeated use of certain measures as a sign of their quality and their acceptance
among other researchers.
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precisely when starting to investigate the concept in behavioral research (e.g. Deutsch
1960), even when experiments were designed speciﬁcally for that purpose (e.g. Berg,
Dickhaut and McCabe 1995). Hence, various trust measures are used and normally they
are not based on any formal systematic deﬁnition of trust. This has led to a vast body
of atomized non-comparable empirical trust research. Right now we can only summarize
past empirical evidence along the lines of speciﬁc measures. For instance, we can analyze
all studies that are based on a speciﬁc version of the most-people question or analyze
all studies that are based on the exact same form of the classic trust game that was de-
scribed in Section 1.3. Trust research will beneﬁt strongly, if future research departs from
a common, more precise deﬁnition which then leads to more precise measures reﬂecting
this deﬁnition. This would immensely facilitate the comparison of empirical research
across diﬀerent disciplines.
Third, a related issue is the quality of measurement. In recent years, both self-report
measures as well as behavioral measures have been challenged. Self-report measure-
ment is contested with regard to potential problems of interpersonal incomparability and
concept-measurement inconsistency (e.g. Hardin 2002; Freitag and Bauer 2013; Reeskens
and Hooghe 2008). Importantly, the self-report measures, on which almost all of the em-
pirical research is based today, were developed before the ﬁeld of survey methodology
could produce the insights that we possess today. Behavioral measurement is also crit-
icized. For instance, it is argued that the classical trust game might confound trusting
expectations with other motivations for behavior (Ermisch et al. 2009). Future research
should focus on developing, testing and contrasting diﬀerent measures of trust. If we
take the challenge of accumulating knowledge seriously, we have to break through the
inertia in current measurement and develop new measures. Trust research would proﬁt
from more speciﬁc trust questions that would also lead to more speciﬁc theories. I am
convinced that it will be in this area  trust measurement  that we are likely to see
the biggest and most important developments in the near future. More speciﬁc ques-
tions that specify a trustee B and an expected behavior X will produce more precise and
reliable answers than the questions we are using right now (Bauer 2014a). In future sur-
veys we might also let respondents locate themselves on probability scales as suggested
in Bauer (2014a), at least in respondent pools where this is a feasible approach. This
would be the preferred way of measurement when we closely follow the general deﬁnition
of trust outlined in Section 1.2. A ﬁrst application of this way of measurement can be
found in Freitag and Bauer (2015), where the authors rely on respondents' assessment
of the probability that diﬀerent categories of trustees will return a purse that they lost
to measure trust. Trust is relevant because of its link to cooperation. Therefore, we
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also need to make sure that our self-report measures are related to trusting behavior,
i.e. to behavioral measures of trust. This will require working both on the frontiers of
self-report as well as behavioral measurement.
Fourth, conceptualization and measurement are but one side of the coin, causal inference
is the other. In the wake of what Imai (2011, 1) terms the revolutions of identiﬁcation
and potential outcomes, scholars are increasingly concerned with selection bias, reinter-
pret classical statistical methods and focus on design-based solutions to the endogeneity
problem. This dissertation follows that trend. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 link the concept
of trust to other concepts and represent attempts to generate more valid estimates of
the causal eﬀects of the respective explanatory variables. In Chapter 3 (Bauer 2014b),
I depart from an ideal thought experiment as benchmark and subsequently employ a
change score model in combination with a matching approach. In Chapter 4 (Bauer and
Fatke 2014), we extensively discuss the problem of causality and employ an instrumental
variable strategy. Despite their weaknesses, these strategies represent a step forward in
comparison to many earlier investigations in the ﬁeld of trust research. Future trust
research should embrace these developments. Trust researchers should adopt and con-
tribute to the various methodological innovations that are currently happening in the
wake of the above-named revolutions. Certain designs represent massive improvements
over earlier methodological approaches to studying causal relationships and we have to
make increased use of them. Moreover, it is necessary that we replicate previous ﬁndings,
applying the more sophisticated methods and the evolved knowledge that we, as social
scientists, have acquired in recent years.
If we follow these propositions the knowledge generated within our ﬁeld will expand sub-
stantially, and we will do justice to one of the most signiﬁcant, if not the most signiﬁcant
concept in the social sciences: Trust.
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A.2 Appendix for Chapter 2: Testing for measurement equivalence in
surveys
Appendix A.2.1 displays response rates across communes, language regions and the overall
response rate for the survey "Volunteering in Swiss Municipalities 2010".
Appendix A.2.2 includes additional information on the analyses of the World Values Sur-
vey 2005-2008.
Appendix A.2.3 shows the modiﬁcation indices for Model C, estimated for all respondents
and grouped respondents according to the language regions, respectively.
Appendix A.2.1: Response rates across communes and regions in Switzerland
Table A2: Response rates across communes and regions in Switzerland
Commune RR (%) Commune RR (%) Language regions RR (%)
Henggart 36 Mörschwil 38 French-Speaking region 29
Kloten 26 St. Margrethen 26 Italian-Speaking region 33
Rafz 32 Thal 32 German-Speaking region 30
Dürnten 38 Buchs SG 31 Overall 30
Rüti ZH 32 Niederhelfenschwil 35
Langnau a.A. 33 Oberbüren 30
Zumikon 30 Poschiavo 34
Neftenbach 29 Trimmis 29
Rickenbach ZH 37 Zizers 32
Aarberg 34 Obersiggenthal 32
Rapperswil BE 29 Spreitenbach 24
Büren a.A. 33 Frick 27
Orpund 29 Laufenburg 32
Langnau i.E. 27 Lenzburg 26
Thierachern 34 Staufen 34
Huttwil 32 Leuggern 27
Sumiswald 30 Münchwilen TG 32
Inwil 38 Savosa 33
Schenkon 34 Biasca 33
Triengen 32 Avenches 24
Nebikon 30 Prilly 29
Altendorf 30 Romanel-sur-Lausanne 34
Rothenthurm 27 Ecublens VD 23
Oberägeri 28 Le Chenit 30
Corminboeuf 35 Troistorrents 26
Châtel-Saint-Denis 26 Zermatt 14
Egerkingen 24 Cologny 27
Aesch BL 26 Satigny 39
Birsfelden 24 Troinex 36
Urnäsch 32 Veyrier 26
Note: Data from the survey Volunteering in Swiss Municipalities 2010; RR = RR1 = the minimum response
rate, is the number of complete interviews divided by the number of interviews (complete plus partial) plus
the number of non-interviews (refusal and break-oﬀ plus non-contacts plus others) plus all cases of unknown
eligibility (unknown if housing unit, plus unknown, other) (AAPOR 2011)
89
APPENDICES
Appendix A.2.2: Information on analyses of the World Values Survey 2005-2008
Data: Additional analyses were carried out using data from the World Values Survey
2005-2008 for 7 countries (Germany; Italy; France; Great Britain; Switzerland; Canada;
USA). While the indicators diﬀer slightly from the Swiss data, from a conceptual point
of view they should measure the same constructs. The indicators that we used in our
analyses are displayed in the table below. The single items on which the constructs load
in the diﬀerent models are also shown.
Method/Estimator: In contrast to the data used in our previous analyses (11-point
answer scales that we regarded as continuous), the WVS data are ordinal. Following
the recommendation in the MPLUS Users Guide v6 (p.531), we rely on weighted least
square parameter estimates using a diagonal weight matrix with robust standard errors
and mean- and variance-adjusted χ2 test statistic (Estimator = WLSMV). In contrast to
classical conﬁrmatory factor analyses, additional parameters are estimated in these anal-
yses, for instance thresholds for the ordinal variables.
Fit indices: To evaluate the ﬁt of our models we rely on cutoﬀ criteria proposed by
Yu (2002: 41, 160-161): A CFI cutoﬀ value of 0.96 seems to be acceptable for binary,
normal, and moderately non-normal continuous outcomes at N C 250; for the WRMR a
cutoﬀ value of 0.95 or 1.0 is acceptable; for the TLI and RMSEA we used 0.95 and 0.06,
respectively, as cutoﬀ values.
Table A3: Items and models
Item Question wording in the WVS Model A Model B Model C
Most people
Generally speaking, would you
say that most people can be
trusted or that you need to
be very careful in dealing with
people? (Code one answer):
Answer Scale: Most people can
be trusted (1) - Need to be very
careful (2)
Other questions
I'd like to ask you how much
you trust people from various
groups. Could you tell me for
each whether you trust peo-
ple from this group completely,
somewhat, not very much or
not at all? (Read out and code
one answer for each):
Trust Generalized
trust
Generalized
trust
Answer Scale: Trust com-
pletely (1) - Trust somewhat
(2) - Do not trust very much
(3) - Do not trust at all (4)
Meet ﬁrst time People you meet for the ﬁrst time
Other religion People of another religion Identity-based
trust
Other nationality People of another nationality
Know personally People you know personally Particularized
trust
Particularized
trust
Neighborhood Your neighborhood
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Table A4: Response rates across WVS countries
Country Calculation of response rate Response rate (%)
Great Britain (2006) no information no information
Canada (2006) Total of 2164 personal in-home inter-
views completed divided by total of
8192 contacts
26
France (2006) no information no information
Germany (2006) Total of 2064 fully productive inter-
views divided by total of 4454 starting
names
46
Italy (2005) Total of 657 fully productive or partial
productive interviews divided by total
of 1000 starting names/addresses
66
Switzerland (2007) Total of 1241 fully productive inter-
views divided by total of 4876 starting
names/addresses
25
USA (2006) Total of 1201 fully productive inter-
views and 48 partial productive inter-
views divided by total of 1710 starting
names/addresses
73
Source: Website of the World Values Survey http://www.wvsevsdb.com/
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Appendix A.2.3: Modiﬁcation indices for Model C for all respondents and the
language groups
Table A5: Modiﬁcation indices for Model C
All
Respon-
dents (N
= 4289)
German-
speaking
Switzer-
land (n =
3307)
French-
speaking
Switzer-
land (n =
835)
Italian-
speaking
Switzer-
land (n =
147)
Generalized Trust = Friends 5.327 6.561 0.509 0.845
Generalized Trust = Neighbors 5.322 6.578 0.51 0.846
Generalized Trust = Other religions 4.12 4.268 0.778 0.239
Generalized Trust = Other nationalities 4.102 4.272 0.774 0.238
Particularized Trust = Most people 11.942 6.308 3.433 0.156
Particularized Trust = Meet ﬁrst time 11.937 6.312 3.431 0.156
Particularized Trust = Other religions 4.113 4.335 0.775 0.238
Particularized Trust = Other nationalities 4.115 4.332 0.776 0.238
Identity-based Trust = Most people 11.947 6.324 3.433 0.155
Identity-based Trust = Friends 5.32 6.717 0.508 0.843
Identity-based Trust = Neighbors 5.321 6.711 0.508 0.848
Identity-based Trust = Meet ﬁrst time 11.948 6.319 3.434 0.156
Friends Most people 1.376 0.523 0.259 0.655
Neighbors Most people 5.109 3.124 1.947 0.776
Meet ﬁrst time Friends 10.139 9.375 1.204 0.003
Meet ﬁrst time Neighbors 0.077 0.146 0.419 0.121
Other religions Most people 2.22 2.086 0.054 0.002
Other religions Friends 9.095 5.496 4.705 0.152
Other religions Neighbors 0.317 0.013 1.416 0.481
Other religions Meet ﬁrst time 0.092 0.132 0.342 0.135
Other nationalities Most people 1.341 0.208 1.455 0.068
Other nationalities Friends 0.822 0 2.354 1.314
Other nationalities Neighbors 1.423 4.106 0.353 1.492
Other nationalities Meet ﬁrst time 7.617 4.51 3.527 0.41
Note: Data from the survey Volunteering in Swiss Municipalities 2010; Estimated in Mplus; Missing
values were treated with listwise deletion; MLM-estimator with robust standard errors and Satorra-
Bentler scaled test statistic; = = MI for Loadings; = MI for error correlations;
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A.3 Appendix for Chapter 3: Negative experiences and trust
Table A6: Summary statistics
Variable Nr N Mean SD Median Min. Max. Range
Trust 2003 1 4466 5.76 2.39 6 0 10 10
Trust 2004 2 8035 5.66 2.45 6 0 10 10
Trust 2005 3 6430 6.07 2.38 7 0 10 10
Trust 2006 4 6383 6.15 2.29 7 0 10 10
Trust 2007 5 5949 6.23 2.26 7 0 10 10
Trust 2008 6 5793 6.26 2.27 7 0 10 10
Trust 03 04 7 3922 0.27 2.25 0 -10 10 20
Trust 04 05 8 5942 0.29 2.21 0 -10 10 20
Trust 05 06 9 5403 0.06 2.06 0 -10 10 20
Trust 06 07 10 5321 0.01 1.97 0 -10 10 20
Trust 07 08 11 5149 0.02 1.94 0 -10 10 20
Threat 2004 12 8115 0.10 0.29 0 0 1 1
Threat 2005 13 6461 0.09 0.28 0 0 1 1
Threat 2006 14 6407 0.10 0.30 0 0 1 1
Threat 2007 15 5970 0.09 0.29 0 0 1 1
Threat 2008 16 5817 0.10 0.30 0 0 1 1
Intense threat 2004 17 7471 0.02 0.13 0 0 1 1
Intense threat 2005 18 5980 0.01 0.12 0 0 1 1
Intense threat 2006 19 5880 0.02 0.12 0 0 1 1
Intense threat 2007 20 5472 0.01 0.11 0 0 1 1
Intense threat 2008 21 5300 0.01 0.10 0 0 1 1
Injury 2004 22 8115 0.01 0.12 0 0 1 1
Injury 2005 23 6462 0.01 0.12 0 0 1 1
Injury 2006 24 6412 0.02 0.12 0 0 1 1
Injury 2007 25 5973 0.01 0.12 0 0 1 1
Injury 2008 26 5822 0.01 0.12 0 0 1 1
Harassment 2004 27 8114 0.01 0.07 0 0 1 1
Harassment 2005 28 6462 0.01 0.07 0 0 1 1
Malea 29 12248 0.49 0.50 0 0 1 1
Agea 30 12248 42.17 18.80 42 11 95 84
Education 2003 31 5913 4.45 3.05 4 0 10 10
Education 2004 32 12094 4.48 3.03 4 0 10 10
Education 2005 33 9342 4.62 3.05 4 0 10 10
Education 2006 34 8619 4.70 3.06 4 0 10 10
Education 2007 35 7719 4.83 3.06 4 0 10 10
Member 2003 36 12248 0.21 0.40 0 0 1 1
Member 2004 37 12248 0.35 0.48 0 0 1 1
Member 2005 38 12248 0.29 0.46 0 0 1 1
Member 2006 39 12248 0.28 0.45 0 0 1 1
Member 2007 40 12248 0.26 0.44 0 0 1 1
Income 2003 41 2934 1.43 1.13 1 0 3 3
Income 2004 42 5188 1.41 1.13 1 0 3 3
Income 2005 43 4297 1.42 1.14 1 0 3 3
Income 2006 44 4225 1.41 1.15 1 0 3 3
Income 2007 45 4007 1.41 1.17 1 0 3 3
Victim 2003 46 12248 0.01 0.10 0 0 1 1
Victim 2004 47 12248 0.07 0.25 0 0 1 1
Victim 2005 48 12248 0.05 0.22 0 0 1 1
Victim 2006 49 12248 0.05 0.22 0 0 1 1
Victim 2007 50 12248 0.05 0.21 0 0 1 1
Unemployed 2003 51 4478 0.02 0.14 0 0 1 1
Unemployed 2004 52 8109 0.02 0.14 0 0 1 1
Unemployed 2005 53 6461 0.02 0.13 0 0 1 1
Unemployed 2006 54 6408 0.02 0.14 0 0 1 1
Unemployed 2007 55 5973 0.01 0.12 0 0 1 1
Job Loss 03 04 56 3945 0.01 0.09 0 0 1 1
Job Loss 04 05 57 5999 0.01 0.10 0 0 1 1
Job Loss 05 06 58 5439 0.01 0.09 0 0 1 1
Job Loss 06 07 59 5360 0.01 0.07 0 0 1 1
Job Loss 07 08 60 5183 0.01 0.08 0 0 1 1
Minority 2003 61 6018 0.01 0.09 0 0 1 1
Minority 2004 62 12234 0.01 0.11 0 0 1 1
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Minority 2005 63 9405 0.01 0.10 0 0 1 1
Minority 2006 64 8658 0.01 0.10 0 0 1 1
Minority 2007 65 7731 0.01 0.09 0 0 1 1
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Table A10: Balance statistics for Model 23 - Model 32 (Figure 3.4)
Model: Out-
come/Treatment
Variable Mean
diﬀ
before
P
value
before
Mean
diﬀ
after
P
value
after
Orig.
N
Orig.
treated
N
N
matched
obs.
M 23: Trust 03 04 Male 0.09 0.02 0.00 1.00 2558 209 379
Threat 2004 Age -3.44 0.00 -0.17 0.42 2558 209 379
Education 2003 -0.15 0.47 -0.04 0.48 2558 209 379
Member 2003 -0.01 0.71 0.00 1.00 2558 209 379
Income 2003 0.05 0.50 0.02 0.45 2558 209 379
Victim 2003 0.12 0.00 0.00 1.00 2558 209 379
Unemployed 2003 0.01 0.24 0.00 0.32 2558 209 379
Job Loss 03 04 0.01 0.36 0.00 1.00 2558 209 379
Minority 2003 0.01 0.44 0.00 1.00 2558 209 379
M 24: Trust 03 04 Male 0.15 0.16 0.00 1.00 2558 22 45
Injury 2004 Age -10.64 0.00 -0.21 0.74 2558 22 45
Education 2003 -0.75 0.29 -0.02 0.73 2558 22 45
Member 2003 0.05 0.64 0.00 1.00 2558 22 45
Income 2003 -0.22 0.39 0.00 1.00 2558 22 45
Victim 2003 0.21 0.04 0.00 1.00 2558 22 45
Unemployed 2003 0.03 0.52 0.00 1.00 2558 22 45
Job Loss 03 04 0.03 0.45 0.00 1.00 2558 22 45
Minority 2003 0.04 0.38 0.00 1.00 2558 22 45
M 25: Trust 04 05 Male 0.06 0.04 0.00 1.00 3867 337 604
Threat 2005 Age -4.24 0.00 0.12 0.40 3867 337 604
Education 2004 -0.27 0.12 0.04 0.45 3867 337 604
Member 2004 0.03 0.27 0.00 1.00 3867 337 604
Income 2004 -0.06 0.38 -0.01 0.53 3867 337 604
Victim 2004 0.42 0.00 0.00 1.00 3867 337 604
Unemployed 2004 0.00 0.97 0.00 1.00 3867 337 604
Job Loss 04 05 0.01 0.24 0.00 1.00 3867 337 604
Minority 2004 0.00 0.69 0.00 1.00 3867 337 604
M 26: Trust 04 05 Male 0.29 0.00 0.00 1.00 3866 41 87
Injury 2005 Age -14.11 0.00 -0.11 0.64 3866 41 87
Education 2004 -1.94 0.00 -0.02 0.88 3866 41 87
Member 2004 -0.12 0.13 0.00 1.00 3866 41 87
Income 2004 -0.47 0.01 0.05 0.53 3866 41 87
Victim 2004 0.58 0.00 0.00 1.00 3866 41 87
Unemployed 2004 0.01 0.60 0.00 1.00 3866 41 87
Job Loss 04 05 0.01 0.62 0.00 1.00 3866 41 87
Minority 2004 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 3866 41 87
M 27: Trust 05 06 Male 0.08 0.01 0 1.00 3601 365 679
Threat 2006 Age -5.09 0.00 0 0.99 3601 365 679
Education 2005 -0.47 0.01 0 1.00 3601 365 679
Member 2005 0.00 0.98 0 1.00 3601 365 679
Income 2005 -0.15 0.02 0 1.00 3601 365 679
Victim 2005 0.33 0.00 0 1.00 3601 365 679
Unemployed 2005 0.01 0.32 0 1.00 3601 365 679
Job Loss 05 06 0.00 0.65 0 1.00 3601 365 679
Minority 2005 -0.01 0.00 0 1.00 3601 365 679
M 28: Trust 05 06 Male 0.24 0.00 0.00 1.00 3604 46 118
Injury 2006 Age -16.22 0.00 -0.05 0.86 3604 46 118
Education 2005 -2.23 0.00 -0.02 0.86 3604 46 118
Member 2005 -0.10 0.20 0.00 1.00 3604 46 118
Income 2005 -0.64 0.00 0.00 1.00 3604 46 118
Victim 2005 0.41 0.00 0.00 1.00 3604 46 118
Unemployed 2005 0.03 0.31 0.00 1.00 3604 46 118
Job Loss 05 06 0.01 0.60 0.00 1.00 3604 46 118
Minority 2005 -0.01 0.00 0.00 1.00 3604 46 118
M 29: Trust 06 07 Male 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.86 3502 342 641
Threat 2007 Age -6.63 0.00 -0.02 0.78 3502 342 641
Education 2006 -0.68 0.00 0.01 0.76 3502 342 641
Member 2006 0.04 0.17 0.00 1.00 3502 342 641
Income 2006 -0.18 0.01 0.00 0.86 3502 342 641
Victim 2006 0.38 0.00 0.00 1.00 3502 342 641
Unemployed 2006 0.01 0.32 0.00 1.00 3502 342 641
Job Loss 06 07 0.00 0.86 0.00 1.00 3502 342 641
Minority 2006 0.00 0.22 0.00 1.00 3502 342 641
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M 30: Trust 06 07 Male 0.30 0.00 0.00 1.00 3504 49 115
Injury 2007 Age -13.92 0.00 -0.06 0.90 3504 49 115
Education 2006 -1.99 0.00 0.04 0.53 3504 49 115
Member 2006 0.09 0.18 0.00 1.00 3504 49 115
Income 2006 -0.65 0.00 0.00 1.00 3504 49 115
Victim 2006 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00 3504 49 115
Unemployed 2006 0.01 0.74 0.00 1.00 3504 49 115
Job Loss 06 07 -0.01 0.00 0.00 1.00 3504 49 115
Minority 2006 -0.01 0.00 0.00 1.00 3504 49 115
M 31: Trust 07 08 Male 0.10 0.00 0.00 1.00 3480 372 688
Threat 2008 Age -7.70 0.00 0.01 0.98 3480 372 688
Education 2007 -0.81 0.00 0.00 1.00 3480 372 688
Member 2007 0.01 0.75 0.00 1.00 3480 372 688
Income 2007 -0.20 0.00 0.00 1.00 3480 372 688
Victim 2007 0.38 0.00 0.00 1.00 3480 372 688
Unemployed 2007 0.01 0.10 0.00 1.00 3480 372 688
Job Loss 07 08 0.01 0.06 0.00 1.00 3480 372 688
Minority 2007 0.00 0.73 0.00 1.00 3480 372 688
M 32: Trust 07 08 Male 0.30 0.00 0.00 1.00 3482 54 115
Injury 2008 Age -9.79 0.00 -0.08 0.62 3482 54 115
Education 2007 -1.14 0.01 -0.04 0.64 3482 54 115
Member 2007 0.04 0.54 0.00 1.00 3482 54 115
Income 2007 -0.23 0.18 0.02 0.71 3482 54 115
Victim 2007 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 3482 54 115
Unemployed 2007 0.03 0.30 0.00 1.00 3482 54 115
Job Loss 07 08 0.01 0.53 0.00 1.00 3482 54 115
Minority 2007 -0.01 0.00 0.00 1.00 3482 54 115
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Table A11: Estimates for victimization of high intensity on ∆ trust after matching on
gender, age, education, membership, income, victimization (previous year),
unemployment status, job loss and minority status (Figure 3.5)
Dependent variable:
∆ Trust 03 04 ∆ Trust 04 05 ∆ Trust 05 06 ∆ Trust 06 07 ∆ Trust 07 08
(33) (34) (35) (36) (37)
Intense threat 2004 0.19
(0.55)
Intense threat 2005 0.49
(0.44)
Intense threat 2006 0.46
(0.42)
Intense threat 2007 0.39
(0.43)
Intense threat 2008 0.14
(0.46)
Malea 1.42 0.63 0.69 0.50 1.45
(0.75) (0.55) (0.55) (0.47) (0.82)
Agea 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Educationb 0.17 0.02 0.05 0.12 0.04
(0.14) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.13)
Memberb 1.12 0.28 0.54 0.47 0.66
(0.69) (0.47) (0.44) (0.48) (0.81)
Incomeb 0.50 0.54 0.29 0.04 0.40
(0.40) (0.27) (0.26) (0.23) (0.38)
Victimb 0.35 0.21 0.83 0.51 0.21
(1.38) (0.51) (0.54) (0.46) (0.57)
Unemployedb 1.46 0.36 0.21 0.98
(1.80) (1.62) (0.88) (1.48)
Job Lossc 0.04 1.23 0.85
(1.04) (1.53) (1.27)
Minorityb 0.51 0.40
(1.44) (1.30)
Constant 0.10 1.37 1.32 0.21 0.95
(1.59) (1.24) (1.04) (0.73) (1.26)
Observations 77 104 106 145 90
R2 0.11 0.07 0.12 0.06 0.07
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03
Note: a = age and gender measured in 2004; b = measured at t-1; c = job loss between t-1 and t; Standard
errors in parentheses; One-to-one genetic matching with replacement with population size 500 for genoud and 1000
bootstrap samples to generate balance statistics using Matching package for R (Version 4.8-3.4) (Sekhon 2011);
p@0.1; p@0.05; p@0.01; Source: Swiss Household Panel (SHP).
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Table A12: Balance statistics for Model 33 - Model 37 (Figure 3.5)
Model: Out-
come/Treatment
Variable Mean
diﬀ
before
P value
before
Mean
diﬀ
after
P value
after
Orig.
N
Orig.
treated
N
N
matched
obs.
M 33: Trust 03 04 Male -0.18 0.05 0.00 1.00 2379 30 47
Intense threat 2004 Age 0.55 0.80 -0.10 0.83 2379 30 47
Education 2003 -0.06 0.91 -0.03 0.82 2379 30 47
Member 2003 -0.15 0.11 0.00 1.00 2379 30 47
Income 2003 -0.08 0.68 0.00 1.00 2379 30 47
Victim 2003 0.05 0.27 0.00 1.00 2379 30 47
Unemployed 2003 0.02 0.59 0.00 1.00 2379 30 47
Job Loss 03 04 -0.01 0.00 0.00 1.00 2379 30 47
Minority 2003 0.06 0.19 0.03 0.32 2379 30 47
M 34: Trust 04 05 Male -0.14 0.06 0.00 1.00 3574 44 60
Intense threat 2005 Age 1.55 0.33 0.02 0.97 3574 44 60
Education 2004 0.29 0.52 0.00 1.00 3574 44 60
Member 2004 -0.04 0.65 0.02 0.81 3574 44 60
Income 2004 0.17 0.31 0.02 0.80 3574 44 60
Victim 2004 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00 3574 44 60
Unemployed 2004 0.01 0.63 0.00 1.00 3574 44 60
Job Loss 04 05 0.06 0.15 0.00 1.00 3574 44 60
Minority 2004 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 3574 44 60
M 35: Trust 05 06 Male -0.17 0.02 0.00 1.00 3279 43 63
Intense threat 2006 Age 1.68 0.39 -0.12 0.71 3279 43 63
Education 2005 -0.27 0.49 -0.09 0.73 3279 43 63
Member 2005 -0.04 0.62 0.00 1.00 3279 43 63
Income 2005 -0.17 0.31 0.00 1.00 3279 43 63
Victim 2005 0.26 0.00 0.00 1.00 3279 43 63
Unemployed 2005 0.06 0.15 0.00 1.00 3279 43 63
Job Loss 05 06 0.01 0.59 0.00 1.00 3279 43 63
Minority 2005 -0.01 0.00 0.00 1.00 3279 43 63
M 36: Trust 06 07 Male 0.01 0.86 0.00 1.00 3199 39 106
Intense threat 2007 Age -4.72 0.07 -0.19 0.88 3199 39 106
Education 2006 -0.40 0.45 -0.03 0.75 3199 39 106
Member 2006 -0.07 0.42 0.00 1.00 3199 39 106
Income 2006 -0.41 0.03 0.00 1.00 3199 39 106
Victim 2006 0.26 0.00 0.00 1.00 3199 39 106
Unemployed 2006 0.01 0.62 0.00 1.00 3199 39 106
Job Loss 06 07 -0.01 0.00 0.00 1.00 3199 39 106
Minority 2006 -0.01 0.00 0.00 1.00 3199 39 106
M 37: Trust 07 08 Male -0.19 0.04 0.00 1.00 3136 28 62
Intense threat 2008 Age 2.18 0.41 0.02 0.95 3136 28 62
Education 2007 -1.13 0.05 -0.03 0.84 3136 28 62
Member 2007 -0.27 0.01 0.00 1.00 3136 28 62
Income 2007 -0.31 0.13 0.00 1.00 3136 28 62
Victim 2007 0.26 0.01 0.00 1.00 3136 28 62
Unemployed 2007 -0.01 0.00 0.00 1.00 3136 28 62
Job Loss 07 08 0.03 0.40 0.00 1.00 3136 28 62
Minority 2007 0.03 0.42 0.00 1.00 3136 28 62
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A.4 Appendix for Chapter 4: Direct democracy and political trust
Table A13: Overview of variables
Variable Expected relationship
Operationalization/
Source
Dependent variable
Political trust Trust toward cantonal political au-
thorities; 0  ˆ no trust, 10  ˆ high
trust
Independent variables: Individual level
Age Elderly are less critical of political institutions re-
sulting in higher trust.
Age in years
Sex Men are less critical of political institution than
women resulting in higher trust.
Dummy; 1  ˆ Male, 2  ˆ Female
Education The higher the level of education, the higher politi-
cal trust.
Level of education
Catholic Catholics exhibit more trust toward authorities. Dummy; 0  ˆ no Catholic, 1  ˆ
Catholic
Economy worse People who perceive that the economy got worse
exhibit lower trust toward authorities.
Dummy; 0  ˆ stayed the same/got
better, 1  ˆ got worse
Unemployed Unemployed exhibit lower trust toward authorities. Dummy; 0  ˆ not unemployed, 1  ˆ
unemployed
Independent variables: Contextual level
Direct democ-
racy: Availabil-
ity of rights
The more extensive direct democratic rights in a
canton, the higher political trust should be (H1).
Index by Fischer (2009) for 2003; 1
 ˆ restrictive rights, 6  ˆ permissive
rights
Direct democ-
racy: Actual
use
The more extensive the actual use of direct demo-
cratic instruments in a canton, the lower political
trust should be (H2).
Frequency of initiatives and op-
tional referendums per year aver-
aged 20022006 according to An-
née Politique Suisse
Financial state The better the ﬁnancial state of a canton, the higher
political trust.
Index of ﬁnancial state in 2006 ac-
cording to IDHEAP; 1  ˆ poor, 6  ˆ
excellent
National income The higher the national income of a canton, the
higher political trust.
Primary national income per
capita in 2005 according to
BADAC; in 100,000 SFR
Language region Political trust is higher in German speaking can-
tons.
Dummy; 0  ˆ Roman canton, 1  ˆ
German speaking canton
Independent variables: Instrumental regression
Population den-
sity
The higher the population density, the easier are
initiatives and optional referendums, and thus the
lower political trust.
Number of inhabitants per km2 in
2000 according to BADAC
Urban or rural
area
Political trust should be higher in urban contexts. Dummy; 1  ˆ urban, 2  ˆ rural
Size of canton Political trust should be higher in smaller cantons. Surface according to Swiss Federal
Statistical Oﬃce in km2
Inhabitants Political trust should be higher cantons with fewer
inhabitants.
Total number of inhabitants in
2007 according to BADAC
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Table A14: Summary statistics
Variable N Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Political Trust in cantonal
political authorities
4259 6.51 2.02 0 10
Individual level
Age 4392 51.94 17.67 18 96
Sex 4392 1.55 0.5 1 2
Education 4352 6.31 3.55 0 12
Catholic 4392 0.42 0.49 0 1
Economy worse 4392 0.1 0.3 0 1
Unemployed 4392 0.01 0.11 0 1
Contextual level
Direct democracy:
Availability of rights
25 4.14 1.13 1.75 5.5
Direct democracy:
Actual use
25 1.38 1.26 0 4
Financial state 25 5.46 0.96 2.12 6
National income 25 0.42 0.06 0.33 0.6
Language region 25 0.72 0.46 0 1
Instrumental regression
Population density 25 474 1018 26 5083
Urban or rural area 4392 1.29 0.45 1 2
Size of canton 25 164035 187715 3700 710544
Inhabitants 25 302128 309042 15471 1307570
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